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In 1608 an English court ruled that those born within the King’s domain were 
English subjects. Subjects had obligations to the Crown, but they also received certain 
rights and privileges. On land they were protected by the common law and could petition 
the King. At sea, treaties kept them safe from the “Barbary pirates”—privateers that 
captured ships and ransomed or enslaved their sailors. During wartime, British subjects 
could privateer themselves, with a commission to plunder the ships of England’s 
enemies. What would “British subject” come to mean as the King’s domains expanded 
across the seas? Even as the British began to embark on the territorial conquests that 
would subject people on the other side of the globe to British rule, Britain was already 
cultivating a maritime empire of diverse subjects right in the heart of Europe. Subjects at 
Sea explores the often forgotten history of the eighteenth-century British Mediterranean. 
In this maritime sphere, sailors, diplomats, inhabitants, and imperial administrators 
interpreted and negotiated British sovereignty and subjecthood through accommodation, 
collaboration, and diplomacy—not colonization or conquest. It explores the entangled 
political, social, and cultural currents of government policy and individual experience 
through the lens of subjecthood. Resource-poor and on the very doorstep of imperial 
rivals France and Spain, Britain’s tiny military strongholds in Gibraltar and Menorca 
would depend on successful diplomacy with North Africa for provisions. With few 
native-born Britons to hand, imperial administrators needed new subjects to sail the ships 
that would supply and protect the colonies. A series of decrees and treaties extended 
 v 
 
many of the rights and protections of subjecthood to the diverse inhabitants of these 
colonies, regardless of their religion or national origin. Long before its global imperial 
conquests of the 1760s, Britain developed a diverse maritime empire in the 
Mediterranean—affirming the subjecthood of Catholics and Jews, Moroccans, Genoese 
and others. These diverse and mobile people would don, shed, and transform British 
subjecthood as they navigated the conflicting currents of trade, war and power in the 
eighteenth-century Mediterranean. In so doing their world offers new insights into the 
varied history of the eighteenth-century British Empire. 
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Introduction 
The voyage from the British Isles to the Mediterranean Sea was not, in the grand 
scheme of global maritime empire, a long one. The fastest clippers might, if friendly 
winds prevailed, make the journey in just under two weeks. Navy Ships left the busy 
southern harbor of Portsmouth and sailed south to the British garrisons at Gibraltar or 
Menorca—the empire’s tiny toeholds in that great sea “in the middle of the land.”1 
Merchant ships from London made a longer journey, leaving behind the empire’s 
throbbing metropolis to travel east down the Thames toward the ocean. From the coast 
they headed south, passing between the “chalky hills” of Dover and Calais— the 
“narrowest part of the channel, between France and England,” where sailors could see 
“the coasts of both these powerful kingdoms at the same time.”2 Rounding the sharp 
finger of Brittany, ships might traverse against the rough winds of the Bay of Biscay 
toward the northwestern tip of the Iberian Peninsula. Here, they would arrive at the end 
of the earth: the sharp peaks the Romans called finis terre, or “Land’s End,” where the 
“known world” ended, or, in this case, perhaps, began.3  
Historians of the eighteenth century British Empire rarely focus on the 
Mediterranean. The history of the two small British outposts in that sea is dwarfed by the 
histories of the American colonies and their revolution, the rise of the Atlantic slave 
trade, and the conquests of the East India Company. The Mediterranean, however, was a 
                                                
1 From the Latin mediterraneus: medius, “middle” and terra, “land.” Coined by the Romans, it was 
probably first been used in the third century A.D. by the geographer Solinus. Kai Brodersen, 
“Mediterranean Sea and Region,” in M. Gagarin and E. Fantham eds., Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient 
Greece and Rome (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4: 387. 
2 Fredrik Hasselquist, Voyages and Travels in the Levant in the Years 1749, 50, 51, 52: Containing 
Observations in Natural History, Physick, Agriculture, and Commerce, Particularly on the Holy Land, and 
the Natural History of the Scriptures (London: L. Davis and C. Reymers, 1766), 10. 
3 Cape Finisterre. 
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unique sphere for the quickly growing empire. It was a diverse maritime space where 
Britain both exercised and navigated power in a region that was largely outside its 
territorial sovereignty and was full of fierce imperial rivals and other strong states.  
The capture of Menorca in 1708 gave Britain a safe and ample harbor for its fleet, 
and a base from which it could protect trade with the Levant and monitor the French 
Navy at Toulon. The capture of Gibraltar in 1704 gave Britain dominance over “the 
greatest thorofare of trade in the world”: the narrow passage between Africa and Europe, 
Islam and Christendom, sea and ocean, old world and new.4 Close enough to England 
that armies, warships, and dispatches might be sent in a matter of weeks, these tiny 
strongholds of British military power and imperial ambition were in the heart of maritime 
Europe—surrounded by hostile or powerful states. The Mediterranean was also the home 
of linguistically, culturally, and religiously diverse peoples who lived and thrived, as they 
had done for millennia, by crossing the blurry boundaries of national, cultural, or ethnic 
identities in pursuit of trade. In the midst of intense eighteenth-century imperial 
competition, the British government, British subjects, and other inhabitants of the 
Mediterranean had to navigate carefully the conflicting currents of power that swirled 
throughout the “middle sea.”5  
The garrison-colonies in the western Mediterranean made that sea a cockpit of 
Britain’s global empire in the center of maritime Europe. It was, however, peopled and 
managed by a mere handful of native-born Britons: garrisoned soldiers, sailors and 
merchants, consuls, and admirals. The colonies themselves were inhabited almost entirely 
by Mediterranean locals. In Menorca, the Catalan-speaking natives were a largely 
                                                
4 Harley to Newcastle, 5- 16 September 1704, Historical Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of the 
Duke of Portland Vol. II (London: H.M.S.O, 1907), 186. 
5 Greek (Mesogeios), Latin (Mare internum), German (Mittelmeer), Arabic (al-Baḥr  al-Mutawassiṭ) 
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agrarian population who were slowly joined by small but influential communities of 
Greek and Jewish merchants—welcomed by the British as potential allies against the 
“popish” locals. By 1750 there were at least 546 “foreigners” on the island (excluding 
British-born subjects) and 21,073 native Menorcans. ⁠6 In Gibraltar, where all but a few of 
the original Spanish families fled the British invasion, a motley group of merchants and 
adventurers, artisans and prostitutes, sailors, butchers, smugglers, and laborers flocked to 
the Rock from across the western Mediterranean. By 1725 there were 414 Genoese 
inhabitants, 400 Spaniards, 137 Jews, 113 British, 23 French, 21 Dutch, and 5 “Algerians 
and Moors.”7 By the end of the eighteenth century Menorca had over 26,000 inhabitants 
and Gibraltar over 3,000—many of whom were British subjects, but only a few of whom 
had been born in the British Isles.8 The British would need these inhabitants to help 
supply the Mediterranean garrisons, and protect the colonies in private warships. 
However, only ships sailed by British subjects were protected from attack by “Barbary 
pirates,” or could obtain letters of marque from the crown to operate as privateers. With 
so few native-born subjects in the region, the British would have to extend the rights and 
protections of subjecthood to natives of the Mediterranean. Over the course of the 
eighteenth century, Britain would bolster its limited power in that sea by extending the 
practical rights of British subjecthood to a diverse array of people. As the century wore 
on, the British would extend these rights and protections not only to native Menorcans or 
                                                
6 State of Natives and Inhabitants of Minorca 1750, TNA CO 174/2 f. 216. 
7 The Number of Inhabitants in Gibraltar Spaniards and others Exclusive of those belonging to the Troops 
and Navy, 20 August 1725 (O.S.), TNA CO 91/1 f. 195. 
8 David Whamond Donaldson, “Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century,” (PhD diss., Open 
University, 1994), 467; List of Inhabitants 1777, GGA, Demography. Gibraltar saw an exponential 
population growth during the Napoleonic wars. By 1816 it would have over 10,000 residents. See Stephen 
Constantine, Community and Identity: The Making of Modern Gibraltar since 1704 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), 30. 
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Gibraltarians, but, in fact, to anyone who could help protect and sustain the colonies, 
regardless of national origin or religion. By the middle of the eighteenth century the 
British Mediterranean was a place in which anyone—Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, 
Catalan, or Jew—could plausibly claim many of the rights and protections of British 
subjecthood.  
THE BRITISH MEDITERRANEAN: WAR AND TRADE 
This “British Mediterranean” flowed between the British Isles and the Levant 
with the circulation of ships and people, goods and dispatches. It was not a fixed 
geographical space. Instead, it ran across the English Channel, through the treacherous 
Bay of Biscay, past the ports of Lisbon, Porto, Faro and Cadiz, where English ships 
might stop for fruit and olive oil on their homeward journey, and through the Strait of 
Gibraltar. As sailors neared the mouth of the Mediterranean, the coast of North Africa 
came into sight—the home of the dreaded “Barbary Pirates” who patrolled the western 
Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, taking ships that did not carry the Mediterranean 
passes that protected British vessels.⁠9 At the entrance to the sea, strong easterly winds 
might force a ship to cruise between the coasts of Spain and Africa for several days 
before it could enter the slender strait—just eight miles wide at its narrowest point. 
British Navy ships might be bound for Gibraltar, where they would dispatch 
reinforcements or supplies for the garrison before heading deeper into the Mediterranean 
to cruise off Toulon. Then, perhaps, they might head to the capacious harbor of Menorca 
where the British fleet wintered. Merchant ships might sail onward and load drinking 
                                                
9  Erik Gøbel defines this area as between the Azores, Cape Finistre and the Canaries, arguing that this area 
must be considered in any study of the Western Mediterranean. See “The Danish ‘Algerian Sea Passes’, 
1747-1838: An Example of Extraterritorial Production of ‘Human Security,’ Historical Social Research 35, 
no. 4 (2010): 164–89, 166. 
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water in Barcelona before pushing on to the English trading factory at Livorno, or 
through the Greek archipelago to Smyrna or Constantinople, or perhaps continue further 
east into the Levant to English factories at Aleppo or Alexandria. This British 
Mediterranean was not a static space, but was instead a maze of journeys. It was a web of 
connections built on communication and trade between tiny outposts: British trading 
factories and consulates at Mediterranean port cities, and the garrisons at Gibraltar and 
Menorca.  
By the seventeenth century, English shipping had gained a unique position in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The Levant Company received a charter from the English crown for 
trade with the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth century, and English ships had almost 
entirely taken over trade between England and Mediterranean ports by the start of the 
seventeenth century. By 1600 it was unusual for a merchant ship of any Mediterranean 
state to appear in the English Channel.10 When the Thirty Years War closed the overland 
routes between Italy and North Western Europe in the 1620s, trade between England and 
Italy became almost wholly seaborne and was largely centered in Livorno.11 For most of 
the seventeenth century, the Levant Company trade surpassed the East India Company 
and by the 1660s and the Mediterranean and southern Europe made up almost half of 
England’s overseas trade.12 The Mediterranean was also the first region in which English 
ships played a significant role carrying goods between foreign ports. Often neutral in 
                                                
10 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(London: Macmillan, 1962), 242. 
11 Davis, English Shipping, 244. 
12 Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, trans. Stephen Parkin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 128; Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution : 
Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550-1653 (London and New 
York: Verso, 2003), 29; Sari R. Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: 
A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power (London: Scolar Press, 1991), 36-42. 
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Mediterranean wars, England’s Protestantism meant that its ships could be acceptable to 
North African states (who were more concerned with attacking longtime Catholic 
enemies), and immune from Tuscan and Maltese privateers who preyed on Muslim 
shipping. ⁠13 
The prime article of British trade with the Ottoman Empire was English cloth, as 
well as tin, salt, coal, and sundry manufactures.14 In return, the Levant provided silk, 
cotton, carpets, mohair, and goats’ hair for the textile industries; special products such as 
alum used for dyeing; sponges; aloes, figs, raisins, honey, pistachios and almonds, olive 
oil and fruits, coffee, and a range of drugs and spices.15 After 1610 the East India 
Company’s agents began to sell large quantities of pepper and other Asian and South 
Asian goods for the Mediterranean market. These goods were often unloaded in Livorno, 
from where they were distributed widely across the region.16 From Portugal came figs, 
oranges, lemons and port wine. Cod came directly on board English ships to the Iberian 
Peninsula and other Catholic domains from Newfoundland. Corn exports from England 
to the Iberian Peninsula also rose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.17  
Britain gained the military outposts that might protect English trade in the 
Mediterranean, just as that trade was in decline. Although between 1621 and 1721, 
English imports of raw silk from the Levant increased by 275 percent, by 1730 this trade 
                                                
13 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 247. 
14 Davis, English Shipping, 229. 
15 Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (New York: Routledge, 1964), 212 n1; Ralph Davis, 
Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 27-28, 190-1; Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, The British Navy and the Use of Naval 
Power in the Eighteenth Century (Continuum International Publishing Group, Limited, 1988), 223.  
16 Davis, English Shipping, 244. 
17 Davis, English Shipping, 229-230. 
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was waning.18 European consumption of Levant silk was being supplanted by silk of 
better quality produced in Italy as well as cheaper silk from China and Bengal. English 
merchants also faced competition from the French who, by the middle of the century, had 
taken a large share of the silk trade.19 Other commodities faced competition as well. In 
the late sixteenth century import of cotton from the Caribbean was on the rise. After the 
1730s, Arabian coffee was largely replaced by West Indian, which even began to be 
imported to the Ottoman Empire itself.20 The long wars with Spain and France in the 
eighteenth century and the blockades and privateering attacks that ensued also helped 
depress the British Levant trade. In 1779 during the American War, for example, no 
English ship was able to reach Istanbul for eight months.21  
As the Levant trade waned in importance, however, the British colonies in the 
western Mediterranean gained importance as military strongholds in Europe. They also 
had strong symbolic significance. Gibraltar, for example, was considered “a bulwark of 
Great Britain”22 The “Grand Assault” on Gibraltar was the biggest single battle of the 
American War of Independence, involving over 60,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines.23 
When the Americans rebelled, long-time British enemies France and Spain had joined in, 
fighting against the British not only in North America, but also in Europe, where they 
                                                
18 Faruk Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach (Baltimore, 
M.D.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 156. 
19 Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square, 30-31. 
20 Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square, 27- 29. 
21 Robert Ainslie to Lord Weymouth, 3 February Feb 1779, TNA SP 97/55, Wood, Levant Company, 147.  
22 Gibraltar, a Bulwark of Great Britain: In a Letter to a Member of Parliament (London: J. Peele and N. 
Blandford, 1725). 
23 Francisco Maria Montero, Historia de Gibraltar y de su campo (Ca ́diz : Imprenta de la Revista Médica, 
1860), 356. 
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hoped to regain their former Mediterranean possessions and even to invade England.24 In 
1781, the British Navy sent the Channel Fleet to resupply the garrison at Gibraltar, 
leaving the channel unprotected and clearing the way for Admiral De Grasse to cross the 
Atlantic and blockade Yorktown—effecting the British surrender that would be decisive 
in the loss of the American colonies. David Syrett argues that Gibraltar, “that pile of 
stone” at the mouth of the Mediterranean, “would twist and distort naval strategy to the 
very end of the American war.”25 Menorca too had important symbolic significance for 
Britons at home. Although Britain managed to hold on to Gibraltar throughout the 
eighteenth century, it lost and regained Menorca twice over the course of the century.26 
When the French took the island during the Seven Years War, people all over Britain 
took to the streets, rioting and burning in effigy the Admiral who failed to protect the 
island. In fact the loss of Menorca led to domestic political upheaval, the fall of the 
Newcastle ministry and the rise of William Pitt—key developments in British politics and 
imperial expansion during the Seven Years’ War.27  
Although the Mediterranean trade began to decrease proportionally to the Atlantic 
of East Indian trades in the eighteenth century, the Mediterranean had by no means 
diminished in importance in the minds of eighteenth-century Britons. As Linda Colley 
reminds us, although the history of the region “is often left out of the history of English 
and British commercial and imperial endeavor,” with the occupation of Tangier, “it 
                                                
24 See Alfred Temple Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish attempt to invade Britain in 1779 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960). 
25 David Syrett, The Royal Navy in European Waters During the American Revolutionary War (Columbia 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 69.  
26 Menorca was occupied by the French between 1756 and 1763, the Spanish between 1782 and 1798 
before it was finally permanently ceded back to Spain in 1802.  
27 See Nicholas Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford University Press, 
1998), Chapter 9 and Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in 
England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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witnessed both the most costly (and catastrophically unsuccessful) colonial settlement 
attempted by the English state in the seventeenth century.” The region also saw “the 
biggest concentration of British troops overseas before 1750.”28 As the Levant trade 
waned, the Western Mediterranean became a center of British naval power, and the 
colonies of Gibraltar and Menorca gained importance as military strongholds in Europe. 
Britain and North Africa 
Isolated by the sea and hostile neighbors, how would these tiny military outposts 
survive or thrive? Although they were strategic bases in maritime Europe, the colonies 
would have to look south across the sea for supplies and support. North Africa would 
become vital, not only in supporting the British presence in the Mediterranean, but indeed 
in perpetuating the expanding definition of British subjecthood that developed there. In 
fact the North African “Barbary States” had long been important for British ascendency 
in the Mediterranean region. According to M.S. Anderson, from the seventeenth century, 
Britain engaged in a “beggar-my-neighbour” policy—using the threat of North African 
privateers to gain the upper hand against European rivals in Mediterranean trade and 
naval power. By encouraging the enduring antagonism between Spain and the Barbary 
States “it was argued, this would expose a large part of Spanish seaborne trade to attack 
and seizure, restrict its growth, and hence limit the number of experienced sailors 
available for service in the Spanish navy.”29 In the eighteenth century, the Barbary States 
were not only important in helping to increase the percentage of the Mediterranean trade 
                                                
28 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: Anchor, 2004), 17. 
29 M. S. Anderson, “Great Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth Century,” Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research 29 (1956): 90-91. 
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carried in British ships and in reducing the maritime strength of Spain, but were also vital 
sources of supplies for the British garrisons.30  
Despite the political and economic significance of North Africa in the eighteenth 
century British Mediterranean, recent work on the relations between Britain and North 
Africa has largely focused on cultural exchange between Christianity and Islam in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.31 Nabil Matar argues that contact with North Africa 
caused Britons to revaluate their convictions and beliefs and helped define English 
national identity. According to Matar, “what was unique about the British experience in 
Barbary was a dangerous encounter with the religious Other—the Muslim, who 
threatened Christian belief by enticing hundreds of men and women to Islam and making 
them renounce their allegiance to God and monarch.”32 However, he argues, the 
relationship between Britain and the “Barbary pirates” changed by the second half of the 
seventeenth century. According to Matar, even captives in this period “gave the 
impression in their published and unpublished accounts that they had lost the sense of 
anxiety of being captured.”33  
Indeed most studies of relations between Britain and North Africa argue that the 
threat of captivity, and therefore the importance of North Africa in British diplomatic and 
                                                
30 Anderson, “Great Britain and the Barbary States,” 93. 
31 See for example, Richmond Barbour, Before Orientalism: London's Theatre of the East, 1575-1626 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: Islam and English 
drama, 1579-1624  (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); Emily C. Bartels, Speaking of the Moor 
From “Alcazar”to “Othello” (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Nabil Matar, Britain 
and Barbary 1589-1689 (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2005). Nabil Matar, Islam in 
Britain, 1558-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the 
Age of Discovery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Europe Through Arab Eyes, 1578-1727 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 
1563-1760 (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Britain and Barbary; Daniel Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theater and 
the Multicultural Mediterranean (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  
32 Matar, Britain and Barbary, 5. 
33 Matar, Britain and Barbary, 10. 
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economic history, waned after the mid-seventeenth century. Kenneth Andrews and David 
Hebb argue that captivity was no longer a major concern for English mariners after 
1641.34 For Matar the problems of captivity faded after the Civil Wars, when, he argues, 
the English “assumed a dominant role in the Mediterranean” and shifted from a trading to 
an imperial power.35 Linda Colley extends the importance of North Africa 
chronologically, arguing that Britons were vulnerable to captivity throughout the first half 
of the eighteenth century.36 However Colley asserts that after 1750, Britain’s relation to 
empire changed—becoming more self confident and assertive, especially in the 
Mediterranean.37  
However, even though the threat of captivity decreased for British subjects in the 
eighteenth century, this dissertation argues that it was the safety provided by 
Mediterranean passes and the need to provision the new Mediterranean colonies that 
made diplomatic relations with North Africa even more important in the eighteenth 
century. The garrisons needed provisions from allies in the Mediterranean, and North 
African states were good sources of grain and live cattle, which was easier and less 
expensive than importing salt beef from Ireland. If British subjects were protected from 
attack by North African privateers, the British would need to expand their definition of 
British subjecthood to encompass the locals who sailed the ships that would provision the 
garrisons. Diplomatic relations with North Africa became crucial to the survival of the 
colonies and created an impetus to expand the definition of British subjecthood. 
                                                
34 David Delison Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, 1616-1642 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1994) 
and Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of 
Charles I  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
35 Matar, Britain and Barbary, 133, 167. 
36 See Colley, Captives and The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2004). 
37 Colley, Captives, 17. 
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Documentary Subjecthood 
Although scholarly attention to the eighteenth-century British Mediterranean is 
only starting to gain momentum,38 Alison Games’ 2008 book “Web of Empire” posits 
that English experiences in the Mediterranean a century earlier provided the training 
ground for Britain’s global empire. “It was in the Mediterranean,” writes Games, “that 
the English acquired their first significant experience with large-scale, long-distance trade 
in an alien and inhospitable environment. The crucial skills learned there anchored and 
shaped subsequent English enterprises around the world.”39 Games portrays the 
seventeenth-century English Mediterranean experience as one of vulnerability, 
accommodation, and dissimulation. According to Games, in order to “weather the 
hazards of the Mediterranean,” English travelers and traders had to “deny or subvert their 
religious or national affiliations.”40 To what extent did British experiences in the 
Mediterranean change in the eighteenth century? Games posits that by the end of the 
seventeenth century, the spirit of adaptability and accommodation had “waned and was 
                                                
38 Linda Colley’s, Captives was one of the first recent studies to call attention to the importance of the 
Mediterranean to the eighteenth century British Empire. More recently several dissertations and articles 
have tackled aspects of the subject. See Tristan Stein, “The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 
1660-1748” (PhD diss., Harvard University 2013); Hannah Weiss Muller, “The Garrison Revisited: 
Gibraltar in the Eighteenth Century,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41 (2013): 353–
76; Hannah Weiss Muller, “An Empire of Subjects: Unities and Disunities in the British Empire, 1760-
1790.” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2010); Michael Talbot, “Petitions of the Supplicant Ambassador: 
British Commercial Representations to the Ottoman State in the Eighteenth Century,” Osmanli 
Araştirmalari: The Journal of Ottoman Studies 46 (2015): 163–91; Michael Talbot, “Ottoman Seas and 
British Privateers: Defining Maritime Territoriality in the Eighteenth-Century Levant,” in Pascal W. Firges, 
Tobias P. Graf, Christian Roth, and Gülay Tulasoğlu eds. Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled 
Ottoman History (Leiden  and Boston: Brill, 2014), 54–70; Michael Talbot, “British Diplomacy in the 
Ottoman Empire during the Long Eighteenth Century,” (PhD diss., SOAS, University of London, 2013); 
Basil C. Gounaris, “Unwanted Heroes?: British Privateering, Commerce, and Diplomacy in the Mid-
Eighteenth-Century Eastern Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Studies 22 (2014): 135–65; Catherine M.  
Styer, “Barbary Pirates, British Slaves, and the Early Modern Atlantic World, 1570-1800” (PhD diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 2011). 
39 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 47. 
40 Games, Web of Empire, 74. 
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replaced and eclipsed by the state’s commitment to centralized authority and to coercive 
strategies.”41   
I argue that in fact adaptability and accommodation remained a central experience 
of British subjects in the Mediterranean, even as Britain’s centralized and coercive power 
grew. The British subjects practicing this adaptability, however, were an altogether 
different cohort. With the acquisition of British colonies in the Mediterranean, a whole 
host of people who had never even visited the British Isles became legally or practically 
“British subjects.” By the middle of the eighteenth century, British subjects in the 
Mediterranean were no longer distinguishable by culture, language, or even geographic 
origin. As the British extended the rights of subjecthood to a wider array of people, 
documentation rather than dissimulation became a way for Englishmen, Genoese, 
Gibraltarians, and Spaniards alike to navigate a world in which Britain was no longer 
weak, but instead might prove either a powerful ally or a dangerous foe. This subjecthood 
could be something they could don or shed just as the Britons of the seventeenth century 
had donned and shed religious or cultural identifications. Subverting national affiliations 
was no longer a matter of dissimulating language, religion, or culture, but was instead a 
matter of bureaucratic savvy and “documentary identity.” Gibraltarians might obtain 
Mediterranean passes to protect the ships they used to provision the garrison, but they 
might instead make a profit by selling their valuable passes to Genoese captains. 
Menorcans might acquire British letters of marque that authorized them to attack French 
merchants shipping, but they might also use these documents aboard Spanish or Tuscan-
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owned ships. Inhabitants might use or subvert the practice of “British subjecthood” to 
navigate a dangerous sea of warring empires. 
By the eighteenth century, England had already tried, and failed, to cultivate a 
garrison and colony at Tangier to protect its Mediterranean trade. The acquisition of 
Gibraltar and Menorca in 1713 finally placed Britain squarely in the Mediterranean as an 
imperial power. The Treaty of Utrecht officially transferred Gibraltar and Menorca from 
Spain to Britain, but it also imposed restrictions on British sovereignty. It limited trade 
with Spain, required Britain to protect the rights of Catholic inhabitants, and barred 
“Jews” and “Moors” from living in Gibraltar. Because the new territories attracted no 
British colonists and but few British merchants, the garrison would come to rely 
increasingly on supplies from North Africa, and needed Jewish and Muslim traders to 
help develop trade networks with North African cities and to oil the sometimes sticky 
wheels of diplomacy with North African leaders. British authorities in Gibraltar would 
gradually begin to ignore this restriction, although not without incurring significant ire 
from Spain. 
Good diplomatic relations with North Africa were also vital to protecting British 
shipping from private North African warships—the so-called “Barbary coast pirates.” 
These “pirates” were in fact privateers commissioned by their governments to attack 
Christian shipping. They took ships and goods and sold sailors and passengers into 
slavery or held them for ransom. By the mid-seventeenth century, Britain had begun to 
make treaties with these states to protect English ships and had developed a system 
whereby “Mediterranean Passes” could be presented to the captain of a “Barbary cruiser” 
that proved the ship was protected by the English Crown. These passes might protect a 
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ship from attack, but treaties required that the captain and two thirds of the sailors must 
be “British subjects.” With so few “native-born subjects” in the new colonies, British 
authorities would have to negotiate protection for the diverse Mediterranean peoples who 
inhabited Gibraltar and Menorca and helped provision the garrisons and civilian 
populations. Nicholas Harding argues that in the eighteenth century, the flag and the 
Mediterranean Pass were two “critical monikers of Britishness.”42  However, over the 
course of the eighteenth century, the British government expanded the categories of 
people who could be considered British subjects to include an ever-widening slice of the 
Mediterranean population. By 1760, a treaty with Morocco offered these protections to 
include “natives of any other country” who lived in Gibraltar or Menorca, instructing that 
these people should be “considered and esteemed as English natural subjects.”⁠43 The 
British Mediterranean became a place with limited British sovereignty, and yet a 
seemingly unlimited definition of British subjecthood—subjecthood that could only be 
established and proven through documents like Mediterranean passes. 
Another example of this “documentary subjecthood” can be seen in the letters of 
marque issued to private warships. In order to protect its Mediterranean possessions, 
augment the Navy’s power, and damage enemy trade, the crown issued letters of marque 
to private warships that allowed them to plunder enemy ships. In the multicultural 
environment of the Mediterranean, however, defining a ship’s national status could be a 
tricky business. Although officially, privateers had to be captained by “His Majesty’s 
natural born Subjects or Foreign Protestants made Denizens’” and crews were required to 
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be two-thirds British, many Menorcans and Gibraltarians took advantage of the broad 
Mediterranean application of British subjecthood to obtain commissions for private war 
ships.44 Even when a captain was undeniably a British subject, the rest of the crew often 
hailed from across the Mediterranean. Although the vicissitudes of war could cripple 
trade for many communities, local inhabitants took advantage of the unclear and 
unevenly enforced rules about subjecthood to privateer for their own financial gain.  
Because British authority in the eighteenth-century Mediterranean was limited by 
treaties, supported by only a few native-born Britons, and deeply dependent on good 
diplomatic relations with North Africa, the British bolstered their power by extending the 
practical rights of British subjecthood to a diverse array of people. With a series of laws, 
decrees, and treaties, the British extended many protections of British subjecthood not 
only to native-born Menorcans or Gibraltarians, but in fact anyone who could help 
protect and sustain the colonies. 
“Rule, Britannia! Rule the waves”: The First and Second British Empire? 
The newest scholarship on the eighteenth-century British Mediterranean has 
emphasized the ways in which the nature and structure of the empire in that sea differed 
from the broader pattern of British imperial expansion. In his 2013 dissertation, Tristan 
Stein argues that Britain focused its power in the Mediterranean on asserting control over 
“oceanic space and networks of trade,” rather than over territory.45 Stein contends that 
England’s role in the Mediterranean “diverged from England’s wider pattern of imperial 
expansion” because sovereignty there was limited by powers such as the Ottoman 
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Empire, the North African regencies, and the Italian states.46 This divergence also has 
implications for the traditional historiographical periodization of the “first” and “second” 
British Empire. By examining subjecthood in this “oceanic space of networks and trade,” 
I argue that British experience in the eighteenth-century Mediterranean demonstrates that 
Britain contended with a diverse set of subjects long before it gained new subjects in the 
Americas or India in the second half of the eighteenth century. This occurred, however, 
not within the context of territorial conquest, but instead in the context of limited 
sovereignty, and within a fluid maritime environment. 
Historians have long claimed that the “first” British Empire was an empire of 
commerce and the seas largely based in the Atlantic, while the second British Empire was 
one of territorial conquest based in Asia.47 By this definition, the British Mediterranean 
might lie quite comfortably within the theoretical sphere of the “first” British Empire. 
However, this traditional periodization has increasingly become aligned with a major 
shift in what PJ Marshall calls “the official mind” of the British Empire. Marshall and 
other have linked the shift from the first to the second British Empire to the changes in 
the composition of Britain’s imperial subjects after the territorial gains of the Seven 
Years’ War, the loss of the American colonies, and the “swing to the east.”48 David 
Armitage has argued that in the 1730s, the perception developed that Britain and the 
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British Empire were “Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.”49 This view arose as a 
reaction to the resistance of Walpole’s government to engaging in commercial war with 
Spain. Walpole’s opponents in the 1730s argued that he did not ensure the “liberty” of the 
colonies because his mercantilist policies subordinated colonial trade to the benefit of the 
metropolis. Armitage argues that this imperial ideology was crucial to the creation of a 
more unified British state and a bond with white settler colonies.50  
During the “first” British Empire, as Marshall argues, Britain’s naval supremacy 
was seen to support world-wide trade and “colonies of free, Protestant British citizens 
enjoying the rights of Englishmen abroad.”  In theory, “the conquest of territory and the 
subjection of alien peoples had no part in any British empire.”51 The Seven Years’ War 
with its vast territorial gains that brought a host of racially and religiously diverse new 
subjects fundamentally changed this conception of the empire. “The British now ruled 
great extents of territory,” writes Marshall, “with subject populations of Native 
Americans, French Canadians, and above all Indians. None of these were Protestant, 
British or free, according to British notions of freedom. New systems of authoritarian 
government had to be devised for them.”52 
Further, Christopher Brown has argued that with the loss of the American 
colonies, Britain emphasized the rise of the empire in the east, and developed an 
“emerging idea of trusteeship” ⁠ whereby imperial authority would be increasingly 
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centralized in the metropole.53 Kathleen Wilson argues that “in the eyes of increasing 
numbers of English observers, the empire of the seas, once idealized as the domain of 
free white British peoples, had become the imperium of palpably alien colonial 
subjects.”54 In this new framing, the British Empire was, according to Wilson, 
“comprised not just of free British subjects but of large numbers of alien people, 
incorporated into the empire by conquest, not consent.”⁠55 
The British Mediterranean, however, was neither the domain of “free, white, 
Protestant Britons,” nor was it a territory populated by “alien people incorporated into the 
empire by conquest.” The realities of British subjecthood in the Mediterranean confounds 
and resists such periodization. Catholic Menorcans became British subjects fifty years 
before the victories and territorial gains of the Seven Years’ War. Long before the 
acquisition of Bengal, Britain affirmed the subjecthood of Catholics, Jews, and Muslims, 
on a tiny rock perched between the Mediterranean and Atlantic oceans. Conceptions of 
the British Empire were not the be-all-end-all of imperial policy. The example of the 
Mediterranean shows the extent to which, even in the early eighteenth century, 
pragmatism and expedience were more important to British imperial policy than 
ideology. And Britain had to contend with a racially, culturally, and religiously diverse 
population of subjects long before the traditional shift between the first “maritime” and 
second “territorial” empire took place.  
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Subjecthood in Law, Treaty, and Practice 
Legally speaking, British subjects could be born or made in three ways: Jus 
Soli—by birth on the soil of the Monarch’s realm, Jus Sangunis—by birth to British 
parents, and through dennization—by which foreign subjects could gain some of the 
privileges of subjecthood by buying a letter of patent and swearing allegiance to the 
crown.56 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, laws were in place by which foreign 
Protestant could be naturalized as British subjects.57  
The legal issue of who might be considered an English subject confronted an 
important test after James Stuart of Scotland acceded to the English throne. “Calvin’s 
case,” brought before the King’s Bench in 1608, echoed conflicts that would develop 
over the next two centuries, as the crown gained sovereignty over territories that would 
stretch around the globe. The question presented in “Calvin’s Case” was whether James 
Stuart’s accession to the English throne would make those born thereafter in Scotland, 
English subjects as well. According to contemporary English common law, “birth within 
the allegiance of the king” would make one a subject of the king.58 Because he had been 
born after the union of the crowns of Scotland and England, the court ruled he had been 
born within the territory of the sovereign’s realm, and could therefore be considered an 
English subject.  
Several historians have argued that the ruling of the Chief Justice, Sir Edward 
Coke, was based on a sense that England needed a new definition of subjecthood that 
could extend allegiance beyond the kingdom. Daniel Hulsebosch argues that in fact Coke 
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was “on the verge of recognizing a new kind of imperial subjectship.”59 Keechang Kim 
argues that a new generation of lawyers such as Francis Bacon believed that it was 
necessary to go even further in the application of subjecthood, so as to extend “the king's 
power, command and protection” outside of England. Bacon argued that the fact that 
English law could “open her lap to receive in people to be naturalized” showed “the 
wisdom and excellent composition” of the law “of a warlike and magnanimous nation fit 
for empire.”60 Lawyers such as Bacon were, according to Kim, “advocating James I's 
imperial claim that all the peoples under his subjection in or out of England—should be 
united in one political and legal unit.”61 
The ruling in “Calvin’s case” did not, however, clearly unite the sovereign’s 
realm into “one political and legal unit.” Coke and the judges ruled that subjects who 
resided outside of England had access to the English common law and could sue in the 
English courts, but only for matters pertaining to England, and not to those pertaining to 
other royal territories. Despite this, Coke hoped that “the King’s protection and power of 
command, as well without the realm, as within, that his Subjects in all places may be 
protected from violence, and that justice may equally be administered to all his 
Subjects.”62 Indeed, Coke was ambiguous about the extent to which English liberties 
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traveled with subjects, although he did suggest that some English liberties should follow 
Britons outside England and into the king’s other territories.63 
As the empire grew, so to did the concept of subjecthood, which expanded well 
beyond narrow or contested legal definitions. Hannah Weiss Muller argues that the 
language of subjecthood became an “organizing principle of the mid-eighteenth century 
British Empire” and “surfaced in treaties, parliamentary papers, pamphlets, newspapers, 
sermons, and official correspondence, just as it did in countless petitions, or 
memorials.”64 According to Muller, in the 1760s and 1770s, French Catholics in Grenada 
and Quebec were active in demanding their right and privileges as subjects: “the bonds 
between subject and sovereign, the ones articulated and performed each time subjects 
approached their monarch or his representatives, operated at a symbolic and functional 
level to integrate an empire that had become increasingly diverse by the 1760s.”65  
The subjecthood of Catholics, however, be they in Grenada, Quebec, Menorca, or 
Gibraltar, was not an easy pill to swallow for fiercely Protestant Britain. Catholics were 
often seen as having “compromised allegiance”—serving not only the king, but the pope 
as well.66 Despite this, in the Mediterranean colonies, the British were compelled by the 
Treaty of Utrecht to protect the Catholic religion, and despite suspicions around Catholic 
loyalty, the imperial authorities in Gibraltar, Menorca, and London extended and 
protected the rights of subjecthood to Catholics in their Mediterranean colonies. 
                                                
63 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British 
Jurisprudence.” Law and History Review 21 (2003): 440. 
64 Hannah Weiss Muller,  “Bonds of Belonging: Subjecthood and the British Empire,” Journal of British 
Studies 53 (2014): 29-30. 
65 Muller,  “Bonds of Belonging,” 29. 
66 See Caitlin Anderson, “Old Subjects, New Subjects, and Non-subjects: Silences and Subjecthood,” in 
Jane Rendall, Nicholas Guyatt and Richard Bessel, War, Empire, and Slavery, 1770–1830, (New York, 
2010), 204. 
  30 
   Another group viewed with wary suspicion throughout the British Empire were 
“indigenous peoples.” The question of whether indigenous peoples were considered or 
considered themselves “subjects,” “allies,” or “dependent nations” is a fraught and 
complicated one.67 There is evidence, however, that as with Catholics, British authorities 
extended the rights of subjecthood to indigenous peoples in several cases. Jenny Hale 
Pulsipher, for example, argues that New England colonial officials in the seventeenth 
century considered Native Americans to be subjects of the Crown. 68 In 1764 officials in 
Whitehall proposed a large scale, but never-implemented plan to make Native Americans 
officially subjects of Britain.69 Several historians have demonstrated that many 
indigenous people themselves argued for their subjecthood and used English law to seek 
protections and privileges, and further their interests.70 Cockacoeske, Queen of the 
Pamunkey tribe, for example, established herself as a vassal of the English king and 
appealed for English justice to resolve disputes among Indians.71 
  It is clear that by the mid-eighteenth century, subjecthood had become an 
important rhetorical and practical tool for diverse people who resided on land claimed by 
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the British crown. In the Mediterranean, however, subject status might extend to diverse 
people within a maritime space over which Britain did not exercise sovereignty. While 
territorial sovereignty might allow those born within the king’s realm to claim the rights 
of British subjects, the limited sovereignty Britain had within the Mediterranean sea 
made documents proving subjecthood important tools that would simultaneously extend 
British power through the king’s subjects, and allow individuals to use that documentary 
subjecthood for their own protection and wellbeing.   
“New Imperial History,” Identity and Subjecthood 
In 2004 Kathleen Wilson issued a call for “a new imperial history.” It would 
explore “questions about identity and difference in imperial settings” through a cultural 
lens.72 It would also strive to entangle the local and the global by examining the 
relationship between what was going on “out there” and “in here”—the empire and the 
metropole.73 In many ways, this call for a “new imperial history” was a promotion and 
expansion of approaches to the British Empire that had been gathering steam since the 
1990s, which was in turn a product of the “cultural turn” of the 1970s and 1980s. Less 
interested in purely economic or political approaches to understanding empire, it was also 
inspired by literary and cultural studies, as well as anthropology and postcolonial theory 
that attempted to let “the subaltern speak.”74 Wilson’s edited collection, A New Imperial 
History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840, focused 
on culture, race, gender, and identity. These “new imperial histories” engaged with issues 
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such as the foundation of national identity in an imperial context and the ways in which 
religion, science, and gender affected and were affected by structures of empire.75  
The issue of empire and identity raised by Wilson finds its literal and figurative 
lineage in Linda Colley’s highly influential 1994 work Britons: Forging a Nation, one of 
the first studies of the British Empire to focus on culture and identity.76 Colley argued 
that during the eighteenth century, Britons developed a cohesive sense of national 
identity through war and imperial expansion.77  
Five years after Colley’s Britons, Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern remarked on 
the way that “British history itself has recently been transformed by a new emphasis on 
the ‘forging’ of identities,” pointing out that the word itself “captures the ambivalence of 
the process as both creation and counterfeiting.”78 As the study of empire and identity has 
taken shape, many historians have been careful to acknowledge and explore its mutable 
and sometimes slippery nature. In examining the identities of Africans in the eighteenth 
century African diaspora, James Sweet argues that “sociopolitical exigencies shaped the 
ways in which Africans deployed identity.”79 According to Sweet, “The savviest and 
most well-traveled Africans took careful measure of their environments, adroitly crafting 
group identities that allowed them to survive, resist, and in some instances thrive in the 
Atlantic world.”80 Identity in this conception was not only forged and mutable, but also 
potentially instrumental. 
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Some scholars, however, have rejected the term “identity” as a meaningful 
category of analysis altogether. In 2000, Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker argued 
that in the attempt to avoid reifying essentialism, scholars have insisted that “identities 
are constructed, fluid, and multiple.” Their concern was that as these identities 
proliferated, “the term loses its analytical purchase.” “If identity is everywhere,” they 
argued “it is nowhere.”81 Instead of the term “identity” they called for scholars to 
separate the many meanings of identity into distinct categories of analysis. They 
proposed terms such as “identification,”—how one identifies oneself and how one is 
identified by others; “self-understanding”—the social processes through which persons 
understand and locate themselves, and other categories such as “commonality, 
connectedness, and groupness.”82  
Uncovering the identities of the past is clearly a tricky and sometimes fickle 
undertaking. However identity continues to be an important element in discussions of 
how culture affected empire and empire affected culture. While attentive to the potential 
power of a cultural lens, this dissertation hopes to take a slightly different perspective on 
the experience of empire. It does not reject identity as a meaningful category of analysis. 
Rather, because it relies largely on government documents and correspondence, it does 
not substantially touch on the national or cultural sentiments of peoples who encountered 
the British Empire. Indeed the eighteenth-century British Mediterranean is a fertile arena 
to study British subjecthood uncoupled from identity, because so many British subjects 
were uninterested in cultivating “Britishness” or in the complicated cultural matrices of 
British identity. In an arena where there were so few “native-born Britons,” and where 
                                                
81 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29 (2000): 1. 
82 Cooper and Brubaker, “Beyond Identity,” 20. 
  34 
British sovereignty was so limited, ideas of “Britishness” or “national identity” were 
largely irrelevant to many of those who would employ or subvert the rights and 
protections of British subjecthood. Through examining Admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, and 
Privy Council cases, and by looking for the stories of Mediterranean inhabitants in the 
letters of British officials, I explore the practical ways in which individuals confronted, 
navigated, and subverted British power. Identity and subjecthood are connected, but not, 
as this dissertation will demonstrate, inextricably intertwined.  
Without understanding the nature and structure of British power in the 
Mediterranean it is impossible to understand the lives and experiences of those who 
navigated that power. And conversely, without understanding the actions of individuals 
in the Mediterranean, it is impossible to understand the nature and structure of British 
power. This dissertation is neither a “new imperial history,” nor is it a traditional political 
history of empire. Instead, it explores the entangled political, social, and cultural currents 
of government policy and individual experience through the lens of subjecthood. 
Subjecthood was neither a stable political classification nor a conceptual cultural 
construction. Instead subjecthood was a negotiable and mutable category connected to 
both international diplomacy and individual rights.  
Global, Maritime, Oceanic and Imperial History 
New, more broad ranging approaches to empire have also given rise to an 
increasing interest in global, maritime, and oceanic history. In the past decade, works by 
Linda Colley, Miles Ogborn, Alison Games, and other early modern British historians 
have begun to focus on the global networks built by individuals who not only traveled 
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within the “empire,” but were also connected the wider world.83 This push toward more 
expansive and “fluid” histories is likewise evident in the popularity of the historical study 
of the sea as a zone of contact. ⁠84 One good example is the 2006 AHR Forum: Oceans of 
History which brought together scholars to examine the historiography of the Atlantic, 
Pacific and Mediterranean.85  
Maritime regions are intrinsically flexible, and oceans connect specific regions to 
the wider globe. The networks that linked the coasts of individual seas also flowed into 
and out of other oceans and to other shores. As Horden and Purcell put it, the seas of the 
world “join up to constitute a changing global history.”86 Scholars often characterize sea 
space as contested; communities within and around the sea are often described as 
“without a center.”87 Further, these oceanic regions have nebulous and shifting borders—
Fernand Braudel described the ongoing ways in which the communities of the 
Mediterranean expanded and contracted to embrace adjacent zones.88 Histories of the sea 
upend the concept of center and periphery by treating political margins as regional hubs.  
Atlantic history, for example, treats that ocean as a “regional system,” and has 
opened new and innovative ways to explore cross-cultural contact, migration, diasporas, 
colonialism, and race relations. The focus on the Atlantic world within the rise of the 
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British Empire, however, has often obscured the importance of the Mediterranean as a 
pivotal site of competing states, an epicenter of commerce, and a critical area of imperial 
rivalry at a moment when the European empires were gathering strength. ⁠ Although the 
calls for early modern historians to expand or even “explode” the confines of the Atlantic 
have been many, historians of the British empire have largely missed the Mediterranean 
in the race toward a “global perspective.”89 
Fernand Braudel’s 1949 magnum opus The Mediterranean took a geographically 
and temporally panoramic view of the area, treating the sea as a space of cultural 
intersection. According to Braudel, and indeed to most historians of the Mediterranean 
since, the sea constituted a regional system during its “golden age,” but that system began 
to break down in the sixteenth century with the rise of the Atlantic.90 The Mediterranean 
as a “regional system,” especially in the eighteenth century is surprisingly understudied. 
Even new broadly geohistorical studies such as David Abulafia’s The Mediterranean in 
History, uphold the idea that the Mediterranean’s golden age was firmly over by the 
seventeenth century. Faruk Tabak, author of The Waning Mediterranean argues that from 
the fourteenth to the sixteenth century the Mediterranean was a “world unto itself, a 
global economy.”91 He contends that most historians think that the shift in the spice trade 
from the Levant to ports in the Atlantic and North Sea signaled the end of the 
Mediterranean heyday, and that competition from the Atlantic as well as the decline of 
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trading centers such as Genoa and Vince signaled the end of an age in which the 
Mediterranean could be thought of as a truly coherent global system. Despite the apparent 
fracturing of Mediterranean unity, Tabak eschews the notion that such a “waning” means 
that the region no longer holds merit in coherent historical study. According to Tabak, 
“The reflexive assumption in the region’s historiography” is that with “the erosion of the 
power of the city-states and the loss of the spice trade, the Mediterranean unavoidably 
lost its economic coherence.” This assumption, Tabak argues, “tends to confine holistic 
analyses of the basin exclusively to its heyday.”  While Tabak agrees that the region did 
indeed fracture, he argues that the task of recovering the centuries from obscurity should 
start by restoring the unity of the Mediterranean.92 
The intertwining of maritime, global, and imperial histories has also contributed 
to widening of what historians consider “Empire.” As David Armitage points out, while 
imperial history shows how “dominant elites have exerted central control over territory, 
population and resources,” maritime history has tended to describe “connections and 
circulations outside centers of control and usually beyond the limits set by particular 
national histories.” ⁠93 Empires traditionally operate outward from sovereign cores 
surrounded by moving frontiers while oceans are “polycentric, without advancing 
imperial borderlands but with a multiplicity of zones where populations collided and 
mingled.”⁠94 This dissertation seeks to bring together these two separate but 
interconnected approaches to the global past—maritime history and imperial history—
and spans these two somewhat contradictory but mutually informing approaches. By 
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combining the imperial and the oceanic model we can see both the far-reaching range of 
state power (in the form of diplomacy, colonial administration, and imperial warfare) as 
well as the flexibility of individual allegiances, contacts, and experiences. We see both a 
world of warring empires and state power radiating from an imperial center (or perhaps 
centers), but also of literal and figurative fluidity. 
ORGANIZATION 
This project approaches issues of subjecthood and sovereignty in the British 
Mediterranean in five chapters. Chapter One explores the shifting ways Britons in the 
Mediterranean performed allegiance. Alison Games claims that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the English learned from their experiences in the diverse and fluid 
Mediterranean an adaptability of identity and allegiance she calls “cosmopolitanism”—a 
technique that would help them survive in a world in which the English state was weak.95 
What would happen to this adaptability with the rapid eighteenth-century development of 
what John Brewer has called the “fiscal military state” and in the face of a rapidly 
expanding empire?96 By finding the stories of individual sailors in Admiralty records, 
diplomatic correspondence, and in their own captivity narratives, Chapter One compares 
how mariners in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Mediterranean performed their 
allegiance in dangerous situations.  I find that while flexibility continued to prevail into 
the eighteenth century, the nature of that flexibility shifted. As Britain’s military might 
and empire grew, language, culture, or dress were rapidly becoming unnecessary for the 
performance of allegiance. As the British state and colonial officials offered the rights of 
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subjecthood to a wide and diverse array of people, British subjecthood rather than 
cultural identity became a mantle people in the Mediterranean might don and shed to 
survive in a dangerous world. 
Chapter Two explores the importance of treaties, both in shaping British power 
and sovereignty in the Mediterranean, and their role in expanding the definition of a 
“British subject.” Saliha Belmessous argues that treaties were powerful tools that 
European empires used to “appropriate much of the globe.”97 However, while a treaty 
might extend an empire’s territory or trading rights, it could also limit its sovereignty. I 
argue that British power in the Mediterranean was constrained and shaped by a series of 
treaties, most critically the Treaty of Utrecht and those with North African states. The 
1713 Treaty of Utrecht ceded Gibraltar and Menorca from Spain to Britain, but it also 
limited trade with Spain, protected the rights of Catholic inhabitants of the new colonies, 
and banned from Gibraltar all “Jews” and “Moors”—potential allies who might help 
develop trade networks. By examining the correspondence between colonial governors in 
Gibraltar and the secretaries of state in London, I show that although governors and 
officials were anxious about angering Spain by breaking the treaty, it became 
increasingly clear that they needed to maintain contacts with North Africa in order to 
survive. Indeed, the limitations imposed on British sovereignty by the Treaty of Utrecht 
caused the British not only to ignore the ban on “Jews” and “Moors” in Gibraltar, but 
also to expand the rights and protections of British subjecthood to a diverse array of 
Mediterranean people. I examine the language of the successive treaties with North 
Africa to show how the British made increasingly explicit that the protections of British 
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subjecthood would extend not only to native-born Menorcans or Gibraltarians, but also to 
anyone who could help protect and sustain the colonies, regardless of national origin or 
religion. 
Chapter Three focuses on diplomatic relations with North Africa, and the 
important role North Africa played in shaping British policy and power in the 
Mediterranean. Nabil Matar argues that by the eighteenth century, the Barbary States had 
lost much of their bargaining strength against the European empires.98 Although many 
letters from British consuls requested that North African “offences” against them be met 
with shows of British military might, the ministry more often sought conciliatory rather 
than violent diplomatic relations with these North African states. Despite Matar’s claim 
that European states increasingly sought to exclude the Maghreb from diplomacy and 
trade, Chapter Three shows that for Britain, fostering trade and positive diplomatic 
relations with North Africa was crucial to maintaining military bases far from England 
and surrounded by major imperial rivals. By examining the correspondence of consuls in 
Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco, correspondence between the leaders of the Barbary 
States and the British Crown, as well as correspondence between the secretaries of state 
and governors of Gibraltar and Menorca, I uncover an evolving system by which the 
ministry maintained diplomatic relations with North Africa by ignoring the requests of 
inexperienced and culturally inept consuls (who increasingly gained their posts by a 
system of Whig patronage). Instead, they increasingly relied on local intermediaries to do 
much of the work of diplomacy with North Africa. 
Chapter Four explores the eighteenth-century development of what Konstantin 
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Dierks calls  “documentary culture” to examine the ways in which the circulation of 
paper in the Mediterranean became what historians such as Miles Ogborn have contended 
was a “technology of empire.”99 By examining the development of the water-born 
“packet” mail service through documents in the Royal Mail Archive and Admiralty 
correspondence, I show the ways in which letters connected the small and diffuse 
community of British officials and conveyed orders in the hierarchy of command. 
However, the documents that circulated in the Mediterranean were not simply a vehicle 
for information, but indeed conduits thorough which British sovereignty flowed. Letters 
of marque and Mediterranean passes became increasingly important as legal proofs of 
allegiance and subjecthood. Examining court cases brought in British Admiralty and 
Mediterranean Vice-Admiralty courts, I contend that the development of these forms of 
“documentary subjecthood” provided many of the rights and privileges of British 
subjecthood to a wide and diverse population, and were tools people in the Mediterranean 
used both legally and illegally to navigate a perilous world. 
The final chapter explores the ways that inhabitants of Gibraltar and Menorca 
used the rhetoric of subjecthood in their conflicts with colonial governors. Legal historian 
Lauren Benton argues that European empires were often characterized by “layered 
sovereignty” and “legal pluralism,” a phenomenon that was pervasive in the 
Mediterranean colonies.100 The Treaty of Utrecht protected the ancient Menorcan civil 
                                                
99 Konstantin Dierks, In My Power: Letter Writing and Communications in Early America (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the 
English East India Company (Chicago and London: University Of Chicago Press, 2007). 
100 Lauren A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400—1900 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Law and Colonial Cultures Legal Regimes in 
World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Benton and 
Richard Ross, Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 2013). 
 
  42 
and ecclesiastical governments and the rights of Catholics in both colonies—a mandate 
which was antithetical to British civil law or the military nature of the colonies. The 
Lieutenant-Governors (who lived in the colonies and did almost all of the day-to-day 
business of civil administration) were exclusively military men, and were also the 
commanders of the garrisons. In Gibraltar, the lack of any civil government gave these 
governors tremendous control over their civilian populations. Still, Gibraltarians argued 
for their rights as British subjects and some forms of civil government developed slowly 
over the course of the eighteenth century. In Menorca however, the island’s traditional 
civil government continued to exist after the British conquest, and it would often vie for 
power against colonial governors. This government consisted of several Universitats—
local councils made up of civil magistrates known as Jurats. The British had also 
promised to respect Menorcan fueros, a series of rights and capitulations that Menorcans 
has amassed over hundreds of years of rule by foreign powers. These protections, as well 
as silence from London on the extent of the powers granted to military governors, created 
contestations between British governors and local civil governments. Using court cases 
and other legal and government documents from archives in Gibraltar, Mahón, and from 
the Colonial Office in the UK, this chapter examines the ways in which the local councils 
and individuals used overlapping and unclear spheres of power to assert their rights as 
British subjects—or sometimes instead their rights as Menorcans, Moroccans or Genoese 
in disputes with colonial governors.  
CONCLUSION 
What would “British subject” come to mean as British sovereignty expanded to 
vast and disparate parts of the globe? This project offers a unique view of British 
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sovereignty and subjecthood during a period of rapid imperial expansion and emerging 
globalization. It explores the British Mediterranean, a cockpit of Britain’s global empire 
located in the heart of maritime Europe—a largely forgotten imperial space in which 
British sovereignty was limited, and diverse people claimed the rights of British 
subjecthood to navigate a dangerous sea. 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain had not only become an 
important trading nation in the Mediterranean, but had also acquired small territories in 
the western part of that sea. Although the British had originally hoped to develop these 
outposts into thriving centers of trade, it soon became clear that they were more 
important as garrisons and naval bases that could serve as important military centers from 
which to engage imperial rivals Spain and France. The necessity of protecting and 
provisioning the garrison-colonies required that imperial and colonial authorities depend 
on regional allies—particularly North African states—for support.  
With no colonists and only small permanent garrisons of British troops, 
administrators in the colonies and London began to cultivate a flexible working definition 
of who might be considered a British subject. Subjects were theoretically under the 
control of the British crown, but also had special rights and privileges. At sea, they 
enjoyed protection from “Barbary pirates” and could obtain licenses to plunder enemy 
ships in times of war. In the colonies themselves, although governors attempted to 
exercise tight control in Menorca and Gibraltar, locals negotiated their rights through 
invoking their status as subjects. Not only would Menorcans and Gibraltarians be 
considered British subjects. An expanding array of Italians, Greeks, North Africans, 
Spaniards, and others would be able to exercise some of the rights and protections 
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afforded to native-born Britons. This would help authorities assert a British presence in 
spaces where native-born Britons were scarce, British sovereignty limited or non-
existent, and local alliances were crucial for developing and maintaining British military 
and mercantile power.  
Both native-born Britons and “new subjects” maintained and cultivated flexible 
allegiances and identities. While in the seventeenth century, flexibility might have helped 
English traders survive when the English state was weak, perhaps paradoxically, 
adaptability also helped Britain’s new Mediterranean subjects navigate the fierce imperial 
conflicts that emerged as British military strength grew. 
This unique imperial sphere would develop through the resourceful ways that 
sailors, diplomats, inhabitants, and administrators negotiated, interpreted, accommodated, 
and subverted British power. Long before the global imperial conquests of the 1760s, 
Britain developed a template for its vast and diverse empire, right in the heart of 
Europe—affirming the subjecthood of Catholics, Jews, and Muslims in the 
Mediterranean—people who, in turn, used that status to safely traverse a war-torn world.
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Chapter 1. Performing Subjecthood: Identity, Allegiance and 
Establishing a British Mediterranean 
 
From the bluffs surrounding the Sant Nicolau Castle in the old Menorcan capital 
of Ciutadella, the peaks of Mallorca’s Cap de Formentor rise westward across the 
Balearic Sea. Today the coast is quiet, a few ships dotting the choppy surf. Ferries run 
most days from Ciutadella’s newly tarmacked port to the Mallorcan city Alcudia—a 
tourist town replete with chic waterfront bars and restaurants on the coast of Menorca’s 
bigger and more popular sister island to the west. In Ciutadella, the rocky creek of the old 
harbor is too narrow for large vessels, but on calm days, a few pleasure yachts moor 
between its steep walls, bobbing with incongruous animation below the still, stone streets 
of the city. In the eighteenth century, however, this lonely seascape would have been 
brimming with activity. Small, fast, Mediterranean Pinks and Xebecs; slow, reliable 
Trabaccoli carrying cargo to Livorno, Genoa, Malta, or Egypt; smaller fishing vessels 
trolling the coastline, and Packet mail ships ceaselessly circling the coasts and islands of 
the Mediterranean, carrying people and letters around the sea. In wartime, French, 
Spanish, Dutch, British, Ottoman, or Russian men-of-war might cruise for prizes, and 
even a few massive old North African galleys might be seen, Christian slaves toiling in 
their hulls. The Mediterranean was swarming with ships and people of many nations, a 
seething, often violent and multicultural morass, encircled by lands dotted with 
cosmopolitan port cities and teeming metropolises. 
  By the seventeenth century, the sea and major port cities of the Mediterranean 
had long been a riot of languages, cultures, and civilizations. In Venice in 1657, English 
traveler John Reresby met “strangers and merchants, from several parts of the world,” 
including “Turks, Persians, Sclavonians, Grecians, and Jews; in fine, people of so many 
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different languages and habits, that it is a just surprise to see so much of the world in so 
narrow a place.”101 In this maritime milieu, cultural exchange and networks of trade were 
not bound by proximity or geography but rather built, as Peregrine Horden and Nicholas 
Purcell argue, by “human mobility.”102 The fluid sea at the region’s heart meant that port 
cities such as Livorno and Algiers might be “close,” while neighbors on land such as 
Genoa and Milan, 100 miles over mountainous terrain, might be quite distant.103 The sea 
made trade an international affair: port cities like Livorno were bastions of religious and 
cultural diversity, and traders and sailors routinely crossed not only the borders of states 
and empires, but also the fluid boundaries of nationality, creed, or culture. Jewish 
merchants were the most famous for their ability to “acquire and shed different identities” 
and “cross cultural, religious and political boundaries” in the pursuit of trade. “To speak 
of the Jews,” writes David Abulafia, “is to speak of traders who had an unusual ability to 
cross the countries between cultures.”104 This flexibility was, however, as Abulafia argues 
“an extreme case of a wider Mediterranean phenomenon.” The Mediterranean was, in his 
words, “a space in which not just goods but identities were traded, processed, and 
repackaged.”105   
 British merchants entered into this diverse, flexible, and multicultural space in the 
sixteenth century, and as Alison Games contends, developed an adaptability whereby 
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they might “deny or subvert their religious or national affiliations.”106 Games argues that 
because of the weakness of the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century English 
state, merchants and other Englishmen who traded in the Mediterranean developed a 
capacity to adapt to local customs—a trait she calls “cosmopolitanism.” Between 1580 
and 1660 the English could not depend on military prowess to further their aims and so 
instead “relied on the culture of trade, a style dictated by an acquisitive spirit inclined 
toward accommodation in order to extract the most advantageous terms of exchange.”107 
The comparison, then, between England’s place in the world when Elizabeth’s meager 
navy was lucky to fend off a Spanish invasion, with Britain’s position as a global 
imperial power after the victories and conquests of the Seven Years’ War, is striking. As 
John Brewer has pointed out, England began as a peripheral European power—a “minor, 
infrequent almost inconsequential participant in the great wars that ravaged sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century Europe,” and within two or three generations rose to become one of 
the most important weights in the balance of power in Europe and a global empire.108 The 
growing strength of the British state and the spread of its power and influence would, in 
turn, affect the experiences of Britons who traveled, traded, and negotiated around the 
world. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the meteoric rise in British 
military might and the growth of a territorial British empire coincided neatly with a 
decline in the adaptability practiced by individual British subjects, or with a wholesale 
rejection by British policymakers of the accommodation England learned from the fluid 
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Mediterranean world. Instead, when England gained each of its imperial footholds in the 
Mediterranean; Tangier in 1661, Gibraltar in 1704, and Menorca in 1708, the British 
attempted to slide gently into the Mediterranean milieu. With no British colonists, only a 
few British merchants, and small garrisons of troops in the new colonies, British 
administrators cultivated adaptable definitions of British subjecthood. Not only those 
born in Menorca and Gibraltar were considered British subjects. Many of the rights and 
protections afforded to “natural born subjects” would now be extended to Italians, 
Greeks, North Africans, Spaniards, and others. Extending these rights to this diverse set 
of Mediterranean people would help the British promote their interests in a region with 
few native-born Britons and where cultivating local alliances was necessary for 
developing and maintaining British power. For their part, both native-born Britons and 
“new subjects” maintained and cultivated flexible allegiances and identities to navigate 
the wars and imperial competition of the eighteenth century. In the seventeenth century, 
adaptability helped English traders survive and thrive in a world in which the English 
state was weak. In the eighteenth century, however, when the British state was growing 
in strength, adaptability and flexible allegiances allowed Britain’s new subjects in the 
Mediterranean to navigate a sea rife with imperial conflicts. 
Like so many places in the Mediterranean, Menorca has a long legacy of cultural 
intermingling. Occupied successively by Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, 
Byzantines, and Moors, by 1700, Menorca was a Spanish possession and its population 
was composed almost entirely of Catholic speakers of Menorquí—a dialect of Catalan—
who survived on subsistence agriculture and had little trade or intercourse with the wider 
cultures of the Mediterranean. Gibraltar was only slightly more diverse, with largely 
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Spanish and a few Genoese inhabitants prior to the British occupation.109 By 1753, 
however, approximately 24% of the civilian population in Gibraltar were from the British 
Isles, 33% were Genoese, 32% Jewish (from various countries), and about 12% Spanish 
or Portuguese.110 By 1782, Menorca, though less diverse, had a significant and politically 
important population of Jews and Greeks and regular trade with Livorno and North 
Africa. Most importantly, Gibraltar and Menorca’s port city of Mahon attracted an 
increasingly diverse population when Britain declared them ports for free trade in the 
early eighteenth century. For the people who lived and sailed in the Mediterranean—
British born, British made, or others—adaptability and fluidity of allegiance remained 
important, even as the British state grew stronger. In the face of the relentless imperial 
warfare of the eighteenth century, sailors, captains, merchants, and travelers deployed a 
flexible sense of national allegiance for both personal gain and protection. As the British 
offered the rights of subjecthood to many diverse residents of the Mediterranean, British 
subjecthood rather than identity became a mantle that Mediterranean peoples could don 
and shed to survive in a perilous sea. 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
British Trade in the Mediterranean 
 From the sixteenth century, English trade with the Mediterranean took place in 
three distinct yet interconnected regions: the Spanish Mediterranean, the central 
Mediterranean (encompassing Italy and the Greek isles), and the Ottoman Eastern 
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Mediterranean.111 Prior to the sixteenth century, Genoa, Florence, and Venice wielded 
almost exclusive control over English trade with the “middle sea.”112 Venetian ships 
transported Italian manufactures and Turkish commodities to Northern Europe and 
returned laden with wool, tin, and lead.113 Principal commodities brought to Europe from 
the Ottoman Empire were silk, cotton, mohair yarn, goat’s hair, and dyestuffs for the 
textile industries; drugs and spices; as well as fruits and coffee.114 Through this lively 
trade, by the fourteenth century there were enough Venetian merchants in England that 
they required their own consul.115 In the sixteenth century, however, the yearly deliveries 
of the so-called “Flanders Galleys” had begun to wane, giving English merchants 
incentive and opportunity to travel through the straits.116 By 1600, English trade with the 
Mediterranean was carried out almost entirely by English ships. Anticipating the 
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Navigation Acts that would give preference to British shipping in the mid-seventeenth 
century, an English Order in Council of 1615 explicitly prohibited Mediterranean imports 
from entering England on any but English ships, or those of certain Mediterranean 
ports. ⁠117  
 In the eastern Mediterranean, the Levant Company strove to bypass Italian 
middlemen through a 1580 treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The company developed 
trading factories in already-established commercial centers such as Istanbul, Alexandria, 
Smyrna, and Aleppo—the headquarters for the company trade. By 1588, the Levant 
Company had a regulated monopoly on trade with the Ottoman Empire.118 In the central 
Mediterranean, Livorno was fast becoming a regular port of call for all ships going to and 
from the Levant, and a place where goods were often warehoused and consigned. When, 
in the mid 1620s, the Thirty Years’ War closed the overland routes from Italy to North 
West Europe, trade between the Italian peninsula and the British Isles took to the seas and 
became largely centered in Livorno.119 In the western Mediterranean, Cadiz developed as 
the chief port of call for English ships, serving as a crossroads for trade into and out of 
the sea. Most ships would stop at Cadiz on their way through the straits, and often took in 
extra cargoes for various Mediterranean ports on their journeys east. Ships returning to 
England from the eastern or central Mediterranean also stopped in Cadiz, where they took 
in olive oil, oranges, lemons, wine, and other goods for English tables.120 In addition to 
the trade between the British Isles and Mediterranean ports, by the seventeenth century 
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English ships began to engage in the “carriage” or “carrying trade”—moving goods 
between various ports in the region. English ships were fast and well armed, and England 
was often neutral in Mediterranean wars. Their services were demanded by both 
Christian and Muslim merchants because as Christians they were safe from Tuscan and 
Maltese privateers, and as Protestants, they shared common Catholic enemies with the 
Ottoman Empire and their North African Regencies—the “Barbary States.” As England 
began to build treaties with Muslim realms, English ships were also increasingly safe 
from attacks from North African privateers.121 
SAILORS AND NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: NED 
COXERE’S STORY 
Describing the early modern Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel writes: “Men 
passed to and fro, indifferent to frontiers, states and creeds. They were more aware of the 
necessities of shipping and trade, the hazards of war and piracy, the opportunities for 
complicity or betrayal provided the circumstances.”122 One such man was Ned Coxere, a 
seventeenth-century sailor born in Dover who set out to sea as a teenager and spent most 
of his life sailing the Mediterranean. He served on board English, Spanish, and Dutch 
merchant ships; fought for the Dutch against the English and then the English against the 
Dutch, the Spanish against the English and the English against the Spanish. He escaped 
captivity by the English once, by the Spanish twice, and from his experience of five 
months of slavery in Tunis. Coxere was also a master impersonator of men from other 
nations—fluent in French, Dutch, Spanish, and the trade language known as the 
Mediterranean Lingua Franca. He escaped Spanish captivity by blending in with a 
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Spanish crew, and escaped an English press gang by posing as a Dutch merchant.123 
Coxere’s story offers us a window into the multicultural world of the Mediterranean 
sailor and the myriad ways in which seamen navigated a precarious, multiethnic world 
rife with warring nations.  
The Mediterranean was, in many respects, a microcosm of the burgeoning world 
of early modern global trade, and even more than merchants, the sailors who carried 
goods around the world were an international lot. The multinational space of the early 
modern ship constituted a “community apart” from the cultures, societies, and political 
structures on land. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker argue that the ship served as “a 
forcing house of internationalism” in which working people of different races and from 
different parts of the world were able to exchange information and ideas.7 As Rediker 
notes, sailors like Coxere “worked among men who, it must have seemed, came from 
almost everywhere: from every corner of England, America, the Caribbean; from 
Holland, France, Spain, all of Europe; from Africa and even parts of Asia. Regional, 
national, and ethnic identities abounded in the ships of the world.” ⁠124 But sailors were not 
only an international lot. They also developed their own distinct culture. Tanned, 
tattooed, and with strange clothing, dialects, and customs, sailors seemed, as John 
Fielding wrote in 1776, “a generation differing from all the world…their manner of 
living, speaking, acting, dressing, and behaving, as so very peculiar to themselves.” ⁠125 
The long periods of time these men spent together, far from any wider society, could 
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cement the bonds of their “community apart,” and develop the maritime culture that was 
“so very peculiar” to sailors. Crossing the Atlantic, for example, would involve a month-
long journey, isolated aboard a tiny vessel in a vast expanse of ocean. In the 
Mediterranean, on the other hand, journeys between ports could be quite short. For sailors 
from England or other distant places, however, a Mediterranean voyage aboard a single 
ship might last several years—especially on vessels going port-to port in the “carrying 
trade.”126 For those who sailed the Mediterranean, their “community apart” had frequent 
contact with communities on land—societies that shaped sailors’ language and culture. In 
the crowded, multicultural world of the Mediterranean Sea, sailors and traders even 
spawned their own trade language, the Mediterranean Lingua Franca, or “open 
language,” which was a mixture of Italian, Provencal, Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, 
Greek, and Arabic.127⁠  
Despite the diverse crews of early-modern sailing vessels, in an attempt to 
channel the growing global trade in England’s favor, in the mid-seventeenth century the 
English state began to enact various regulations on shipping and trade known as the 
“Navigation Acts.”128 Crucial constraints on the lives and livelihoods of sailors, the acts 
stipulated that three out of four seamen on English ships be subjects of the crown.129 Such 
requirements, however, were rarely or unevenly enforced, especially in times of war or 
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labor scarcity when even the British state acknowledged that half or more of ships’ crews 
might well be “foreign.” ⁠130   
Work aboard merchant ships provided mariners like Coxere shorter voyages than 
the Navy, better wages, and better opportunities for prosperity in the form of “venture”—
a personal stock of goods individual sailors could bring aboard in hopes of making their 
own profits. Despite these benefits, life aboard any ship was full of dangers: pirates, 
privateers, and the Navy’s press gang. To negotiate the dangerous and precarious world 
of the maritime Mediterranean, sailors could resort to trickery and deception. In order to 
trade with Spain during the Anglo-Spanish War, Coxere, another Englishman who spoke 
Dutch, and four or five Dutch seamen went ashore near Spain’s North African fort of 
Santa Cruz,131 claiming they were “Hollanders.” The ruse was so meticulous that they 
had “writings all made in Dutch (my name was to be Peter Johnson of Amsterdam), and 
had clothes fitted after the Dutch fashion.” ⁠132 For Coxere, language and culture—in the 
form of national dress—were important markers of national allegiance. Indeed, Coxere’s 
personal ability to dissemble his national identity was helped immensely by his linguistic 
skills. After being captured by a Spanish man-of-war, Coxere managed to escape by 
blending in with the crew. Hearing that a Dutch ship was anchored nearby, Coxere used 
his knowledge of Spanish to negotiate a ride from a boatman who came to the ship to sell 
wine. The boatman, assuming that Coxere was a member of the ship’s company, rather 
than an English prisoner, took Coxere to the Dutch ship. “I went aboard of the 
Hollander,” Coxere later wrote, “where I paid the boatman, and he went about his 
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business, not knowing he had cheated the king of a prisoner.” ⁠133  
The complex and skilled performance of identity and allegiance which Coxere’s 
narrative demonstrates would, however, evolve and fade over the course of the eighteenth 
century. With new Spanish- or Italian-speaking Menorcan and Gibraltarian subjects, 
language and clothing would no longer constitute the marker of national allegiance. 
Instead the more legalistic and in some ways murkier status of “British Subject” would 
replace the performance of national identity. Performing national allegiance became 
increasingly a matter of presenting legal documents and bringing court cases, and less a 
matter of language and culture—a shift toward the bureaucratic organization of people 
hinted at by Coxere’s meticulously forged papers identifying him as a Dutch merchant. 
While in the 1650s such papers would need to be combined with a passable knowledge of 
Dutch and sartorial ingenuity, by the 1780s, “inhabitants” of Gibraltar or Menorca, 
regardless of their language, culture, or place of birth, might present Mediterranean 
passes, ships’ papers or letters of marque to prove (or dissimulate) their national 
allegiance.  
False Flags 
Even in the seventeenth century, not only individuals, but indeed entire ships 
could counterfeit their national allegiance. When ships met on the open seas in wartime, 
the flags they flew would tell other captains and crews whether they were friend or foe. 
While Coxere was sailing in an English ship during the Anglo-Spanish War, the captain 
flew the colors of neutral Livorno in order to safely load goods from the Canary Islands, 
then under Spanish rule. The captain sent an Italian sailor ashore who would pretend to 
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be the ship’s master, “so as we might trade without danger.”134 So common (and perhaps 
so transparent) was this particular deception that another English ship (which itself flew 
Dutch colors in the harbor) fired on Coxere’s ship. Suspicious that the Livornese flag 
must be “a decoy,” the captain believed that Coxere’s ship was in fact Spanish.135 
Although the crew of Coxere’s ship hoped the Livornese flag would protect them from 
attack, the crew of the other English ship assumed a neutral flag indicated a trap.  In the 
complicated guessing game of “false flags,” an English ship pretending to be Dutch 
might, as Coxere describes, fire on an English ship pretending to be Italian.  
Flying false flags could be used for both protection and for surprise aggression 
and remained a popular method of perpetrating or preventing attacks into the eighteenth 
century. The Admiralty sent out numerous warnings for British ships to be on their 
guard.136 During the War of Austrian Succession, Admiral Cavendish warned the fleet 
that “several of the Enemies Privateers are either English or Dutch Built, others belong to 
Dunkirk, and some resemble French Fishing Boats, and even mix with them near the 
shore, and are supposed to be assisted by them…you are to be very watchful in fixing 
every ship Vessel or boat you meet with, and not to trust to every ship or Build, or to 
Colors.”137 North African corsairs too, used false flags to lure their prey into a sense of 
security, sometimes coming alongside or boarding as friends.138 After the English sailor 
Joseph Pitts was taken captive by an Algerian cruiser, the ship took two other vessels—
the first, an English craft they captured after “they hauled up their sails and hanged out 
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our English king’s colors and so appearing man-of-war-like” lured the English ship to her 
doom. In the second capture, the Algerians “used the like strategies to decoy her 
down…by putting up Dutch colors.”139 
Captivity 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Europeans sailing in the 
Mediterranean were in danger of being captured by North African privateers, after which 
they would be either ransomed or sold into the Barbary Coast slave trade. Over the course 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, North African privateers took over 20,000 
English and British captives.140 Captivity was a constant threat for early modern sailors, 
and Daniel Defoe wrote (perhaps hyperbolically for the 1720s) that “not a sailor goes to 
sea in a merchant ship...but he feels some secret tremor that it may one time or other be 
his lot to be taken by the Turks.”141 Although the number of Britons in captivity or 
slavery in North Africa drastically decreased in the eighteenth century, the climate of fear 
created by the numerous captivity narratives published throughout the period, along with 
the very real threat of capture, made slavery in North Africa a major concern for sailors, 
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merchants, and travelers, and a defining experience of international contact in the 
Mediterranean.142 As late as 1746, the British consul in Lisbon reported that ninety 
English captives in North Africa were “turned moors for want, having no Subsistance 
allowed them, and it is feared others will be obliged to do the Same...”143 Under Muslim 
law, any Christian captive who converted to Islam would be freed, and in fact a great 
number of these converts grew to be quite successful in their adopted homelands. Joseph 
Pitts (who was himself captured by a Dutch “renegade”) converted to Islam and served 
aboard an Algerian privateer that attacked Christian shipping.144 Ned Coxere as well was 
captured by a Tunisian cruiser (captained by an English “renegade”) and spent several 
months in slavery in North Africa. While in captivity, a slave master told Coxere that if 
he would “turn Turk” he “might be captain of the ship.” Coxere declined because he “had 
a wife and children at home.”145 Other seamen, however, did quite successfully make the 
conversion. According to Coxere, an English coxswain who had been particularly kind to 
him, “became a rich man and had the Ann, one of the Turk ships.”146 
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 Porto Farina Castle, Edward Coxere, 1684  
Located on the northeastern coast of modern Tunisia, Porto Farina [Ghar al Milh],  was 
an important base for Barbary corsairs. Image from Edward Coxere, “A Relation of the 
Severall Adventures By Sea with the daingers Dificultie[s] and hard Ships I met for 
Severall years,” Friends’ Library MS Vol. 281. 
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European sailors who converted to Islam were valuable assets to North African 
fleets, but women captives could advance by converting to Islam as well, and might 
prove to be important diplomatic go-betweens. Although evidence about the lives of 
female converts is sparse, we know of several female captives who were able to escape 
slavery by entering a North African leader’s harem. Nabil Matar argues that after the  
“horror of initial captivity,” potential economic and social advantage “awaited the captive 
if she learned how to operate in a harem with hundreds of other rivals.”147 For example, a 
Moroccan privateer captured a fifteen-year-old English girl bound for Barbados in 1685. 
After she converted to Islam and entered the Sultan’s harem, she became a favorite of 
Emperor Mawlay Isma‘il, and, some evidence suggests, was the mother of Muhammad 
al-’Alem, who would later proclaim himself Sultan and occupy Marrakesh in an attempt 
to wrest power from his father.148 Sometimes referred to as “Lala Bilqis,” Arabic for the 
Queen of Sheba, this woman, whose English name has vanished from the historical 
record, rose steadily through the ranks of the harem. Although most wives were 
dismissed after the age of 30, Lala Bilqis was allowed to move about freely and stayed in 
the Sultan’s favor until she was at least 50 years old.149 Lala Bilqis also inserted herself 
into diplomatic relations with England. In 1711, she sent, by way of Moroccan 
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Ambassador Bentura de Zuri, her “Love and Esteem” to Queen Anne, and assurance that 
she would serve the Queen, “whom she will be glad of Opportunitys to shew the sincerity 
she desires to contribute all she can cultivate a good correspondence between your most 
Serene Majesty & the Empr. My Great Master.”150 When Queen Anne sent an embassy to 
Morocco in 1713, among the gifts for important people in the Sultan’s government and 
household was “A Rich Crimson Velvet” sedan chair for the “Darling sultaness a Native 
of England.”151 When, in 1720, envoy Charles Stewart visited Morocco to sign an Anglo-
Moroccan peace treaty, he brought “5 Loads of Cloth” for “Lala Balkies a Renagado 
Queen.”152 Not only did converting to Islam and joining Mawlay Isma‘il’s harem liberate 
this English girl from captivity, it also significantly raised her social status and financial 
situation from what it might have been had she remained in England or made it to 
Barbados in 1685, where she was probably headed for a life of indentured servitude.153 
As Matar argues, not only might Christian women attain social and political status 
through captivity and conversion, they also sometimes “facilitated exchange and trade,” 
by cementing “strategic alliances and commercial agreements between their adopted 
country and their original homeland,” because, as Matar points out, they were “seen by 
their one time countrymen as retaining some of their cultural ties to Christendom.” ⁠154  
Other stories, however, belie the image of a bright future for any captive willing 
to convert to Islam for spiritual or practical reasons. A young Irish woman known as 
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“Mrs. Shaw,” who had also entered Mawlay Isma‘il’s harem, for example, was 
eventually given by the Emperor to a Spanish Renegado who abandoned her. When 
English captain John Braithwaite met her in Morocco in 1729, she had spent nine years in 
that country, forgotten most of her English, had a young infant to care for, and was 
“almost naked and starved.”155 In her book about British Captives in the Mediterranean, 
the Americas, and India, Linda Colley describes captive Britons as the “underbelly of 
empire.” She argues that British captives generally, and Barbary captives specifically, 
“embodied in a particularly dramatic form the vulnerability of the laboring poor in 
general.”156 For the British men and women who might be plucked from a ship and sold 
into slavery, Barbary captivity could be just one in a long line of threats to their liberty. 
John Kay, for example, a Northumberland apprentice, was swept by the press gang into 
the army in the early eighteenth century. When he was freed, he went to sea aboard a 
Venetian merchant ship, was captured by Algerian corsairs, and was a slave in North 
Africa for three and a half years. Upon his return to England in 1724 he was arrested for 
vagrancy and hauled before the Lancashire Justices of the Peace to whom he told his 
story.157 Apprenticed, pressed, enslaved, and imprisoned, Kay’s vulnerability to capture 
did not define him as an Englishman, but rather as a poor man with few resources to 
defend himself. As a member of the laboring poor, Colley points out, Kay “experienced 
virtually his entire adult life as a succession of captivities.” ⁠158  
Indeed Catherine Styer argues that the government of England itself attempted to 
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use the threat of captivity in North Africa to control the behavior of British sailors, who 
might be tempted to sail with ships carrying the goods of England’s commercial rivals.159 
Too many Englishmen serving on the ships of European rivals might allow those nations 
to benefit from English mariners’ knowledge of British trade routes, and from treaties 
with North Africa that were meant to protect British shipping.160 While non-British 
passengers or merchants on British ships were protected from enslavement, the 
seventeenth-century treaties with Algiers that protected English ships did not explicitly 
state whether English sailors serving on foreign ships would be protected. Noticing this 
discrepancy, in 1700 consul Robert Cole attempted to revise the treaty with Algiers so 
that it would protect British subjects on board ships without an English Mediterranean 
pass. For any ship without a pass, he proposed, “the Goods on board that ship shall be 
Prize, But the Master, Men, and Ship shall be restored.”161 After protests from English 
merchants that this might lead to the “omission, negligence, or Collusion” of masters to 
sail without passes, or to circumvent English trade protections, in 1701 Cole reinstated 
the ambiguous terms of the 1682 treaty.162 With this threat of captivity, the English 
government hoped to prevent their subjects from sailing on foreign vessels, and to 
discourage English ships from sailing under false flags in order to avoid the duties and 
rules set forth in the Navigation Acts. As Styer argues, by refusing to protect Britons on 
foreign vessels or sailing under a “flag of convenience,” the British government might 
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use the threat of captivity to force their sailors to abide by British laws.163 In 1721, for 
example, an Algerian cruiser captured the George and enslaved the crew. The captain, 
John Young, was able to pay his own ransom, and lobbied the British government to help 
free his British crewmembers. After repeated claims by the Algerians that the ship was 
Portuguese, not British, Young finally confessed that he had secretly sold the vessel to 
Portuguese owners in order to avoid the duties imposed on English shipping. Technically, 
therefore, the ship had been taken under Portuguese colors, and the crew could not be 
redeemed.164 Styer’s work makes clear that the protections of British subjecthood might 
be withdrawn from those helping England’s competitors. On the other hand, as I will 
argue in the following chapters, those protections might be extended to those whose 
commercial activity supported Britain’s military presence in the Mediterranean.  
The eighteenth-century acquisition of Gibraltar and Menorca increased the 
importance of protecting foreigners involved in British shipping—particularly on ships 
supplying the garrisons of Gibraltar and Menorca. Treaties with North African states 
specified that Mediterranean passes were only to be granted to vessels with British 
captains and crews that were two-thirds British subjects. The fact that the new British 
colonies granted passes to vessels with so many “foreign” sailors, however, often caused 
consternation from the captains of Barbary cruisers and North African leaders alike. In 
1752, for example, the governor of Tétouan complained that his cruisers had encountered 
several vessels “with English Colours without so much as one English Subject aboard,” 
and that some Genoese and other foreigners had committed “piracies” while under the 
protection of a British pass issued at Gibraltar. The governor of Gibraltar responded by 
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writing that in fact the majority of Gibraltar’s inhabitants neither spoke English “nor had 
the appearance of the Native English.”165 This did not mean, however, that they were not 
to be treated as British subjects. Indeed, as I will discuss further in Chapter 2, despite the 
fact that these inhabitants might not appear to be “Native English,” they were protected 
by treaties with Morocco and other North African states that specifically stipulated that 
they were to be “considered and esteemed” British subjects.166  
Impressment 
While treaties with North African States protected most British subjects from 
slavery, they did not protect subjects from another form of capture and captivity. Unlike 
the dangers from other states, the practice of naval impressment brought British sailors 
face to face with the direct violence of British state power itself. Voyages aboard 
merchant ships generally lasted between nine and ten months, but seamen in the Navy 
could find themselves aboard a man-of-war for years on end, making naval service a 
largely unpopular seafaring choice.167 During times of armed conflict, press gangs 
patrolled port towns, sweeping British sailors into the Navy. Several acts in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries codified the press gang tradition, including the 
Vagabonds Act of 1597, which created a class of people liable to impressment. 
According to the act, “idle peoples, rogues, sturdy beggars and vagabonds” could be 
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impressed into the Navy.168 Further, those convicted of crimes were sometimes ordered 
into naval service. In 1689, for example, Samuel Gibbons was indicted and pled guilty to 
stealing a silver drinking vessel and was ordered into the Navy.169 In the same year, 
Samuel Knightly and Thomas Emmerson were indicted for wounding Richard Hawkins 
in a fight.170 Likewise, both were “ordered to Sea in Their Majesties Service.”171 By 
sending convicts into the Navy, the courts not only effectively exiled “undesirable 
characters,” but also helped build the armed forces in times of war. Orders to enter the 
army or navy were most frequently given during the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-
1697), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13), the War of American Independence 
(1775-83), and the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815.)172 
Resistance to impressment could lead to violent conflict and sometimes death. As 
Nicholas Rogers describes it, “press-gang affrays were extremely violent, for threatened 
seamen were quite prepared to use knives, cutlasses, pokers, shovels, and broken glass to 
defend themselves. Cuts, bruises, and fractures were commonplace in these affrays, and 
sometimes gangers and the prey lost eyes, ears and even part of their noses.”173 In 1688, 
five Middlesex soldiers seeking to impress John Snape were convicted of manslaughter 
after Snape refused to tell them his name or accept the King’s shilling—the coin offered 
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to sailors as a reward for volunteering. 174 In 1689 press-master Walter Preston was 
convicted of stabbing John Murray in the street after Murray refused to be pressed.175 
Such violence could also break out into full-fledged riots. Studying the last half of the 
eighteenth century, Nicholas Rogers has found evidence of at least 602 press gang affrays 
and riots in Britain between 1738 and 1805. ⁠176 
While some sailors engaged in violent resistance, others resorted to trickery to 
avoid being pressed. Ned Coxere managed to elude the press gang by his usual linguistic 
and sartorial deception. During the first Anglo-Dutch War, the English captured the 
Dutch merchant ship in which Coxere was sailing. Rather than announcing himself as an 
English subject, Coxere pretended to be Dutch. He continued the masquerade when he 
got ashore, posing as a Dutch merchant, wearing Dutch garb, and having a friend act as 
an interpreter. His act was so convincing that he managed to fool two soldiers looking for 
recruits who referred to him as “the Fleming on horseback,” and even his own mother 
who at first failed to recognize him. 177 Coxere’s masquerade was doubly effective 
because posing as a Dutch merchant concealed both his nationality and his class—the 
two defining factors in vulnerability to impressment. A major argument against the press 
gang that gained potency in the eighteenth century was that impressment went against 
sailors’ rights as freeborn Britons. Reformer James Oglethorpe published an anonymous 
pamphlet in 1728, advocating reform of the conditions in the Navy. “Why am I shut up in 
here?” Oglethorpe quoted in the voice of an impressed sailor, “I that am born to be free; 
are not I and the greatest Duke in England equally free born? Where is the liberty of an 
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Englishman?”178 This rhetoric of the “free born Englishman” is belied by the fact that 
class was palpably a defining factor of impressment. While a common sailor could be 
captured by the press gang, a Duke certainly could not. Englishmen were subjected to a 
violent military draft because of their status as subjects, but also because of their status as 
poor or working men.  
 Sailors were vulnerable to impressment not only in their homeports, but abroad as 
well. In the 1750s much of the tension between English merchants and the authorities at 
Livorno related to the Tuscan government’s reticence to enforce the naval or mercantile 
service of British subjects. The British consul complained that the Tuscan authorities 
refused to permit English ships “to secure the English Sailors that shall be found 
straggling there”—part of a policy of neutrality the British felt tacitly favored the French. 
The British consul even obtained a letter of support from the Spanish consul who asserted 
the longstanding practice in Livorno of restoring sailors “of their own nation, Deserters, 
Vagabonds & those not employed in any other Service” to their lawful sovereign.179 
Although sailors might assert their rights as “freeborn” Britons, governments 
collaborated to enforce the obligations of subjects to their “lawful sovereign,” even in 
ports like Livorno—far from the epicenter of British power. And while sailing abroad 
could mean great flexibility in a mariner’s individual opportunities and allegiances, the 
power of the English state was still a force to be reckoned with. 
  British naval impressment swept up not only English subjects, but sometimes 
anyone serving aboard and English ship. In 1705, pamphleteer and moral reformer 
Edward Stephens published a tract and sent a letter to the Levant Company about the 
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impressment of Greek sailors who served Levant Company ships. Because so many 
English seamen died or deserted en route to Smyrna and other eastern ports, English 
merchants often hired Greek mariners to man their ships for their return. Stephens 
complained that these sailors were often “pull’d and hall’d by the Press-Masters, like 
Dogs out of the Merchant-Ship and put upon Men of War; that they are kept on Service 
so long that they have no reasonable Opportunity to see or relieve their Families and 
Relations.” Stephens complained that many of them left wives and children at home, and 
since they were “no Subjects of England, but Subjects either to the Turks, or to the 
Venetians,” they ought not to be impressed.180 The relative scarcity of “natural born” 
British subjects living in the Mediterranean meant that it was indeed often impossible to 
man ships with the legal number of British subjects, and many ships flying an English 
flag had few if any native Britons, a trend that would intensify with the acquisition of 
Gibraltar and Menorca.  
Privateering 
 Throughout the eighteenth century the British government outsourced segments 
of its imperial warfare by issuing letters of marque to private vessels to “annoy the enemy 
trade.” As David Starkey argues, privateers performed a useful role by capturing enemy 
ships and providing alternate employment for the merchants whose regular trade had 
been disrupted by war.181 Privateering could be a profitable enterprise for a sailor, and 
mariners like Ned Coxere often hoped to “seek for purchase” aboard men-of-war. But 
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privateering also created a complicated relationship between states and subjects. 
Although these ships sailed under British colors, their crews hailed from all over the 
Mediterranean and their interests were in turning a profit through the goods they 
plundered. Most were not chiefly interested in serving the British crown as faithful 
subjects, and their actions sometimes challenged British sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the “private” nature and liminal national status of privateering vessels provided sailors 
and captains more latitude, and also gave the British ministry plausible deniability if 
privateers ran amok. 
English merchant and privateer Fortanatus Wright had a long history of causing 
trouble for the British government. Wright made a name for himself in the first half of the 
eighteenth century by getting into trouble with the government of Luca for refusing to 
surrender his weapons although they were illegal there.182 In 1747, the Ottoman Porte 
complained that Wright had seized Turkish goods that were carried in French ships. The 
Levant Company intervened and obtained a ruling from the government that Turkish 
property could not be taken as prize, even if it was captured in French ships. Despite 
pressure from the British ministry, Wright refused to surrender the money he had 
plundered from the French ship Hermione. In 1747 the Privy Council ordered the 
governors of their Mediterranean colonies to seize Captain Wright in “answer to the 
Turks who have been injured” for the damage they suffered by his “Misbehaviour.”183 In 
Menorca, copies of the orders were “affixed in the Publick places,” and warrants were 
sent to the governors of both colonies, the Levant company, and captains of other 
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privateering vessels.184 Wright was arrested by the Tuscan authorities in December 1747 
and spent six months in prison.  
Despite censure from the British government, by the Seven Years’ War Wright 
was again crafting plans to privateer. Out of prison on Admiralty bail, he had established 
himself and his family in Livorno and commissioned a ship that he told the builder he 
would sail on a merchant mission to Jamaica.185 By the summer of 1756, however, war 
had broken out between France and England, and the Tuscan authorities imposed strict 
limitations on the arms and crew size of any ship outfitted in their neutral port. In June, 
however, Wright’s agent in London obtained a letter of marque for Wright’s new ship—
the St. George.186 Wright did not, it seems, tell the Tuscan government that he had 
obtained a letter of marque from the British government, nor did he tell the Admiralty 
that he was operating out of Livorno—the register of his letter of marque listing his 
location as Liverpool.187  
In Livorno, Wright enlisted a crew of about 50 people, “Sclavonians, Venetians, 
Swiss, Danes, English & one Tuscan” to sail in a convoy of five ships to Brazil and then 
back to the Levant, under the neutral Tuscan flag.188  “In the grey of the morning” on 26 
July 1756,189 about four leagues from shore, Wright and his convoy redistributed all of 
their weapons onto the flagship and traded fire with a French vessel before retreating to 
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Livorno. When Wright produced his British letter of marque to the Tuscan authorities, he 
was accused of abusing the neutrality of the port by privateering under the Tuscan flag.190 
In a published letter to King George, Wright claimed that he had acted in self-defense, 
only loading all of the weapons onto the flagship when “a xebeck of great force” with “an 
especial design” to intercept Wright’s convoy sailed toward him.191 According to a 
statement from the Tuscan court, however, officials claimed that at dawn, Wright had  
“discovered a Latin Sail & believing it to be a merchant Ship, he took down His Imperial 
Majesty’s Colours & hoisted those of England, going on to meet the ship, to take it, & 
encouraging his Sailors to Row.” The Tuscan authorities complained that by flying 
Tuscan colors, and then attacking a French ship, Wright “made use of them as an 
Instrument and as a means by which he might surprise the Enemy’s ship” thereby 
embarrassing the neutral prince of Tuscany.” ⁠192  
  In court proceedings, Wright’s advocate claimed that although the other ship was 
flying French colors, it in fact belonged to two Tuscan subjects. Further, the sailors on 
board the ship were Italian, and, the advocate claimed, the “French” ship had been lying 
in wait for Wright and his convoy to leave the safety of the harbor so that they might 
capture them as prize. According to the advocate, Wright and his crew had not attacked a 
peaceful French vessel, but instead had acted in self-defense against a piratical Italian 
warship. ⁠193 Reading between the lines of this exchange, it seems probable that both ships 
were sailing under false colors in order to act as privateers. Neither ship was exactly what 
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it might seem, and neither were their crews. The Venetian consul complained that 
“Eighteen Mariners, subjects of the Republick had been engaged for a Mercantile Vessel 
& obliged afterwards to serve, some being killed and others wounded in the ship St. 
George, that was become a Corsair.”194 The British representative in Florence, Horace 
Mann, replied that, in fact, Wright had planned to go directly to Gibraltar to arm himself 
for privateering, but was instead forced to defend himself just outside Livorno against the 
French ship. “Every one knows,” Mann continued, “that in the time of an open war 
between two Powers, the mariners who enter into the service of either one or other, know 
that they expose themselves to the Danger of being attacked, & to be obliged to defend 
themselves.” ⁠195 It seems likely, then, that two largely Italian crews fought against each 
other under French and English flags. 
On one hand, the larger state conflict between England and France subjected 
individual sailors to the dangers of war—as in the case of the Venetian sailors wounded 
in the putative crossfire between France and England. But on the other hand, war between 
state powers allowed the sailors and merchants alike to use state relationships for their 
personal gain. Wright (and presumably many of his crew) hoped to use the neutrality of 
Livorno in order to outfit a privateer and sail under the Tuscan flag in order to avoid 
immediate attack. The Venetian sailors hoped to gain a good living working aboard an 
English privateer, while the Tuscan ship owners and their crew used the state of war 
between France and England as an opportunity to plunder an English ship in the name of 
France. The malleable national allegiances so long practiced in the Mediterranean, then, 
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persisted into the eighteenth century, when sailors of many nations might take advantage 
of the relentless wars for their own monetary gain.  
Wright’s Livorno incident also highlights the often-arbitrary designation of friend 
and foe—determined largely by broader political relations between nations. The label of 
“friend” or “enemy” did not necessarily stem from the nationality or place of origin of 
early modern mariners themselves, nor that of the captains or owners of a ship. For 
example, en route to Mallorca, Ned Coxere’s ship was chased by three vessels that the 
captain and crew feared to be Spanish. Instead, they proved to be Turkish men-of-war. 
Instead of the feared Spanish attack, Coxere and the crew had a friendly exchange 
because the Ottoman Empire and England were then at peace. In fact, the lieutenant “was 
a Dover man, an old renegade named Wood, but in Moorish Balam. We parte[d] very 
good friends, and got home safe for England.”196 While this encounter ended in friendly 
relations, a similar encounter with a Turkish ship (similarly with an English renegade 
captain) in an earlier voyage resulted in Coxere’s captivity in North Africa.197 In both 
cases the captain’s country of birth had been England, but chosen allegiances and larger 
state conflicts determined the nature of the interaction. While governments, empires, and 
nations waged war, the peoples subject to those nations made do the best they could, 
taking advantage of these circumstances to plunder enemy ships, seeking employment in 
the navy, or avoid conflict by alternately invoking or dissembling their national 
allegiance—or—as in the case of captives like Lala Bilquis or “renegades” like Wood—
even crossing the lines of religious and national identity.  
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THE SEA AND THE LAND: MARITIME POLITIES AND A TERRITORIAL EMPIRE 
England’s move into the Mediterranean as a colonial power and the proliferation 
of its naval presence there brought a host of new Mediterranean people under the 
protection of British colors. With few native Britons to sustain the new possessions, 
inhabitants of Gibraltar and Menorca were offered some of the rights and protections of 
British subjecthood in the form of Mediterranean passes and letters of marque. Although 
these new subjects might not speak English or have “the appearance of the Native 
English,” they would prove crucial in helping to develop and sustain British power in the 
region. But what would be the nature of that power? Would the British enter the 
Mediterranean as a commercial empire, making their new possessions centers for free 
trade? Or would the colonies become naval bases from which to wage wars of imperial 
competition? British policy in the new colonies would demonstrate a tension between the 
state’s ambitions to promote trade, and their desire to get a leg up in the imperial contests 
that characterized the eighteenth century. Ultimately, although early efforts to shape their 
new colonies into Mediterranean-style freeports were largely unsuccessful, these attempts 
would increase the diversity of those people drawn to the colonies, and consequently of 
those who might claim the protections of British subjecthood.  
Tangier: The First British Mediterranean Colony 
 England first entered the Mediterranean as a colonial power in 1661, when 
Tangier became a Crown colony as part of the dowry of Portuguese princess Catherine de 
Braganza upon her marriage to Charles II. English troops established a garrison there in 
January of 1661 and by November, Charles declared, “Our City of Tangier is and shall be 
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a port free to all merchants, as well foreigners as others.”198 Although the Navigation Acts 
of the 1650s and 1660s had created a protectionist mercantilist system whereby the 
English state attempted to promote English trade through the exclusion of competitors, 
Tangier’s status as a free port signaled England’s interest in engaging in a Mediterranean 
model of trade based on tolerance and diversity. The “free port” or protofranca model 
became popular in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century. Although the definition of 
a free port remained ambiguous and flexible, it generally fell into one of two broad and 
often overlapping categories: a port city open to merchants of any religion or nationality, 
or a port which was “duty free” and where goods were exempt from customs taxes.199 
Despite this distinction, in general, a freeport was a place where merchants of any 
nationality or religion were free to trade on equal terms and where duties were 
minimal.200 Although common in antiquity, freeports did not emerge again until the 
sixteenth century, when the Grand Dukes of Tuscany established the most famous early 
modern free port: Livorno.201 Livorno became an important model for “free cities” and, as 
Corey Tazzara argues, it “came to epitomize both the policy’s advantages and its 
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limitations.”202 The city began introducing laws to open trade as early as 1547. In 1593 it 
introduced “Livornina” reforms that allowed merchants of any religion or nationality to 
trade, and in 1675 it became a tax-free city for all incoming and outgoing commerce.203 In 
1657, English traveler John Reresby wrote that Livorno was “frequented by merchants 
from all parts, Armenians, Turks, Jews, Sclavonians…persons of all habits and countries 
in a manner, and the rather so, that none are here molested for their opinion.”204 By the 
late seventeenth century, the city was famous for its toleration, its large and active foreign 
communities, and for its simple and inexpensive customs procedures. 
 The “free city” hopes for Tangier embodied the tensions between the maritime, 
commercial, and territorial aims of England’s Restoration monarchy.205 According to the 
instructions to Tangier’s first governor, it was to serve simultaneously as a navy base, a 
center for commerce, and as the foundation for a larger English colony in Africa.206 The 
Earl of Sandwich hoped Tangier would attract trade from around the Mediterranean, and 
become a base from which England could put whatever conditions it liked “upon all the 
World, that passe through the Streights.”207 According to Charles II’s 1662 declaration, 
Tangier’s free port would welcome all vessels excepting any “coming beyond the cape of 
Good hope,” the English colonies or countries with whom England was at war. It would 
also charge a small, flat rate for warehousing goods in the city with no additional export 
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tax.208 This plan for a Mediterranean-style portofranca contrasted with the mercantilist 
policies England imposed on its American colonies, without abandoning them entirely: 
any goods exported to England or English possessions had to be sent in English ships 
manned by English crews. Ships from the American colonies were barred from the 
Mediterranean world of free trade.  
The creation of a civil government in Tangier can be seen as a further attempt to 
style the new English colony as a different kind of possession than those in North 
America. In 1668, the English created a charter for Tangier stating that it was to be a 
‘free-city’ for all Christians. It allowed foreigners to serve on Tangier’s common council 
and to hold official positions.209 A charter created a Court Merchant—a tribunal for 
foreign merchants to settle trade disputes that operated according to the Law Merchant.210 
The Lex mercatoria, or Law Merchant had developed in Europe since the Middle Ages, 
but had been abandoned in England in favor of the common law. Tangier’s Court 
Merchant was comparable to similar French and Italian courts, and as one Spanish 
commentator noted, “neither the city of London, with its great emporium of merchandise, 
nor any other city in the British dominions’ possessed such an institution.”211 These 
courts, it was hoped would be important “for the attracting of trade and the more effectual 
encouragement of merchants and others trading to and from our Port and City of 
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Tangier.”212 Tristan Stein argues that the creation of this merchant court at Tangier 
“testified not only to the crown’s commercial aspirations for the city, but also to the 
extent of the colony’s integration into the culture and political economy of the 
Mediterranean.”213 
Despite the grand schemes to make Tangier into a Mediterranean free port, the 
dream of a Livorno-style center of diversity and trade was never realized. Instructions to 
governors alternated between encouraging the settlement and participation of foreign 
merchants, and warnings to guard against them or expel them outright. In 1664, 
instructions to Lieutenant-Governor John Fitz-Gerald, ordered that “no more strangers be 
suffered to inhabit there than will consist with the security of the place; especially you 
must have a watchful eye over the Jews, if you suffer any.” Fitz-Gerald was to respect the 
privileges and immunities promised to Catholics under the “first articles,” but he should 
not suffer “new ones to be admitted in the place of those dying.”214 On the other hand, in 
1665, instructions to Governor Belasyse, directed him to be “very careful in seeing our 
proclamation made good declaring Tangier a free port.” The instructions directed that 
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“entire satisfaction be given to all merchants who shall resort thither,” and that Belasyse 
should see that “equal justice be administered to them.” The ministry also endorsed his 
proposal to build Catholic churches “for the satisfaction of those of that profession” as 
well a synagogue for the Jews.215 After the institution of a civil government in 1668, the 
instructions issued to Governor Middleton claimed that the incorporation of the city was 
“the most likely Meanes to advance our Free-Port, diminishe our Charge, and invite 
Inhabitants and Commerce thither: Which were the Only Ends aimed at by us, in 
possessing that Place.”216 
Despite these instructions, Tangier remained at its core a military outpost. An 
important indicator of this reality is that there were twice as many soldiers as inhabitants 
in the colony. The garrison usually consisted of only 1,200 to 1,400 soldiers, including 
English, Irish, and Scotch, while there were usually only about 600 inhabitants, including 
some English merchants and a sprinkling of Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Dutch, 
Italians, and Jews.217 Despite the city’s trade policies, it often had difficulty supplying the 
garrison, a problem that would reemerge in the eighteenth century, particularly in 
Gibraltar. Without a treaty with Morocco, the garrison was intermittently attacked by 
Moroccan troops and English ships were attacked by Moroccan privateers, further 
exacerbating the problems of sustaining either the town or the garrison. Further, growing 
fear of Catholicism at home made Tangier’s open and inclusive charter politically 
suspect.218 In 1683 Tangier was evacuated and the fortifications destroyed. The tiny strip 
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of land surrounded by hostile enemies—a feature that would be recreated in Gibraltar in 
the eighteenth century—meant that provisioning the garrison and town necessitated a 
wealth of foreign trade and good diplomatic relations with Morocco that England was 
never able to muster. After the utter failure of Tangier as either a freeport, a colony, or 
indeed as a garrison, and as trade in the Mediterranean waned and imperial warfare 
intensified, the question of whether Britain’s Mediterranean colonies were free ports or 
garrisons remained.  
Gibraltar and Menorca: Garrisons or Freeports? 
 With the acquisition of Gibraltar and Menorca as new British colonies, the 
inevitable question arose: would they be Mediterranean-style centers of internationalism 
and trade in the spirit of Livorno or Genoa, or would they become military garrisons and 
bases for Britain’s expanding Navy and intensifying fiscal-military state? Queen Anne 
declared Gibraltar a free port in 1706 in the hopes that merchants and traders might be 
induced to settle there, attracted by the prospect of supplying the garrison and by broader 
opportunities for trade in the Mediterranean. Free port status meant that most goods could 
be shipped into and out of Gibraltar without the payment of additional duties, although 
port duties and service charges might still be collected.219 In Menorca too, the British 
entertained hopes that it would become an entrepôt of Mediterranean trade. These hopes 
were boosted by the early decision of the Oxford ministry to grant Mahon free port status 
in 1712.220  
 Although both Gibraltar and Mahon were initially declared freeports, as time 
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went on it became increasingly clear that they would develop primarily into military 
bases rather than into lively centers of Mediterranean trade. The 4,000 British military 
men and their families stationed on Menorca remained wary of and separated from the 
mostly Catholic inhabitants, maintaining friendly if distant relations with the islands’ 
Jewish and Greek Orthodox population. ⁠ In Gibraltar, a permit system beginning in 1720 
restricted the numbers of “foreign workers” and in 1752 regulations by Governor George 
Bland required that property be sold henceforth only to Protestants. ⁠221 
 It seems that for the most part, free port status was granted to and perpetuated in 
both colonies specifically to encourage merchants and sailors to help supply the garrisons 
and develop the possessions into strong, secure, and well-supplied Navy bases, rather 
than in the pursuit of a Mediterranean entrepôt of free trade. The conflict between free 
port status and the military garrison reality would haunt Gibraltar throughout the 
eighteenth century. As late as 1783 residents of Gibraltar complained that although they 
had been invited to Gibraltar under royal assurances of free trade, Governor Eliott was 
treating it as a “mere place of arms.”222 The fact that neither colony developed into a 
Livorno-style free port, however, did not keep them from attracting diverse inhabitants 
from around the Mediterranean. Indeed the growth of British military power combined 
with the evolving improvisations of local colonial authorities attracted and established the 
kind of diverse and pluralistic communities more often associated with an earlier 
Mediterranean milieu.  
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NEW SUBJECTS 
Britons in the Mediterranean had practiced flexible allegiances since their 
introduction into that sea. Although the colonies increasingly developed as garrisons 
rather than commercial centers, tactics of accommodation prevailed. The unclear and 
often ad-hoc subjecthood of the residents of these territories was complicated by the 
fluidity of traditional Mediterranean identities and the inability of existing British 
subjecthood law to capture the diverse and complex Mediterranean milieu. For the “new 
subjects” of Gibraltar and Menorca, the developing category of “British subject” became 
increasingly important as both a shield and a tool. Despite the more complicated 
conception of subjecthood that the new Mediterranean colonies introduced, Menorcans 
and Gibraltarians were keen to use their subject status in much the way that seventeenth-
century Britons had: to privateer, to trade, and to avoid captivity in North Africa. 
When the previous Spanish population fled Gibraltar after the British invasion, 
the ragtag group of Maltese, Genoese, Jews, Moors, Greeks, Portuguese, and newly 
imported Spaniards who repopulated it were neither “natives of Gibraltar” nor born on 
British territory. Complicating the situation further still, Article X of the Treaty of 
Utrecht explicitly forbade Moors or Jews from living in the town, and forbade any 
maritime trade with the Spanish mainland. Only 20 miles across the windy straights from 
Morocco, North Africa became a vital source of food and supplies to support the 
garrison—things they desperately needed on the infertile and inhospitable rock. Despite 
the parameters of the treaty and repeated demands from the metropolitan authorities to rid 
the rock of all Jews and Moors, the realities of life and trade in the Mediterranean made 
this task impossible. Between 1713 and 1721, British authorities tried again and again to 
expel Jews from Menorca, wary of their tenuous peace with Spain. However, colonial 
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governors, aware of the realities of Gibraltar’s position in the Mediterranean, and the 
importance of Jewish trade networks with North Africa and Italy, would expel, as 
Lieutenant Governor Cotton put it, only “people of no consequence.” ⁠223  
Although Cotton tried to attract British Protestant merchants from Cadiz and 
Malaga to fill the vital trading links of the Jews, even this solution might contradict the 
treaty, as Gibraltar was to have no overland trade with Spain. ⁠224 By the summer of 1718, 
however, Spain and England were once again at war. Gibraltar found itself yet again 
isolated from Spanish supplies, dependent on Moroccan goods, and needing the services 
of Jewish merchants. ⁠225 The perilous position of the garrison led to a peace treaty with 
Morocco in 1721. The treaty gave English merchants the right to settle and work in 
Morocco and “the subjects of the Emperor of Fez and Morocco, whether Moors or Jews, 
residing in the dominions of the King of Great Britain […] the same privileges that are 
granted to the English residing in Barbary.” This direct contradiction with the Treaty of 
Utrecht would vex governors for years to come. But it provided legal bases for Moroccan 
Jews and Moors to reside in Gibraltar. Just four years later there were already 137 Jews 
in residence on the rock. 
 Indeed, as Hannah Weiss Muller points out, the rights, practices, and realities of 
subjecthood in the Mediterranean colonies were often formed by treaty rather than British 
case law. Although technically, the tenet of Jus Soli—subjecthood by birth on British 
soil—would exclude inhabitants of Gibraltar and perhaps even those in Menorca born 
before 1713, the realities of life in the Mediterranean demanded that colonial governors 
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and other British administrators expand the definition of subjecthood. A 1716 treaty with 
Algiers avowed that “the island of Minorca, and city of Gibraltar, Are now in His 
Majesty’s possession and are become part of His Britannic Majesty's dominions […] 
every person sailing in ships or vessels, whether Spaniard, English or otherwise, fishing 
in boats or vessels, living or residing there, shall be esteemed as his natural-born subjects 
[…] in the same manner, as if they had been born in any other part of the British 
territories.” This treaty and others like it with North African powers were vital to 
protecting Mediterranean trade and to the survival of the garrison.226  
In Menorca, the issue of British subjecthood was in some ways more 
straightforward than in Gibraltar. Because the majority of the inhabitants of the islands 
had remained after the British invasion, Menorcan’s subject status was more legally clear. 
While native Menorcans might be British subjects, they might not, in the eyes of some, 
be ideal or even loyal British subjects. A proposal to populate Menorca with Protestant 
inhabitants complained that “The Spaniards who inhabit it are as…beggarly as litigious 
and as averse to us our Religion and Industry as they were on the day we took them and 
whoever has the least Acquaintance with these people must be entirely convinced that 
they never will change [we cannot] make them in any shape desirable Subjects to Great 
Britain.”⁠227  
Although the British were never successful in populating Menorca with Protestant 
inhabitants, they did find that they could gain local allies by encouraging the trade and 
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settlement of non-Catholics, particularly Greeks and Jews. In 1744, several Greek 
merchants petitioned the ministry to become British subjects.228 It was eventually decided 
that Greek inhabitants “were to enjoy the same rights as British subjects” in the island, 
and that they were to have a priest of their own and even their own church.229 During the 
Seven Years’ War, between 40 and 50 Greeks joined the army in defending Fort St. 
Phillip against the French. After the war, Governor Johnston petitioned the ministry that 
Theodore Alexiano, a prominent Greek merchant who would later become master of the 
Port of Mahon, should be allowed “some recompense…for his losses and services.” 
Johnston recommended Alexiano for the title of “Receiver of the Duty called Weights & 
Measures,” a job that which would bring him around £100 per annum. “It was formerly 
granted to a native of this Island,” Johnston continued “but as very few of them shewed 
the least affection to his late Majesty’s person, or government, I am humbly of opinion 
that Theodore Alexiano is much more entitled, than any of the inhabitants, to this mark of 
his Majesty’s favour.”230 
Doubts about Menorcans’ loyalty and complaints of their unwillingness to fight 
during wartime were a common theme in governors’ letters to the ministry. Frustrated in 
an attempt to recruit Menorcan privateers at the start of the War of Austrian Succession, 
Governor Anstruther blamed it on Menorcans’ “attachment to the Spaniards, which will 
ever continue whilst there is such a number of Friars allowed to live in this Island who 
discourage the People from learning English by which means they might be induced to be 
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better Subjects.”231 Despite Anstruther’s fears, and the fact that few Menorcans chose to 
take up arms to defend the island from invasion, privateering would become one of the 
major ways Menorcans would exercise their subjecthood. As British subjects, Menorcans 
had the right to obtain letters of marque against Britain’s enemies and by the end of the 
War of Austrian Succession, Menorcan privateers had brought 71 of 287 prizes into Port 
Mahon.232 Over the course of British rule, privateering enriched all segments of the 
population. Chaplain Christophe Lindemann, who served in the garrison from 1775 to 
1782, wrote of the privateering industry in Menorca: “the craftsmen earned money by 
equipping the privateer, the doctor and apothecary by providing medicine, the priest with 
consecration and intercession, the lawyers in recovering prize-money and in passing 
sentence.”233  So eager were the Menorcans to privateer, that in the early years of the 
American War, privateers with letters of marque against American and French vessels 
began illegally taking Spanish prizes as well—actions that played a role in stoking 
tensions with Spain and eventually bringing them into the war.234 In 1779, Captain 
Christopher Villalonga and his privateering vessel The Ferret, for example, got into 
trouble for capturing Spanish ships before any official war between Britain and Spain had 
been declared.235 
By 1782, 55 Menorcan privateers crewed by 3,000 sailors had taken 268 prizes in 
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the course of the war.236 The French suffered most, losing 115 ships. Other prizes came 
from the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, and Spain.237 
Although Spanish losses were not as heavy as those of other nations, those losses were 
perhaps more painful because their source was Spain’s former subjects—subjects who 
lived in what the Viceroy of Mallorca bitterly referred to as a “nest of robbers.”238  
As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the fact that many Menorcans chose to sail on 
board French privateers when British letters of marque were unavailable, only provided 
support to critics’ claims that Menorcans would never be loyal subjects.239 In 1778, 
Menorca’s Governor James Murray glumly conceded that it was “now too late to think of 
a Minorqueen Militia.” Since Spain had joined the war, he would not be able to get any 
volunteers, and “to press a number of them into the fort will answer little purpose; indeed 
such men will do more harm than good...”240  
If Menorcans were reluctant to join the British military, they vociferously claimed 
their rights to protection from attack by North African privateers. Both Menorcans, and 
Gibraltarians, however, were often accused of abusing their privileges as British subjects 
by employing foreign seamen, or illegally selling their passes to foreign ships. In 1724, 
the governor of Menorca instituted a new set of rules for issuing Mediterranean passes to 
Menorcan mariners. The governor issued the regulations because “some Minorcan 
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Patrons have shewn so little regard to their Oathes & obligations taken for the King’s 
Passports which secure them from Turks & Moors that they have not scruples to act 
counter to them by employing Foreigners in their vessels.” Under the new rules, captains 
must bring their crews before the Vice-Admiralty Court before each voyage “in order that 
everyone of them may make Oath that he is a British Subject.”241 A stream of new 
regulations on the issue of Mediterranean passes over the course of the eighteenth century 
had little effect on the problem. In 1765, the British consul in Genoa wrote, in hyperbolic 
frustration, “I am persuaded that at this time above one third of the Trade in the 
Mediterranean under the English Colours is carried on by Italians and other Foreigners no 
way connected with England.”242 In truth, while the unstable legal status of the colonies’ 
inhabitants made defining British subjecthood difficult, governors tended toward 
employing a broad definition of subjecthood in protecting mariners.  In 1750, Governor 
Blakeney wrote to the Secretary of State, defending his decision to issue a pass to a 
Menorcan ship that the Tunisian authorities complained was crewed almost entirely by 
Italians. He explained that the three Italians to whom the pass had been issued “had long 
been Inhabitants [and] had sailed under British Colours in the late war.” Further, he 
wrote, “the Number of ships belonging to his majesty’s trading subjects of this Island are 
so much decreased of late years, that there is not a sufficient Number of Sailors, Natives 
to navigate them so that they are under a necessity of taking Foreigners as part of their 
Complement.” Finally, defining who was, and who was not considered a British subject 
on the island was complicated by the fact that “foreign Mariners frequently marry with 
natives of this Island, which their Church will not refuse them, whereby they claim a 
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privilege of becoming Denizens and His Majesty’s Subjects, which by the Laws of the 
Island, I find they are intitled to.”243  
While the Governors of Gibraltar and Menorca frequently argued for an 
expansive definition of subjecthood for their seafaring inhabitants, the unstable nature of 
British power in Menorca made subjecthood tenuous as well. In 1756, the British lost 
Menorca to the French, and when British envoy Hyde Parker traveled to Morocco to 
negotiate the release of British captives, four Menorcans lost their subject status, 
seemingly overnight. Parker argued that the sailors were now subjects of France, and thus 
ineligible for redemption under British treaty. The Moroccans, however, countered that as 
they had been British subjects when they had been captured, the British ought to redeem 
them.244 While subjecthood was a legal mantle that might be donned for protection, it 
might also be taken away as the fickle boundaries of empire expanded and contracted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From England’s entry into the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, both 
English mariners and the British government cultivated an adaptability that allowed 
subjects of a weak state to survive in the multicultural Mediterranean world. Britain’s 
development as a major military and imperial power, however, did not result in the 
British state or its subjects abandoning this adaptability. Flexibility continued to prevail 
in the eighteenth century, as Britain’s military strength grew. However, the nature of that 
flexibility transformed. Dreams of a British entrepôt of trade in the Mediterranean 
morphed into the desire to develop diversely populated Mediterranean colonies in the 
pursuit of naval security rather than free trade. With no real British-born “colonists” and 
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only small garrisons of soldiers, the diverse populations of Gibraltar and Menorca 
became “new subjects,” essential to supplying the garrisons. Not only would Menorcans 
and Gibraltarians become British subjects, but increasingly Catalans, Spaniards, Italians, 
Greeks, Jews, and others also received many of the protections of British subjecthood. 
While seventeenth-century English sailors like Ned Coxere performed different national 
allegiances by donning cultural and linguistic disguises, eighteenth-century mariners 
donned and shed the legal status of “subject” more formally through letters of marque, 
Mediterranean passes, and legal arguments. Indeed, language, culture, or dress were 
rapidly becoming unnecessary for the performance of subjecthood. The complex and 
expert performance of identity and allegiance sailors like Coxere practiced in the 
seventeenth century faded in the face of a subjecthood shaped by treaty, local 
improvisation, and as I will discuss in further detail in Chapter 4, the development of 
documentary identification. By the eighteenth century, British subjects might speak no 
English whatsoever, and it was their ability to prove their usefulness in maintaining the 
British garrisons that cemented their rights as subjects. Documents like letters of marque 
or Mediterranean passes, rather than language or dress proved those rights. Despite the 
importance of documentary subjecthood that the new colonies introduced, Menorcans 
and Gibraltarians were keen to use their subject status in much the same way that 
seventeenth-century Britons had: trading, privateering, and avoiding slavery in North 
Africa. However, while in the seventeenth century, adaptability helped English sailors 
survive and thrive in a world in which the English state was weak, in the eighteenth 
century, it helped Britain’s new Mediterranean subjects navigate the violent imperial 
wars that emerged in the face of growing British military strength. As the British offered 
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the rights of subjecthood to the many diverse inhabitants, British subjecthood rather than 
identity became a flexible tool Mediterranean peoples might deploy to survive in a 
dangerous world. 
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Chapter 2. Rule By Treaty: Limited Sovereignty and Expanding 
Subjecthood 
 
Empires were not built solely by military conquest; they were often constructed 
and shaped by treaties. As Saliha Belmessous argues, “treaties were powerful instruments 
that Europeans used to advance their interests, create new settlements, and eventually 
appropriate much of the globe.”245 When the Treaty of Paris concluded the hostilities of 
the Seven Years’ War in February 1763, it returned many of the captured territories to 
their previous owners and redistributed huge swaths of territory between European 
monarchs. It also shaped and constrained the nature of rule in those territories. In the 
treaty, George III pledged to protect freedom of worship for “his new Roman Catholick 
subjects” in former French territories like Quebec and Grenada, a freedom not granted in 
England itself.246  
The Seven Years’ War is often heralded as a watershed moment in British 
imperial ascendency, and a moment when Britain suddenly gained a large population of 
subjects who were neither “British” nor Protestant. Historians have argued that the 
enormous territory granted to Britain by the Treaty of Paris fundamentally changed the 
nature of both the British Empire and of British subjecthood. As Peter Marshall points 
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out, “Victory in the Seven Years War…meant that the British now ruled great extents of 
territory with subject populations of Native Americans, French Canadians, and above all, 
Indian…” none of whom were Protestant, British or, when gauged against the ideal of the 
“freeborn Englishman,” free.247 Hannah Weiss Muller argues that the 1763 Treaty of 
Paris “signaled a moment when…alternative definitions of subjecthood were proposed 
and then embraced,” not only by new subjects, but also by colonial administrators.248  
Although the Treaty of Paris granted enormous territorial concessions to Britain 
and added Catholic subjects to the empire, it was not, in fact unique in the history of the 
British Empire. Half a century before, the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht granted Britain new 
territories in North America, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean. And like the Treaty 
of Paris, the Treaty of Utrecht not only granted Britain rule over a significant population 
of new “foreign” subjects, it also protected the rights of Catholics.249 British imperial 
policies in these new territories were not, therefore, purely the product of British law or 
culture, but were instead shaped and constrained by treaty. The importance that treaties 
played in British imperial policy is, for example, acutely demonstrated by the English 
conquest and colonization of Ireland. Subjugated by military and political domination 
rather than by a treaty with a sovereign state, the legal rights of Catholics in Ireland were 
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even more severely curtailed than in England. Irish Catholics could not legally own 
property, inherit land, or join the army until 1778.250 In contrast, Menorcan Catholics 
were allowed to keep their lands, titles, and estates, as well as their ecclesiastical courts 
and traditional civil government. Treaties, then, not only added territory to the empire, 
but also shaped the nature of British rule in new imperial domains.  
Peace treaties were not the only legal agreements important to empire building. 
Commercial treaties were also vital to the growth and prosperity of the British Empire. In 
the Mediterranean, treaties with North Africa had been in place since the seventeenth 
century and served a dual function. These “Treaties of Peace and Friendship” contained 
both trade agreements and peace accords that protected British shipping from privateers 
who, without such treaties, were free to capture merchant vessels, and to enslave or 
ransom British sailors. In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht itself made continued peace and 
commercial treaties with North Africa still more important. The British would need to 
protect not only the ships that traded goods between London and the Levant, but also the 
local shipping that sustained the new towns and garrisons they had acquired by the Treaty 
of Utrecht. Further, Article X of the treaty forbade overland trade between Gibraltar and 
Spain. Resource-poor Gibraltar would have to be almost exclusively provisioned by ship, 
making the effective protection of vessels supplying that garrison essential to its survival.  
However, treaties with North Africa would also prove to be problematic for 
relations between Britain and Spain. At war with various Islamic powers since the 
Umayyad conquest of Iberia in the eighth century, Spain had explicitly limited British 
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contact and collaboration with North Africa in the Treaty of Utrecht. Although the treaty 
acknowledged that according to Britain’s existing commercial treaties with North Africa,  
“British subjects cannot refuse the Moors and their ships entry into the port of Gibraltar 
purely upon the account of merchandising,” it also stipulated that “no refuge or shelter 
shall be allowed to any Moorish ships of war” in any of the harbors of Gibraltar or 
Menorca.251 Which ships exactly should be considered “ships of war” and in what 
circumstances Menorca and Gibraltar should allow North African ships into their harbors 
would soon become a matter of contention between Spain and Britain.  
The Treaty of Utrecht posed another conundrum for British relations with North 
Africa when it banned all “Jews” and “Moors” from Gibraltar—the very people who 
might help develop essential maritime trade networks with friendly Mediterranean states. 
Although in general, Britain heeded the directive to respect the rights of Catholics in their 
new Mediterranean colonies, the trade limitations imposed by the Treaty of Utrecht and 
the requirements of supporting their new garrisons meant that they increasingly ignored 
the prohibition of “Jews and Moors” in Gibraltar. In fact, the embargo on overland trade 
with Spain also made Britain’s treaties with North Africa essential not only to protect the 
ships provisioning the new colonies, but also to cultivate trade with the Barbary Coast. 
Many historians have argued that Europeans did not value the treaties they signed 
with non-Europeans in the same way that they valued the treaties they made with each 
other.252 Anthony Anghie argues that by the nineteenth century in particular, “The 
colonial confrontation…was not a confrontation between two sovereign states, but rather 
between a sovereign European state and a non-European society that was deemed by 
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jurists to be lacking in sovereignty—or else, at best partially sovereign.”253 But was there 
such an imbalance in perceived sovereignty in eighteenth-century relations between 
Britain and North Africa or the Ottoman Empire? Although Catholic states such as 
Venice and Genoa had been making treaties with the Ottoman Empire since the 
fourteenth century, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, Protestant Europe was 
largely opposed to alliances with “infidel rulers,” a position that would soon change.254 
England was among the first to eschew this principle, making a treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire in 1580, and maintaining a close diplomatic relationship with Morocco during 
Elizabeth’s reign. The Dutch, too, began making treaties both with North Africa and with 
South East Asian rulers in the early 1600s, and, as Arthur Westeijn argues, Dutch treaties 
with non-European rulers were, in fact, the basis of their colonial development.255 
Fittingly, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius argued that such treaties were morally and 
legally acceptable. In his 1608 Mare Liberum, Grotius argued that making treaties with 
non-Christian peoples was consistent with both natural and divine laws.256 By the middle 
of the eighteenth century, treaties between European and non-European nations had been 
embraced throughout Europe.257 In 1758, the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel wrote that “The 
law of nature alone regulates the treaties of nations: the difference of religion is a thing 
absolutely foreign to them. Different people treat with each other in quality of men, and 
not under the character of Christians, or of Mahommmedans.”258 Indeed not every 
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encounter between Christian and non-Christian states was a colonial encounter, and while 
Britain struggled for imperial ascendancy, the Ottoman Empire, and then individual 
North African states, would become important allies. By the eighteenth century, the 
Treaty of Utrecht and the new colonies in the Mediterranean made cooperation with these 
“infidel” states even more important. 
 While the Treaty of Utrecht constrained British sovereignty in the new colonies, 
treaties with North African states began to expand the boundaries of British subjecthood 
itself. Within the maritime milieu, the number of people “considered and esteemed as 
British Subjects” grew in direct response to the limits to British sovereignty on land. 
Through decrees from London, local compromises, and a series of treaties with North 
African states, the British extended the protections of British subjecthood not only to 
native-born Menorcans or Gibraltarians, but to anyone who could help protect and sustain 
the colonies—regardless of religion or place of birth. By 1760, a treaty with Morocco 
stipulated that not only those born in Gibraltar or Menorca, but indeed natives of any 
country who lived “under the English Government” in Gibraltar or Menorca should be 
protected at sea. These natives of Spain, Genoa, the Greek Isles, or Portugal  (and even 
Holland or France) would, according to the language of the treaty “be considered and 
esteemed as English natural subjects.”259  
Taken in conjunction, the Treaty of Utrecht and the long string of treaties with 
North Africa significantly changed the nature of the British Empire and British 
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subjecthood. Not only did these treaties force Britain to consider how to contend with a 
large population of Catholic and other non-Protestant subjects, but they also encouraged 
Britain to recognize other “aliens” as protected, even essential British subjects. Long 
before the 1760s, treaties with North Africa explicitly conferred subjecthood on a broad 
spectrum of Mediterranean peoples; well before the acquisition of Quebec or Bengal, 
British treaties affirmed the subject status of Catholics, Jews, Greek Orthodox, and 
Muslims in the Mediterranean. 
TREATIES WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
Before England had ever considered treating with North Africa, the greatest 
power in the Mediterranean region was the Ottoman Empire. English desire for direct 
trade with the Levant would draw them into direct diplomacy with this formidable 
Muslim realm. Trade treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe began 
in the fourteenth century when the sultan granted “capitulations” or ahdname to Genoa—
trading privileges and protections for Genoese subjects living in or traveling through the 
empire.260 As the Ottoman state expanded, Venice and Florence received similar rights.261 
By the sixteenth century, Western European states began to jockey for trading privileges: 
France received ahdname in 1569, England in 1580, and the Dutch in 1612.262  
For England, the Ottoman Empire was to become an important ally. As the 
balance between Catholic and Protestant powers in Europe became a persistent concern, 
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and as England’s involvement in global commercial and imperial competition expanded, 
the nation would find itself increasingly aligned and entangled with Muslim states. Goran 
V. Stanivukocic argues that as “the only real empire in the sixteenth-century 
Mediterranean,” the Ottomans could help tiny England battle older and more established 
maritime powers such as Spain, Italy and France for military and commercial 
influence.263 As Stanivukocic reminds us, Ottoman engagement of the Spanish Navy in 
the Mediterranean prevented the full fleets of the Spanish Armada from sailing for 
England in 1588.264  
 Unlike bilateral treaties in which two states agreed on provisions that could not 
be unilaterally revoked or altered, ahdname were granted by the Sultan as an imperial 
favor. They were not created by threats of war or aggression, and were “not regarded as a 
formal alliance,” but rather as a unilateral and  “convenient instrument of policy” that the 
Porte might use to promote European trade.265 However, Maurits H. van den Boogert has 
pointed out that although some portrayed them as unilateral capitulations, the privileges 
given to the European mercantile communities were granted on the premise that 
recipients of these imperial favors would maintain peaceful relations with the Porte and 
its subjects.266  
This capitulation system not only provided foreign merchants with fixed duties at 
Ottoman ports; it also provided a wide array of legal protections. Because Ottoman law 
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protected only Ottoman subjects, any foreigner whose nation had not been granted 
ahdnames had no legal protection when traveling through or residing in the Ottoman 
Empire. Aside from capping duties, the ahdnames guaranteed the protected foreign 
subjects free passage by land or sea throughout the empire, freedom of worship, and 
freedom from slavery. It placed them under the legal jurisdiction of their consul at 
Istanbul, making them largely immune from Ottoman law.267 Merchants of nations 
without capitulations had to operate under the flag of a nation that did have formal 
relations with the Porte, making the ahdnames a prerequisite for international trade in the 
Levant.268   
1536-1713 TREATIES WITH NORTH AFRICA 
Treaties With the Ottoman Regencies 
Like all capitulations to European powers, England’s treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire promised that Ottoman ships would not give “the least injury or molestation” to 
English vessels, and that all Englishmen enslaved within the Ottoman Empire “if they 
appear to be true subjects of England,” would be “restored to liberty.”269 Despite these 
articles, it soon became clear that the Ottoman capitulations did not reliably protect 
European shipping from North African privateers. As English trade in the Mediterranean 
                                                
267 Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, 32. See also Article 37, The Capitulations 
and Articles of Peace Between the Majesty of the King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland &c. and 
the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire 1661:  “The English merchants, & all under their banner shall & may 
safely, & freely trade, & negotiate in Aleppo, Cairo, Scio, Smirna & in all parts of our dominions, & 
according to our ancient customes of all their merchandize, they shall pay three in the hundred for custome, 
& nothing more,” in Paul Ricaut, The Capitulations and Articles of Peace Betweene the Majestie of the 
King of England, Scotland, France, & Ireland &c. and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (Constantinople: 
Abraham Gabai Chafnahat, 1663), 11.  
268 Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, 24. 
269 “Treaty of Commerce made and concluded between Mahomet IV Sultan of the Turks, and Charles II 
King of Great Britain, whereby the ancient Agreements made in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and of King 
James I and Charles I are repeated and confirmed Article by Article, with a considerable Addition,” 
September 1675, Article I; Article XII in Charles Jenkinson, A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, 
Alliance, and Commerce, Between Great-Britain and Other Powers Vol. 1 (London: J. Debrett, 1785), 228. 
  103 
expanded, North African privateers became an increasing threat. North African corsairs 
had traditionally used galleys rowed by slaves to assault merchant ships—large vessels 
that confined them to the Mediterranean.  In the seventeenth century, however, modern 
sailing vessels enabled them to range further afield, attacking ships off the Atlantic coasts 
of Europe and even reaching as far as Iceland.270 Between 1613 and 1621, Algerian 
privateers captured 447 Dutch, 193 French, 120 Spanish, 60 English, and 56 German 
ships.271 During the 1620s, corsairs were active in the English Channel and along the 
southern coasts of England and Ireland. Algerian privateers even conducted raids against 
coastal villages near Devon and Cornwall.272 
 By the seventeenth century, the rogue privateers who attacked European shipping 
in contravention of the Ottoman capitulations were largely based in the Maghreb. The 
“Ottoman Regencies” or ocaklar (garrisons) of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli had come 
under Ottoman influence in the sixteenth century. They had done so, however, for mutual 
benefit, rather than by military or political domination. Through distance and political 
significance they were able to maintain a level of distinct autonomy—a fact that was 
central to the Porte’s inability to fully control their privateering activities.273  
Key to the development of the Regencies’ relationship with the Ottoman Empire 
was a shared goal of thwarting Christian aggression against Muslim ships and lands. 
After the Spanish conquest of Muslim-held Granada in 1492, Spain’s Reconquista had 
evolved into a policy of military conquest of North Africa, and an ongoing struggle for 
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supremacy in the Mediterranean. Through war, intimidation, and negotiation with local 
leaders, the Spanish began establishing fortified garrisons at strategic ports along the 
North African coast. 274 Along with Spanish aggression, other Christian groups such as 
the Order of St. John of Jerusalem had been operating a lucrative corsair business in the 
central and eastern Mediterranean since the fourteenth century. By the early sixteenth 
century the Order of St. John was issuing privateering commissions to individual knights 
to attack Muslim shipping and take captives—an extension of the medieval holy war that 
conveniently allowed the order to retain three-fourths of a privateer’s profits.275 Spanish 
aggression, the ongoing threats of Christian corsairs, and the inability of local North 
African leaders to defend against Spanish occupation made many in the area ready to 
welcome outside help, and made the Porte keen to gain territory from which to develop a 
new Western theater of war against Hapsburg Spain.276 
In the early years of the sixteenth century, two brothers from the Greek island of 
Lesbos rose as dominant figures in the fight against Spanish ambitions in North Africa. 
Oruç and Hızır, known as the “Barbarossas” because of their red beards, were the sons of 
a retired Turkish cavalryman turned pottery merchant.277 Returning from a trade mission 
for his father’s business, Oruç was captured by corsairs commissioned by the Knights of 
St. John, and was set to work as a galley slave. When he was finally ransomed, he took to 
privateering, basing himself first at Antalya on the Turkish coast, and then, with his 
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younger brother Hızır, at Tunis. From there, the two organized privateering vessels that 
attacked merchant shipping and waged jihad against Christian corsairs such as the 
Knights of St. John.278  
Soon, Oruç and Hızır began to combine their lucrative privateering operation with 
a war against Spain, often working in partnership with local North African leaders to 
repel Spanish attacks. In 1516 the brothers moved their base of operations to Algiers, and 
Oruç extended his authority and political ambitions westward, leading assaults on 
territories where local leaders had acquiesced to Spanish rule.279 In 1517, Oruç captured 
the Spanish-held Tlemcen, an important religious center west of Algiers. When Oruç died 
in the ensuing Spanish siege, Hızır was left in charge of his growing but fragile empire. 
Believing that continued war against Spain would require outside assistance, Hizir asked 
Istanbul for military aid.280 In return, he offered to bring the Sultan, Selim I, “all, or the 
greatest part of Barbary.”281  
Hizir’s proposition was an alluring prospect for Selim and the expanding Ottoman 
Empire. In 1517, the Ottomans had conquered Egypt, but Hizir’s offer presented Selim 
with the opportunity to expand farther westward into the Mediterranean. In return for 
Ottoman troops that would reinforce Hızır’s coastal garrisons, Selim accepted Algiers as 
a sanjak, (Ottoman province) and appointed Hızır as its governor-general or 
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beylerbeyi.282 With imperial backing, Hızır recaptured Tlemcen, consolidated his 
influence along the North African coast, and turned Algiers into an impressive naval 
base. By 1529 he commanded a fleet of eighteen galleys, and had captured the important 
fortress of El Peñón in the mouth of Algiers harbor.283 In 1533 Sultan Sulaiman I, 
concerned about the Spanish and Genoese threats in the Mediterranean, summoned him 
to Istanbul and appointed him Admiral of the Ottoman navy (kapudanpasha) and chief 
governor of North Africa. Sulaiman gave Hizir the honorary title Hayrettin “The 
Goodness of the Faith,”284 and charged him with building the Ottoman fleet.285 
Despite the territorial and naval incorporation of North Africa into the Ottoman 
Empire, Barbary corsairs and the Porte had fundamentally different agendas.286 For 
Hayrettin Barbarossa, the imperial title of beylerbeyi was an endorsement from the 
Mediterranean’s most prominent Muslim leader, and granted him legitimacy in his 
negotiations with local North African rulers.287 With their incorporation into the Ottoman 
Empire, the North African provinces could also access raw materials for shipbuilding, 
munitions, and weapons that could not be produced in North Africa. For Istanbul, 
cooperation with the corsairs enhanced their navy and gave them ports from which to 
engage Hapsburg Spain in the western Mediterranean.288 Further, the corsairs’ experience 
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in the region and frequent cooperation with Moors exiled from Spanish territory meant 
that they had become “experts in naval affairs who knew the Spanish lands.”289  
As Emrah Safa Gürkan argues, the incorporation of corsairs into the Ottoman 
Navy also changed Istanbul’s naval policy and foreign relations.290 The Ottoman Navy’s 
dependence on corsair captains for their naval might, meant that there was little incentive 
to intervene when North African corsairs captured European ships protected by Ottoman 
ahdnames. Privateering activities funded themselves and provided the empire with slaves 
and loot.291 While some historians have argued that Istanbul ignored any breaches of 
treaty because the corsairs were engaging in a “Holy War” against Christians, Gürkan 
argues that that “the Ottomans lacked the means, rather than the intention,” to punish 
wayward privateers.292 Although the Porte tried to suppress the economic temptations 
that damaged their international reputation, the fact that orders to stop the capture of 
European ships were so often disregarded is “proof of the fragile Ottoman control over 
North Africa.”293  
In 1604, Ahmed I officially acknowledged in his capitulations to France that he 
had limited power over the Ottoman Regencies and their privateering activities. An 
article in the capitulations admitted that some North African corsairs would “take and 
plunder, make slaves of merchants and sailors” on French ships,  “against our will and 
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that of the late Emperor Mohammed.”294 Ahmed gave “friendly consent” for “the 
Emperor of France” to “give chase” to Barbary corsairs who did not heed the Ottoman 
Capitulations and to “punish them and deprive them of his ports.”295  
Similarly, an article added to England’s capitulations admitted that “it is publicly 
knowne, That certaine pyrates of Tunis & Algier, contrary to our Imperiall Capitulations, 
mind, & will, doe take, & rob in the seas, the ships merchandize & men, subjects to his 
Majestie of England.”296 Although protests by European Ambassadors in Istanbul might 
force the North African Regencies to relinquish ships and captives in the late sixteenth 
century, by the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century it became clear that the 
sultan’s authority alone could no longer protect European shipping in the Mediterranean, 
and that the treaties signed with the Porte were not sufficient to redeem English captives 
from the North African Regencies.297 
As Nabil Matar points out, another major problem facing such treaties was the 
fact that European nations so often broke them. When, in the seventeenth century, Dutch 
and British ships arrived in the Mediterranean to engage in the “age of piracy, ” neither 
the Ottomans nor the Venetians were capable of controlling the proliferation of piracy or 
of policing the sea. Alberto Tenenti has argued that the decline of Venice between 1580 
and 1615 was largely a result of British and Dutch piracy in which they “showed 
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themselves to be pirates more ruthless and dangerous than any others.”298 Like the 
Ottoman Empire, European states often had difficulty controlling their subjects, 
especially when they were far from the imperial center. Piracy was rampant, and English 
and Dutch pirates often took Ottoman subjects prisoner.299  
  Despite the mayhem, by the early seventeenth century European powers began to 
develop direct diplomatic relations and treaties with the Regencies, treating with them as 
autonomous entities. In 1605, the French ambassador negotiated a tentative agreement for 
the release of slaves at Algiers, and a bilateral treaty with Tunis that gave both sides safe 
passage and the right to harbor in each other’s ports. It also facilitated the exchange of 
“Turks and Muslims” held captive in Provence for French subjects held in Tunis.300 
Guillame Calafat argues that the 1605 treaty between Tunis and France marked a “new 
era in diplomatic relations” between Europe and the Ottoman Regencies.301 Despite the 
fact that the preambles of the treaties acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty and mentioned 
the Capitulations specifically, the direct negotiation of treaties with Tunis, Algiers, and 
Tripoli, confirmed the relative autonomy of the Regencies.302  
The Dutch were next to negotiate directly with North Africa. In 1615, officials in 
                                                
298 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615 trans. Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 56-88; 61. 
299 Nabil Matar, British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563-1760 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
300 Weiss, Captives and Corsairs, 30. For the text of the treaty see “Articles pour l’accomodement des 
sujets du Roi avec les Vicerois et Capitaines des Janissaires et galères de Tunis. Août 1605,” in Edgard 
Rouard de Card, Traites de la France avec les pays de l 'Afrique du Nord: Algerie, Tunisie, Tripolitaine, 
Maroc (Paris: A. Pedone, 1906), 113-115. 
301 Guillaume Calafat, “Ottoman North Africa and ius publicum europaeum: The case of the treaties of 
peace and trade (1600-1 750),” in Antonella Alimento, ed. War, Trade and Neutrality: Europe and the 
Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteen Centuries (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2011), 173. 
302 See for example treaties between France and Tunis 1604, Algiers in 1690 and Tripoli in 1729. See 
Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation: A Study in Treaty Making (Leiden: 
Sijthoff, 1973), 146.  
  110 
Istanbul invited the Dutch to establish direct contact with the Regencies.303 In response, 
the ruler of Tunis, Yusuf Dey, acknowledged the Ottoman capitulations and the Dutch 
proposals for peace and friendship, but demanded that that the Dutch send a permanent 
consul and that captains of Dutch ships carry documents to prove their nationality and 
submit to inspections at sea.304 These early demands for documents as proof of allegiance 
were ones that would be repeated in various permutations over the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed it was demands like Yusef Dey’s—for 
documents and proof of nationality—that would later lead to the development of the 
Mediterranean pass system. Ironically, as I discuss in Chapter 4, the documents 
themselves would allow not only native-born Englishmen, but also many diverse 
inhabitants of the Mediterranean to claim protection as British subjects in the eighteenth 
century.  
Soon, England also began to treat directly with the North African Regencies. 
After a failed attempt to bully Algiers into respecting the Ottoman capitulations,305 
England sent Sir Thomas Roe to Istanbul to solve the problem of North African attacks 
on British shipping. Roe quickly realized that only direct diplomatic negotiations with the 
Ottoman Regencies could protect British ships from attack by privateers.306 In 1622 Roe 
made a treaty directly with Algiers and Tunis that established a commercial relationship, 
appointed a permanent consul, and exchanged Algerian slaves for English captives in 
Algiers. A draft of the treaty stated that Algiers would not commit any act “contrary to 
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the said Imperiall Capitulations,” but complained that “the said English Nation often 
times made warre upon us; for which cause wee have also been inforced to revenge our 
selves.”307  
This treaty between England and Algiers was to become the basis for all future 
agreements between the two countries and was the first acknowledgment by the English 
government that the Regencies were quasi-independent states with which the European 
powers would have to treat directly. Other states with commerce in the Mediterranean 
would soon be forced to negotiate directly with the deys, beys, and dīwāns in North 
Africa rather than solely with the Sublime Porte at Istanbul.308 
A 1622 treaty between the Dutch Republic and Algiers is a particularly good 
example of the difference between the unilateral ahdnames, and the new bilateral 
sulhname that European states had begun to negotiate with North Africa. The treaty 
guaranteed free trade between the two states, mandated that Dutch ships show their 
documents to Algerian cruisers in order to prove their nationality, opened Dutch harbors 
to Algerian ships and banned Algerian cruisers from inspecting Dutch ships for enemy 
goods. The treaty also had a specifically military aspect: it proposed joint action against 
that common enemy of Spain.309 De Groot argues that the treaties between European 
states and the Regencies in this period represented “the beginning of the special 
relationship of Ottoman Barbary with European powers,” which would persist until the 
early nineteenth century and was “characterized by its modern style more or less 
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conforming to established European diplomatic and legal usage.”310 
Diplomacy with Morocco in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
Strategic interests in the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic—particularly 
rivalries with France and Spain—also required English cooperation with the Kingdom of 
Morocco.”311  Because Morocco was independent of the Ottoman Empire, the legal 
complexities involved in treaty-making was, in some ways, less diplomatically vexing 
than treating with the Ottoman Regencies. Elizabeth was the first English monarch to 
establish close diplomatic relations with Morocco. In her political dealings with the 
Muslim world, Gerald Maclean argues that “Elizabeth’s status as a Protestant queen 
proved useful, since her religion allied her with Muslim rulers against Catholic nations, 
while her gender meant she posed little threat to male authority.”312 Although England 
was a minor, peripheral, and relatively poor European power in the sixteenth century, 
small but important victories against Catholic powers made it an increasingly appealing 
ally to Morocco. In the last fifteen years of her reign, Elizabeth and Moroccan Sultan 
Ahmad al-Mansur maintained a frequent correspondence and discussed allied military 
action against Spain on several occasions.313 Although Anglo-Moroccan negotiations 
never yielded direct military collaboration against Spain, they did achieve commercial 
treaties in which the two countries traded not only fabric and saltpeter, but also military 
stores such as firearms, ammunition, and timber to build warships.314 In July 1585, 
Elizabeth granted a charter for the Barbary Company and in March 1588, Sidi al-Mansur 
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issued a royal edict protecting all English traders, travellers, and residents in his 
kingdom.315 Commercial relations as well as periodic (but never realized) negotiations for 
a military alliance against Spain continued into the seventeenth century.316 However, 
political fractures within Morocco, and the inability of Moroccan sultans to control 
coastal territories meant that after Al-Mansur’s death in 1603, English shipping was no 
longer safe from Moroccan privateers, or from pirates. Further, the disintegration of a 
central Moroccan authority meant that as in the case of relations with the Ottoman 
Regencies, England was soon thrust into diplomatic conundrums about sovereignty, 
international law, and treaty making.  
With Morocco in a state of civil war, the Spanish were able to seize the Moroccan 
cities of Larache and al-Ma’mura between 1610 and 1614. In response, the Governor or 
qā′id of Azmūr, Sidi al-Ayachi, began counter-attacks against Spanish shipping. 
Meanwhile, after Philip III of Spain’s 1609 edict expelling Moriscos, approximately 
3,000 wealthy “Andalusians” from western Spain moved to Morocco’s Atlantic coast. 
From there, many began naval attacks against Spanish ships—aided by arms purchased 
or traded for captives from the English and Dutch.317 In 1627, Sidi Al-Ayyashi, seized the 
west-coast city of Salé, declaring it an independent republic. This new “Republic of Salé” 
became an important Atlantic power and the home of feared corsairs, the “Sallee 
rovers,”—many of whom were Moriscos expelled from Spain, or “Renegados”—
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European Christians who had converted to Islam and taken up privateering in the name of 
Salé. 
In need of military equipment, the new republic turned to England for arms and 
alliance. Through the enthusiastic English consul John Harrison, the Saletians sought a 
treaty of cooperation with King Charles I. Only a month after Salé declared its 
independence, the British envoy negotiated a treaty in which each side agreed to allow 
the other’s ships to trade and resupply in each other’s ports, to keep the peace at sea and 
to aid against each other’s enemies.318 Despite Harrison’s eager endorsement of this 
treaty, Charles was reluctant to sign. According to Harrison, the Saletians—who were 
incredibly effective at capturing ships at sea—were dangerous for British traders in both 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Further, he believed that their fervent anti-Catholic 
sentiment meant that they would boldly fight with England against Spain.319 Admiralty 
judge Sir Henry Marten, on the other hand, objected to the alliance, pointing out that 
because Salé was in rebellion against the recognized ruler of Morocco, any treaty would 
amount to an alliance with pirates.320 
Despite these negotiations, attacks on English shipping in the Mediterranean and 
on the English and Irish coast continued. In 1636, merchants and ship-owners in Devon, 
Dorset, and Hampshire complained that “there are a great number of Turkish pirates from 
Algiers, and especially from Salley in Barbary, which of late years have so infested both 
this and the Irish coasts that they have within these few years taken from your petitioners 
four score and 7 sail of ships.” Due to these losses, and the “miserable captivity 1,160 
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able seamen taken in the said ships” the merchants did not “dare to trade into foreign 
parts.”321 The English tried a variety of methods to mitigate the threat of Saletian 
privateers, mostly without success. In 1632, an Anglo-Moroccan force assaulted Salé in 
an attempt to pacify the rebellious territory and liberate English captives.322 Although the 
English were able to free over 300 captives, Morocco was not able to bring the republic 
back into the imperial fold, and despite the brief alliance with the Moroccan Sultan, 
Charles I would continue to collaborate with Al-Ayyashi throughout the 1630s, 
exchanging provisions and arms for captives.323  
Despite his continued cooperation with Al-Ayyashi, and the growing number of 
English captives at Salé, Charles steadfastly refused to sign a binding treaty with the 
rogue republic. At a time when Parliament was challenging his own authority, Charles 
may have been all the more wary of signing treaties with “rebels.”324 This refusal to treat 
with the Saletians, however, resulted in huge numbers of Britons held captive in Salé, 
and, as some historians have posited, may have fuelled public animosity toward the 
doomed monarch.325  
The Development of the Pass System 
By the mid-seventeenth century, England had developed distinct diplomatic 
relationships with each of the so-called “Barbary States.” Although treaties and 
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diplomatic negotiations were frequent, lasting peace was not forthcoming. Pirates flying 
the English flag often caused diplomatic crises when they attacked North African ships. 
To further confuse the situation, ships trying to avoid attack often flew the English flag as 
well, risking the ire of North African privateers who found them to be carrying enemy 
goods or subjects in contravention of treaty. Distinguishing friend from foe was crucial 
for avoiding attack. Yet, as Gillian Weiss argues, “the various nautical badges of identity-
credentials, salutations, flags, and architecture-were infinitely disposable, forgeable, and 
malleable. Documents could be faked or tossed overboard…merchant vessels rigged with 
cannons, enemies camouflaged as allies.”326 As the Algerian Dey’s letter to the Dutch in 
1617 indicated, proving a ship’s nationality remained a problem throughout this period, 
and any peace made with a North African state would probably not last long, due either to 
European piracy, or to the capture of a ship with disputed nationality. Amid this chaos of 
false flags and questionable allegiances, by the mid-seventeenth century Youssef Dey’s 
demand that all Dutch ships carry proper documentation proving their national allegiance 
would develop into a coherent pass system. 
For the English, a rigorous system of passes developed in the 1660s. The 1658 
treaty with Tunis declared the right of vessels of both countries to “quietly pass without 
molestation, they displaying their colours.” Rather than demand that the English ship 
have a pass,  it mandated that Tunisian ships “are to have a certificate, under the hand of 
the English consul there, that they belong to that place.”327 The 1662 treaty permitted 
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Tunisian cruisers to send two men on board vessels flying English colors “in order to 
satisfy themselves that they were English.”328  
The treaty signed with Tripoli in 1662, however, called for a more complex and 
codified process, and led to the development of the Mediterranean pass system that would 
become so important when the British gained their eighteenth-century Mediterranean 
colonies. It is probably no accident that the first English treaty with North Africa to 
mention specific passes was made in 1662, a year after the English occupation of 
Tangier. As would be the case half a century later, the English needed to supply their 
garrison. Therefore, improving the technology of protection became important for 
mariners provisioning the colony.329  The 1662 treaty with Tripoli stipulated that Tripoli 
cruisers:  
“Have liberty to send one single boat, with but two sitters more than the common 
crew of rowers, and no more to enter on board the said merchant ship but the two 
sitters, without the express leave of the Commander of the merchant ship; that 
upon producing unto them a Pass, under the hand and seal of the Lord High 
Admiral of England, the said boat do presently depart and the merchant ship to 
proceed on his voyage. And although the Commander of the merchant ship 
produce no Pass from the Lord High Admiral of England, yet, if the major part of 
the ship’s company be subject to the King of Great Britain, etc. the said boat shall 
presently depart, and the merchant ship proceed freely.” 330  
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Although this treaty with Tripoli did not absolutely mandate the use of a pass, peace with 
Algiers would eventually produce a more strictly codified system of passes. Three 
treaties with Algiers were signed and broken during the 1660s and 1670s before a more 
permanent agreement was reached in 1682.331 The 1682 treaty with Algiers was followed 
by an Order in Council in England laying out precise rules for issuing passes that would 
help to stop the diplomatic problems that arose from ships of uncertain national 
identity.332 Passes were to be issued only to English or colonial built vessels or to 
“foreign vessels made free.” Masters of vessels had to be English or “Protestant 
Denizens,” and two thirds of the crew must be English subjects. Captains were required 
to swear on oath as to the ship’s origin, and the nationality of the owners and crews.333  
While even in the mid-seventeenth century, identifying a ship’s national origin 
proved difficult, Nabil Matar argues that after 1688, defining “national identity” became 
even more problematic. After the accession of the Dutch William III to the English 
throne, and after the Hanoverian succession made German monarchs kings of England, 
the issue of who was protected by the English crown became particularly difficult to 
                                                
331 In 1662 Vice Admiral John Lawson “made an advantageous treaty with Algiers, so that ships will pass 
freely without search, which much rejoices the merchants,” see “Charles II - volume 56: June 1662,” in 
Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1661-2, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: H.M.S.O., 
1861), 396-426. In 1669, Sir Thomas Allin sailed to Algiers to “demand restitution or satisfaction, and to 
proclaim war if it is refused,” see “Charles II: February 1669,” in Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSP 
Dom), 177-218. In October 1674 Sir John Narbrough was empowered to treat with Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli, and procured the release of all the English slaves at Algiers, see “Warrant to the Lord Keeper for 
putting the Great Seal to three instruments of that date containing powers to Sir John Narborough to treat 
with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli,” October 18, 1674. See 'Charles II: October 1674', in CSP Dom: Charles 
II, 1673-5, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell (London, 1904), 373-391. Blank passes were sometimes sent to 
English consuls abroad, see TNA ADM 7/630, Register of passes 1662-8; For the 1682 treaty see Hertslet, 
Treaties vol. I, 58-66. 
332 Register of passes 1684-88, TNA ADM 7/76. 
333 Treaty between Great Britain and Tripoli, 18 October 1662. 
  119 
parse. Plausible subjects might include Dutch, Germans, or French Protestants.334 In 
April 1699, the Dey of Algiers complained that “… although sometimes an English 
vessel that abroad may be put to it for want of English saylors, to take in forreigners, yet 
it can’t be thought that they should have above two thirds strangers when not one third 
Englishmen on board.”335 Despite the advent of Mediterranean passes, the limitations on 
crews’ nationality and religion were difficult to enforce in the multicultural maritime 
world of the seventeenth century and would prove to be impossible to uphold once the 
British gained the colonies of Gibraltar and Menorca. A new definition of the “English 
subject” was on the horizon. 
1702-1713: THE WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION 
 In many ways, the War of Spanish Succession would intensify the relationship 
between England and North Africa. The conflict at the heart of the war was the balance 
of power in Europe—the same conflict that had so often played out in European 
competition over ahdnames from the Ottoman Empire, or in treaties with North Africa. 
Further, the specific dictates of the Treaty of Utrecht and simmering tension with Spain 
over the British possession of Gibraltar would cause Britain to build even closer 
diplomatic ties with North Africa.  
The war had come at a discouraging time for the new English Monarch, Queen 
Anne. William had spent the 1690s embroiled in the Nine Years’ War, in an effort to 
maintain a balance of Catholic and Protestant power in Europe and to ensure England’s 
Protestant succession. But when Louis XIV’s grandson Philip ascended to the throne of 
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Spain in 1700, the frightening proposition that the two crowns might unite under a single 
Bourbon monarch seemed dangerously close to fruition. England and the Grand Alliance 
had spent the last decade of the seventeenth century putting a stop to Louis’ hegemonic 
ambitions through violent warfare, and the deathbed decision of the childless Hapsburg 
Charles II of Spain to pass his throne to Bourbon Philip—the Duke of Anjou—threatened 
to make the victories and compromises of the Nine Years’ War meaningless. When Louis 
XIV confirmed Philip’s place in the succession to the French throne, the Alliance’s fears 
seemed to be confirmed. When he began sending troops to the Spanish Netherlands—the 
buffer between France and the Dutch Republic—and dominating trade with the Spanish 
America, the English, Dutch, and Austrians came together once more, seeking to place 
Archduke Charles, the Hapsburg grandson of the Holy Roman Emperor on the Spanish 
throne as Charles III. 
 Despite their alliance, the Dutch and British knew that war often brought imperial 
spoils. Strategic conquests such as Gibraltar and Menorca could be a boon to a northern 
nation’s Mediterranean trade, and although the Protestant English and Dutch might be 
allies against Catholic France, they were fierce competitors in the realm of global 
commerce. Since the British had lost Tangier in 1684, finding a new base of operation in 
the Mediterranean seemed a desirable goal—both to safeguard the Levant trade, and to 
control the connections between the Atlantic and Mediterranean. In 1704, when an 
Anglo-Dutch fleet captured Gibraltar, British ambassador to Portugal and inveterate 
schemer John Methuen commented that  “the Consequence of the place to England seems 
to require an English Garrison and in truth an English Governour.” He went on to say that 
he wished that “the Government of that Place in Particular had been put in the hands of 
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an Englishman & which I think ought yet to be in a handsom manner endeavoured.”336 In 
a similar vein, the Duke of Marlborough argued that Gibraltar “may be of vast use to our 
trade and navigation in the Mediterranean, and therefore no cost ought to be spared to 
maintain it.”337 Similarly, when an Anglo-Dutch force captured Menorca in 1708, 
General Stanhope wrote to the Queen about the capture of the ports of Mahon and 
Fornells: “Her Majesty being now Mistress of the Two best Ports in the 
Mediterranean…it as my humble opinion that England ought never to part with this 
Island which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of war and peace.” ⁠338 
 Although both Gibraltar and Menorca had been invaded in the name of Charles 
III, from the start there were Britons anxious to take them as possessions of the Queen of 
England. By 1709, many in the ministry were anxious to end the war—especially on 
terms favorable to England—and Britain began secret peace negotiations with France. 
The accession of Charles III to the throne of Spain was not at the forefront of the British 
agenda. Instead their goals were, more broadly, to thwart any union of the French and 
Spanish crowns, safeguard the British West Indian and Mediterranean trades, and to 
obtain France’s recognition of the Protestant succession in Britain.339 When Louis sent 
word that he had obtained Philip’s promise that the British would have Gibraltar for the 
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“real security of their trade with Spain, and in the Mediterranean,” the Queen and 
ministry were increasingly willing to sacrifice Charles’ throne for British trade 
interests.340 Despite these negotiations, the ministry continued to worry about Dutch 
interference in British plans for Gibraltar. In May 1711 Secretary of State Bolingbroke 
instructed the British Ambassador at The Hague to convince the Dutch to withdraw their 
troops from Gibraltar in such a way as to not arouse Dutch suspicion of British designs 
on the colony. By October, the ministry ordered Gibraltar’s Governor, Colonel Stanwix, 
not to “admitt any Soldier into this garrison…of any nation whatever but such as Her 
majesty’s Subjects,” an instruction he found confusing given that there was a Dutch 
regiment currently in the garrison.341  
In Menorca as well, although Charles III had appointed his own civil governor, it 
became increasingly clear that the English were in charge, and Stanhope even appointed 
his own military governor, Lewis Petit.342 Petit also had a commission from Charles III as 
Brigadier, and in deference to the putative Spanish rule, flew a Spanish flag from Fort St. 
Philip—a fact that the future governor, the Duke of Argyll found “contrary to her 
Maj[esty’s] Interest.” ⁠343 By March 1712, as many Menorcans began to realize that the 
authority of the Spanish governor was largely symbolic, the Jurats—members of the 
local civil government—wrote to Charles’s regent in Barcelona pledging their loyalty to 
the Catholic monarch and complaining that British officers were “boasting” that Menorca 
would soon become British. They declared that they opposed any treaty that might make 
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them “subjects of another prince who professes a contrary religion.” ⁠344 The reply from 
Barcelona advised the Menorcans to “tolerate the present unhappy circumstances with 
prudent resignation,” and reassured them that the idea that Menorca might become 
British was “irrational.” ⁠345  
In September 1712, nervous at the prospect of British rule, the Jurats sent their 
syndic, Cristóbal Rubí del Vilar to argue their case in Barcelona. ⁠346 When in November, 
the Duke of Argyll raised the British flag over Fort St. Philip, it was apparent that the 
Jurats’ protests had been to no avail. The Duke reassured the Jurats that the Queen 
would continue to protect all of their ecclesiastical and civil rights and privileges, along 
with their freedom to practice Catholicism. ⁠347 
THE TREATY OF UTRECHT AND IT’S AFTERMATH 
The Treaty that would officially end the war was negotiated in the Dutch city of 
Utrecht between March and April of 1713. However, the Peace of Utrecht was, in fact, a 
series of treaties between the various warring powers, rather than a single document. 
Since the unofficial negotiation between France and Britain had begun in 1709, Gibraltar 
and Menorca had become increasingly important in the list of British demands. As the 
plenipotentiaries left for Utrecht, Bolingbroke instructed them that they were to insist 
“that Gibraltar and Port Mahon with the island of Minorca be for the future annexed to 
the crown of these realms.”348 When the diplomats complained of Dutch opposition, 
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Bolingbroke instructed, “if they persist in their opposition …make this open and fair 
declaration to them: that [the Queen] will insist to have the asiento granted to her 
subjects, and to keep Port Mahon and Gibraltar, that from these three points, no extremity 
shall ever oblige her to depart.”349 Britain had now made it clear that it was less invested 
in the accession of Charles III than in ensuring the balance of power in Europe, and in 
using the negotiations to advance its trade interests. The asiento—exclusive rights to 
provide slaves to Spain’s colonies—would be a major boon to British merchants in the 
highly lucrative trans-Atlantic slave trade. Gibraltar and Menorca would secure the 
British trade in the Mediterranean—Menorca providing a safe harbor for the fleet and  
“Gibraltar being the greatest thorofare of trade in the world”350  
Menorca and the Treaty of Utrecht 
Although Britain had already been negotiating secretly with France for several 
years, the first direct negotiations between Spain and Britain began in October 1712. 
Despite early assurances from France that Spain would cede Menorca, when negotiations 
with Spain began, Philip V only reluctantly agreed to surrender Menorca, and instructed 
his envoy to insist that the Menorcan fueros and their Catholic religion would be 
protected.351 The British, however, asserted that because they had already conquered the 
island through force, they would not accept concessions for religious tolerance as a 
binding condition of the treaty.352 The Queen was resolved “never to consent to anything 
which might be under-stood to derogate from her absolute & Independent Sovereignty” 
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over places which she argued she had conquered. Through the right of conquest, the 
treaty ceding Gibraltar did not need to give her a legal right to possess Menorca, it simply 
“acknowledge’d that she had already.”353 
Although eventually Britain agreed to allow “free exercise of the Catholic 
religion,” and to “safeguard people, goods and privileges” of Menorcans, Spain was 
afraid that if they if pressed for more clear and binding concessions, Britain would 
withdraw from any capitulations whatsoever and keep Menorca by right of conquest.354 
The specific details and extent of Britain’s concessions remained ambiguous:  
The Queen of Great Britain promises that all the inhabitants of the said island, 
both ecclesiastic and secular, will safely enjoy all their goods, rights and 
privileges, even the freedom to worship in the Roman Catholic faith: and, for the 
protection of the said religion in that island, measures will be taken which will not 
be at variance with the civil government and laws of Great Britain.”355  
 
Further confusing the situation, Philip V agreed to cede to the crown of Great Britain “the 
whole island of Menorca, transferring forever all rights and full dominion over the said 
island.”356 On one hand, according to the treaty with Philip, Spain yielded “the whole 
island of Minorca,” to Great Britain and transferred to her “all right, and the most 
absolute dominion over the said island.” On the other hand, the Treaty of Utrecht 
stipulated that Britain must take care that all inhabitants, “both ecclesiastical and secular, 
shall safely and peaceably enjoy all their estates and honors, and the free use of the 
Roman Catholic religion.” In a final contradictory decree, it stipulated that “measures 
shall be taken for preserving the aforesaid religion in that island, provided the same be 
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consistent with the civil government and laws of Great Britain.” These directives set out a 
confusing and contested mandate for British power. While on the one hand, the British 
had “the most absolute dominion” over Menorca, on the other, it had to preserve 
Menorcan “Estates and Honors,” and protect the practice of Catholicism on the island—a 
practice that many argued was not at all consistent with the “laws of Great Britain.” 
Although Menorcans remained suspicious that the British would not honor their 
rights as either Menorcans or British subjects, they often argued that both their 
subjecthood and the legally ratified peace were important cornerstones of their rights. In 
1713 Queen Anne sent Henry Neal to survey Menorca and to take stock of her new 
possession.357 Members of Menorca’s civil government alleged widespread abuses by the 
British military on the island. They alleged that the military authorities were treating 
Menorcans not as “subjects of our lady Queen but as a Conquered People.” Even though 
a peace treaty should secure their rights as British subjects, the British continued to “use 
the same way & means here as they did in Catalonia during the continuance of the War & 
not making a difference between that and a state of peace.”358  
Under medieval conceptions of international law, the territory of a state was 
considered the private property of the monarch, and therefore any transfer of sovereignty 
(by conquest, treaty, or any other means) also meant the transfer of “all private lands and 
property and services of the subjects, who were transferred with the soil, in the same 
manner as a slaveholder may transfer his slaves and all they possess, together with the 
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title to his plantation.”359 When a conqueror occupied the territory of his enemy, that 
territory too was “in every point considered his State property, with which and with the 
inhabitants therein he could do what he liked.”360 By the seventeenth century however, 
these formations had begun to change. Grotius wrote that “By conquest, a prince 
succeeds to all the rights of the conquered sovereign or state…He gains the same right, 
which the state had before, to alienate the possessions, or to transmit them if he chuses to 
his descendants.” For Grotius, the conquest of territory entailed “complete subjection,” 
and the new king’s “authority over it becomes an absolute, rather than a limited 
sovereignty.”361 On the other hand, he wrote, “Lands are not understood to become a 
lawful possession and absolute conquest from the moment they are invaded.” According 
to Grotius, conquered territories were only a temporary possession that would not be 
considered permanent until “ratified and secured by some durable means, by cession, or 
treaty.”362  For Menorcans, the fact that they were being treated as a “conquered people” 
was illegal because under the Treaty of Utrecht, any British claim to power through either 
the rights of war or conquest were moot.  
British rule of Menorca during the War of Spanish Succession had been in many 
ways a covert and uncertain affair. The official Spanish cession of Menorca to Britain 
under Article XI of the Treaty of Utrecht, however, might finally signal a clear sphere of 
British sovereignty. Instead, the provisions of that treaty would provide a limited and 
contradictory mandate for British rule—continuing the legacy of unclear and contested 
                                                
359 Henry Wager Halleck, Halleck’s International Law: Or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in 
Peace and War (London: C. K. Paul & Company, 1878), 133. 
360 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise Vol. II War and Neutrality (London: Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1912) 204; Korman, The Right of Conquest, 30-31. 
361 Grotius, Chapter 8: On Empire Over the Conquered 
362 Grotius, Chapter 6: On the Acquisition of Territory and Property by Right of Conquest. 
  128 
British authority on the island, and, as I will discuss in Chapter 5, causing clashes 
between colonial governors and local magistrates for the next century of British rule. 
Treaties with North Africa after the Treaty of Utrecht 
After the treaty of Utrecht, the surge of Mediterranean trade required to support 
the new British colonies necessitated further treaties with the Barbary States to protect 
vessels supplying the colonies. When he first visited Menorca in 1712, the Duke of 
Argyll had written to the deys and beys of North Africa, advising them that Menorca was 
now British territory.363 In March 1714, Queen Anne also gave instructions to Admiral 
James Wishart to make representations to the government of Algiers that they should 
consider the inhabitants of Menorca “Our natural born subjects and are consequently 
included in Our Treaties with them.”364 In Morocco, in July 1714, British envoy Captain 
Patton and Ahmed ben Ali ben Abdala, qā’id of Tétouan, signed a new “Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship & Commerce” between Emperor Ismail of Morocco and Queen Anne.365 This 
treaty too affirmed that all persons living in Gibraltar and Minorca should be considered 
British Subjects.366 The Queen was also eager to secure new treaties with the Ottoman 
Regencies, and sent Admiral Baker to negotiate. While Baker was awaiting his orders in 
Menorca, Lieutenant-Governor Kane, eager to establish trade between Menorca and 
North Africa, called a meeting of Menorcans who might be interested in establishing 
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business connections with the North African states, particularly the possibility of 
importing livestock to the island.367 
Like the 1714 treaty with Morocco, Baker made treaties made with Tripoli, Tunis 
and Algiers that affirmed British possession of the new territories, and affirmed the 
inhabitants as British subjects.368 These treaties stipulated: 
for this time forward, for ever, the said Island of Minorca, and the city of 
Gibraltar, shall be esteemed in every respect…to be part of His Britannic 
Majesty’s own Dominions, and the inhabitants thereof to be looked upon as His 
Majesty’s natural subjects, in the same manner as if they had been born in any 
other part of Great Britain.369 
   
All three treaties also contained prohibitions against North African privateers cruising for 
prizes “before or in sight” of Gibraltar or Menorca. The Treaty with Tunis specified that 
“none of the ships or vessels belonging to Tunis…shall be permitted to cruise, or look for 
prizes of any Nation whatsoever” in sight of Gibraltar and Menorca or “to hinder or 
molest any vessels bringing provisions and refreshments for His Britannic Majesty’s 
troops and garrisons…or to give any disturbance to the trade or commerce thereof.”370 
Despite the new treaties, North African corsairs were often confused and irritated 
when they boarded ships that carried British passes but were full of Spanish or Italian-
speaking sailors. After numerous complaints, in 1726 Lieutenant Governor Kane sent a 
letter to the consuls at Tétouan and Algier asking them to explain to the corsair captains 
and admirals at those ports the “mixt people of which the Kings subjects of Gibraltar are 
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composed with the Reasons how they came to be of different Nations.”371 These 
explanations about the diversity of these new British subjects would not suffice however, 
especially, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, given the new opportunities for abuse available 
to Genoese or Spaniards posing as Menorcans or Gibraltarians.  
To ensure that anyone serving the garrisons would be protected, the British 
treaties with North Africa would need to provide explicit protections to Menorcans,  
Gibraltarians, and eventually all inhabitants of the colonies regardless of their nationality. 
The 1721 treaty with Morocco stipulated that “not any of the Spanish,” or other people 
under the governments of Gibraltar or Menorca “shall be taken or molested, sailing under 
English colours with passports.”372 In 1722, the Privy Council issued new rules about 
passes, exempting Gibraltar and Menorca from the rules about religion or national origin 
of the captain and crew.373 In the instructions they sent to the Governor of Gibraltar, the 
Privy Council was explicit: the governors should issue passes to inhabitants, “what 
religion soever they may be” so long as they swore an oath of allegiance to the King374—
the text of which was conveniently offered in both English and Spanish. Finally, in a 
1760 treaty with Morocco, the British added to the list of people enjoying the protections 
of British subjecthood “natives of any other country” who reside “under the English 
government at Gibraltar or Menorca.” These Spaniards, Genoese, Greeks, Portuguese, 
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Jews, or Moors would, according to the language of the treaty “be considered and 
esteemed as English natural subjects.” 
Either “Jews or Moors” 
 In Menorca, the Treaty of Utrecht would cause confusion about the religious and 
civil rights of Menorcans. In Gibraltar, the central conflict was between Britain’s 
relationship with North Africa and Article X of the treaty of Utrecht. This article forbade 
“Jews or Moors” from residing in the town, and banned any direct trade across the border 
with Spain. In the early years of British rule, these provisions created uncertain futures 
for Jewish residents, and eventually led to war with Spain. Because Anne had granted 
Gibraltar free port status in 1706, ships of all nationalities were allowed to come and go, 
in hopes this would encourage vessels to supply the garrison. “Maany boats and 
embarkations came from Portugal, Barbary and even from the enemy’s towns of Malaga, 
Marela, Estepona, Tarifa and other adjacent places,” reported Colonel Bennett, an 
engineer dispatched to report on the state of the rock. He described crews that risked their 
“lives and liberties, to bring wine, bread fruit and other refreshments tto the garrison” 
while the war raged around them.375 Further, he reported, “a great number of Spaniards, 
both men, women, and children…about 300,” arrived either to recover their property or 
to serve the garrison.376 Despite the lively trade emerging in the new colony, Bennett was 
hardly enthusiastic about these visitors and inhabitants, who, he feared, represented a 
Papist threat. Another group who came “in great numbers from Barbary, Leghorn and 
Portigal” was Jewish traders. Bennett was suspicious of these newcomers, claiming that 
they “showed themselves enemies to the place by hindering our getting materials (repairs 
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for the fortifications, more profitable for other causes) and may at some time or other do 
more damage to the place, being a mercenary people, and may betray the garrison as they 
have often done to the Moors during their conquest of Spain.”377 Despite Bennett’s 
intolerant misgivings about the civilians who came to trade, both Catholics and Jews, as I 
will discuss in Chapter 3, proved to be vital to the survival of the garrison. 
In the early days of British rule, British authorities tried to honor Article X of the 
Treaty of Utrecht with attempts to ban and expel “Jews and Moors” from the rock. 
Governors were wary of disturbing their fragile peace with Spain, but were also aware 
that North African merchants provided valuable trade connections.378 However, the 
frequency with which orders to expel Jews from Gibraltar came from the Secretaries of 
State in the first years of British occupation, seems to indicate that none of the governors 
were successful—if they made any serious efforts at all. In November 1713 the 
ambassador to Spain reminded Governor Congreve that it had been Queen Anne’s will 
that Article X be “inviolably observed.”379 In February 1714, Secretary Bolingbroke gave 
Congreve one month to rid the rock of all Jews and Moors.380 By May, Congreve wrote 
that he had expelled all but “Six jews of Barbary and as many European jews.” He 
claimed that these twelve were being detained “till they Sattisfie the English Merchants” 
to whom they owed money.381 Despite these successive orders to expel Jews in the early 
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years of British Gibraltar the Jewish population—by bribing officials or by illegally re-
entering the colony—continued to grow.382 
This largely laissez-faire attitude toward the Treaty of Utrecht would have 
diplomatic consequences. In 1717, Spanish Ambassador Marquis de Monteleon 
complained that contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, there were “above 
three hundred Jews” in Gibraltar and that they even “keep an open synagogue.”383 
Although Governor Cotton denied the accusation,384 he was ultimately accused of taking 
bribes from Jewish merchants. Cotton, Major Thomas Fowke, and leading Jewish 
merchants made depositions and oaths before the Deputy Judge Advocate at Gibraltar, 
swearing that no gifts had changed hands.385 Although Cotton seemed reluctant to expel 
Jewish residents from the town, finally in 1717, he reported he had “strictly complyd with 
what is stipulated in the 10th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, By removing both from the 
Towne and Bay the Jews of all Nations,” except for one he kept prisoner until he received 
goods to pay his debts.386 The Jews had been successfully expelled from Gibraltar. 
Gibraltar: The Treaty of Utrecht and the Conundrum of North Africa, 1721 
  In Morocco, although a treaty had been completed in 1714, it broke down a few 
months later, when Captain Paddon failed to produce the chinaware, cloth, and twelve 
spotted deer he owed the Sultan.387 Despite several attempts to negotiate a new treaty, 
diplomatic relations were stalled, helped neither by a blockade against Morocco initiated 
by Admiral Cornwall, nor by Cotton’s expulsion of the Sultan’s Jewish subjects from 
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Gibraltar in 1717.388 Negotiations for a more permanent peace dragged on; it was finally 
concluded in 1721. Key to this treaty was Article 7, which explicitly stated that “the 
subjects of the Emperor of Fez and Morocco, whether Moors or Jews, residing in the 
dominions of the King of Great Britain, shall entirely enjoy the same privileges that are 
granted to the English residing in Barbary.”389 This direct contradiction of the Treaty of 
Utrecht would frustrate governors for years to come. But it also provided a legal basis for 
Jews and Moors to reside in Gibraltar, and just four years later there were already 137 
Jews again residing in the town.390 
 If no “Jews or Moors” were to reside in Gibraltar under the treaty of Utrecht, and 
all subjects of Morocco—whether Jews of Moors—were to enjoy the same privileges of 
residence and freedom that English subjects enjoyed in Morocco, what actions could the 
Governor take to uphold Britain’s contradictory diplomatic obligations to both Morocco 
and Spain? When Richard Kane, summoned from Menorca to govern Gibraltar, first 
arrived on the rock in 1725, he wrote to Lord Townshend: “I shall obey His Majty’s 
Commands in using my best endeavours for keeping a good Corrispondence with the 
Spaniards; & to the best of my understanding shall observe such treaties stipulated with 
that Crown.” He was, however, “greatly apprehensive of some difficulties if they should 
strictly insist upon one part of the 10th Article of the Utrecht Treaty,” as the treaty with 
Morocco and the treaty with Spain were “directly opposite one to the other.” Kane laid 
out the contradictory clauses of the treaties, worrying that if Gibraltar honored the treaty 
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with Morocco, it would disrupt the peace with Spain: “as the Port is to be free to Moors 
by treatys,” Kane wrote, “upon some occasions, it gives offence to Spain.”391 A month 
later, he wrote to the ministry again: “I was so particular in my letter of the 18th of 
August touching the Treaties of Peace which respect the Jews, that I shall say no More of 
them than to hint that they are in number 111 Males & 26 Females, and that they have 
been allowed a Synagogue.”392 Despite his promise to “say no More,” about the Jews in 
Menorca, Kane was so troubled by this conundrum that he wrote letters to both 
secretaries of state, the secretary to the Lords’ justices, and the consuls at Tétouan and 
Algiers. After much parsing and pondering, Kane decided that the wording of the treaty 
with Morocco was perhaps “only renewing an old Article; and that the Privileges there 
mentioned were not to Extend any farther than as the Dominion was at that time”—
before Britain had gained Gibraltar.393 Kane wrote to the consul at Tétouan, asking if he 
could, “without giveing Umbrage,” ask the qā’id of Tétouan—one of the signatories of 
the 1721 treaty—whether he believed Article 7 was meant to apply to Gibraltar. Finally, 
he resolved that he would “order the Jews that are here to give Notice to their 
Correspondence in all Parts not to come hither with a view of Inhabiting here; and Shall 
acquaint all Jews who have families that they are to prepare to retier from hence with 
their famalys, and that none arc to be admitted here but as travelers.”394 
Regardless of Kane’s interpretation of the treaty, it is clear that both Moroccan 
subjects and leaders interpreted the treaty as a license for Moroccans to move to 
Gibraltar. “Every Vessell that has lately come from Tetuan has brought Some Jews,” 
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Kane complained. “These people fancy that the last Clause in the 7th Article of the late 
Treaty with Moroco gives a right to all jews…who Shall Call themselves Subjects of 
Moroco, So that…we are not to refuse any Jew of Barbary that Shall demand the 
privilege of recideing here.”395 When, after a year of writing letters on the subject, Kane 
finally received a response from the ministry in the summer of 1725, it was probably not 
what he had expected. London advised Kane that although allowing Jews to reside in 
Gibraltar was “not strictly conformable to ye Treaty of Utrecht,” that “considering the 
present circumstances of our Affairs,” Kane should tolerate those Jews currently living in 
Gibraltar. The ministers in London “would accordingly have you suspend ye Execution 
of any Orders that may have been formerly sent for removing them from thence.”396  
This “present state of affairs” was the growing hostility between Spain and 
Britain. It was no secret that Spain chafed at British occupation of Gibraltar and would 
take any opportunity to win it back. Two months earlier, in April 1725, Spain had signed 
the Treaty of Vienna. Eager for a share of the thriving global maritime trade, Flemish 
merchants and ship-owners sought to replicate the success of the Dutch, British, and 
French East India Companies by establishing direct commercial relations with the Indies. 
In 1715 they created the Ostend Company and began trade with India, Bengal, China, and 
Mocha.397 Under the Treaty of Vienna, Spain would grant Austria’s Ostend East India 
Company the same rights as British and Dutch traders in their colonies, and in return, the 
Austrian Empire would relinquish any claims to the Spanish throne and promise to aid 
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Spain in recapturing Gibraltar.398 Although the British ministry had previously been 
adamant about honoring the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and expelling “Jews and 
Moors” from the Rock, outright war with Spain would make the deportation of Jews not 
only useless, but also deprive Gibraltar of a civilian population key to supporting the 
garrison.  
However, the ban on “Jews and Moors” was not the only contradiction between 
the Treaty of Utrecht and the treaties with North Africa, and not the only problem heating 
up tensions between Spain and Gibraltar. The bilateral sulhnames with North African 
states had long contained reciprocal agreements, and to a greater or lesser degree 
provided North Africans with rights and privileges in British domains. The 1716 treaty 
with Tunis, for example, required that “the ships of either party shall have free liberty to 
enter into any port or river, belonging to the Dominions of either party” and that “all 
ships belonging to the Dominions of either Party shall have free liberty to use each others 
ports for washing, cleaning or repairing any their defects.”399 The Treaty of Utrecht, on 
the other hand, while acknowledging that because of their commercial treaties,  “British 
subjects cannot refuse the Moors and their ships entry into the port of Gibraltar purely 
upon the account of merchandising,” it also stipulated that “no refuge or shelter shall be 
allowed to any Moorish ships of war” in any of the harbors of Gibraltar or Menorca.400 
All of the 1716 treaties with the Regencies explicitly banned North African privateers 
from “cruising” –-looking for prizes—in sight of Gibraltar or Menorca. The treaty with 
Tunis specifically promised that no Tunis privateer would  “hinder or molest any vessels 
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bringing provisions and refreshments for His Britannic Majesty’s troops and garrisons” in 
Gibraltar or Menorca or “give any disturbance to trade or commerce thereof.” However, 
it seems clear that neither Morocco nor any of the Ottoman Regencies saw such language 
as a ban on their ships’ protections and respite in the ports of a country with which they 
were at peace. Indeed the treaties also had, to varying degrees, reciprocal promises of 
protection.401 The 1716 Treaty with Tunis (the most reciprocal of the 1716 treaties) not 
only provided that ships of both nations could use each other’s ports for repairs, but also 
stipulated, that “if any of the ships of either Party shall by accident of foul weather, or 
otherwise, be cast away upon any coast, belonging to either party, the persons shall be 
free, and the goods saved and delivered to the proprierts there of.”402 Likewise, the 1721 
treaty with Morocco stipulated that “If any English ship be thrown upon the Emperor’s 
coasts…the same shall be protected...in like manner the Emperor’s ships happening to be 
thrown on the coast of Great Britain, or the Dominions thereto belonging.”403 Despite the 
caveat about treaties with North Africa in the Treaty of Utrecht, the 1720s saw increasing 
hostility from Spain about the presence of North African ships in Menorca and, to a 
greater degree, Gibraltar. 
In the summer of 1723 an Algerian vessel sank off Gibraltar. Thirty-two men 
from the doomed vessel came ashore, and, as Lieutenant-Governor Hargrave tells it, 
“desired my Protection since their Nation was in Peace with the King my Master.” 
Hargrave, wary of Spanish reaction, ordered that they be brought within the protection of 
the British guards, but not into the town itself, “fearing the Spaniards should cutt off the 
Communication with us, the Trade being prohibited with Algier at that time.” That night, 
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the Marquis of Mourreal, commander of the Spanish garrison across the border, “sent a 
Captain of Horse to acquaint me that he designed immediately to attack the Moors, and 
hoped I would not be surprised to see his Troops marching for that purpose.” Mourreal 
claimed that because the men were outside of the city, they were beyond the jurisdiction 
granted by the Treaty of Utrecht and so beyond British protection. “I desired him to give 
my humble service to the Marquis,” Hargrave wrote to London “and to acquaint him that 
as those people were under the protection of the king my master’s Garrison I could by no 
means suffer them to be attacked.404  
 In a similar situation a year later, a ship of the Dey of Algiers “by a violent Storm 
with her Masts broken…came to an Anchor near the Walls of the Town” of Gibraltar,  
firing a gun as a distress signal. When the crew had been rescued, the captain requested 
material to “fitt his Vessel,” a request the nervous Hargrave denied him, telling the 
captain that the garrison did not have supplies to fit a ship, “nor could I admit him to fitt 
here.” “Whereupon,” according to Hargrave, “the captain was in a great Passion and said 
that the King of England’s ships, were furnished with every thing, when they came to 
Algier, and as his Nation was in Peace with the King my Master, he expected to meet 
with the same treatment here.” Hargrave placated the captain by selling him “Two Pieces 
to serve him for Masts and a small quantity of Rope.” Responding to letters of complaint 
from the Spanish Ambassador, Hargrave added in his letter to London that he believed 
that his solution would be “agreable to His Majesty’s Commands to me, that I should 
have a strict regard to the Neutrality, which His Majesty is desirous to observe with the 
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Government of Algier. I thought I could not do less then to suffer them to buy those 
things without which it was not possible for them to return to Algier.”405  
These and similar incidents in the 1720s gave fodder to Spanish claims that 
Britain was failing to honor the terms of Treaty of Utrecht. It seemed impossible for 
Britain to honor its obligations to Spain, while continuing to uphold its treaties with 
North Africa—treaties that were essential to the survival of the Garrison and colony. On 
21 December 1726, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Marquis de Pozobueno, told the 
Duke of Newcastle that “the cession which His Catholic Majesty had previously made at 
the peace of Utrecht had become null and void,” because Gibraltar had extended the 
fortifications of the garrison, and had “permitted Jews and Moors, enemies to the 
Catholic religion, to reside in the city.”406 Within a few months, Spanish troops laid siege 
to the city.  
Ironically, despite (and in many ways because of) Spain’s insistence that 
“enemies to the Catholic religion” should not reside in Gibraltar, the siege of 1727, as 
Joshua Hassan argues, “set the seal on the settlement and subsequent growth of the 
Jewish community of Gibraltar.”407 Not only did Jewish participation in defending 
Gibraltar against Spain show that they were “an integral part of the population of the 
garrison,” but the siege drove Gibraltar to develop stronger ties with North Africa. 
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Governor Kane reported that when the qā’id of Tétouan heard news of the siege, he wrote 
“a handsome Letter offering supply’s of provisions &c and protection to all who should 
come thether under English Collours, with offers of other Services.”408   
The Spanish finally withdrew after a five-month siege, and the Anglo-Spanish 
war officially ended with the 1729 Treaty of Seville. Although the British would continue 
to make some efforts to honor the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht that excluded North 
Africans from Gibraltar, it was with decreasing success or conviction. A new treaty with 
Morocco in 1729 tried to solve the Utrecht contradictions by stipulating that subjects of 
the Emperor of Morocco, could spend thirty days in Gibraltar in order to trade, but could 
not reside there.409 This condition, however, was rarely, if ever, enforced—especially as 
trade with Morocco became increasingly crucial for Gibraltar’s survival. Nabil Matar has 
cited this article of the 1729 Anglo-Moroccan treaty as an example of the increasing 
exclusion of the Maghreb from trade and contact with Europe. It is indeed the case that 
by the eighteenth century, North Africans were increasingly barred from direct trade with 
Europe. However, what Matar does not take into account in his interpretation of this 
treaty, is that this article was a specific attempt to reconcile Gibraltar’s increasingly 
important relationship with Morocco, with the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht—a 
compromise made in language, if not in practice. In fact, Gibraltar historian Tito Benady 
argues that orders containing this new provision may never have been sent to Gibraltar at 
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all.410 The facts that in subsequent decades the article was widely ignored, the vibrant 
trade between Morocco and Gibraltar increased, and the Jewish population continued to 
grow, demonstrate that despite the rhetoric, Morocco was too valuable an ally and trading 
partner for the British to practice any meaningful “exclusion of the Maghrebi.”  
CONCLUSION 
The eighteenth century was a period of enormous change for the British Empire 
and the people who would encounter it: diplomats and merchants, governors and 
inhabitants, alien subjects and native-born Britons. The empire was never, in fact, as 
many historians note, the domain of “free white British peoples.”411 Nor was it ever 
solely “composed of peaceful, settler communities, with colonists who enjoyed the rights 
of freeborn Englishmen and who possessed a preeminent commitment to trade rather than 
dominion.”412 While the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War may have revealed, as 
Christopher Brown has argued, the hypocrisies and inconsistencies of this peaceful and 
mercantile conception of the British empire, and the American War might have driven 
some Britons, as Kathleen Wilson argues, to feel that the empire “had become the 
imperium of palpable alien colonial subjects,”413 the British empire in the Mediterranean 
could never have been imagined as either. From the start, it was neither the domain of 
free, white, Protestant Britons, nor a territory populated by “alien people incorporated 
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into the empire by conquest.”414 Instead, a diverse and mobile population of erstwhile 
“British subjects” formed an empire of people, rather than territory, an empire that was 
governed by interlocking and contradictory treaties rather than by sheer subjugation or 
conquest. This unique imperial sphere would develop through the resourceful ways that 
sailors, subjects, diplomats and administrators negotiated, interpreted and accommodated 
those treaties.  
British bureaucrats in London and Menorca might grumble about Menorcans 
never being loyal subjects, or hatch schemes to expel the Jewish population from 
Gibraltar. However, the realities of governing these tiny and vulnerable military outposts 
meant that Britain’s new “alien colonial subjects” were not only important to the 
empire’s survival, but were also, increasingly, indispensible. It is true that governors and 
politicians sometimes (perhaps often) espoused the notion that the inhabitants of the 
Mediterranean outposts were simply problematic aliens, foisted upon the British and 
either banned or protected by a treaty with a hostile and watchful neighbor. These 
administrators were not, as I will describe in Chapter 5, paragons of tolerance or 
inclusion. But the treaties that continually expanded royal protections for Mediterranean 
“aliens” speak louder than the petty bigotry of individual British administrators. New 
subjects were essential to British naval expansion in the Mediterranean and, by extension, 
their quest for global dominance. As the century wore on, the British expanded and 
extended royal rights and protections—populating their maritime Mediterranean realm 
with diverse and mobile subjects. In turn, those subjects, unaware (and probably 
uninterested) in the crisis of empire and identity that loomed in Britain’s future, would 
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not only negotiate, interpret and translate the treaties that ruled their lives, but also what 
it meant to be a “British Subject.”
  145 
Chapter 3. Civilities and Offences: Diplomacy, Trade and Courting the 
Maghreb 
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In March 1756, Moroccan ambassador ‘Abd al-Karim b. Zakur (known to the 
British as Benzacor) arrived in England. He wore “no Shirt, and a loose Garment of white 
Swanskin” covering his head and body, drawing a large number of curious spectators.415 
He became popular in London society during his short stay. Admired for his polite 
manners, he attended the theater, and dined with many of London’s political and social 
elite, including Secretary of State Henry Fox and his wife, Lady Caroline, who declared 
him the “best bred of all the foreign ministers.”416 In a letter to Fox, Benzacor thanked 
him for the “unspeakable favours, honours & civilities” that Fox, Lady Caroline, and the 
“glorious English Nation” had shown him.417 Benzacor was on an important political 
mission. He bore a letter for King George II from Sidi Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah —“the 
prince of Safi,” son of the Emperor of Morocco. The prince was displeased. His 
displeasure with England had begun when Gibraltarians began trading illicitly with cities 
in the rebellious northern region of Morocco—the Tanja. Trade with the port cities of 
Tétouan, Tangier, Asilah, and Salè were vital for the survival of the garrison at Gibraltar, 
and Britain had concluded a commercial treaty with the emperor of Morocco in 1750.418 
The Tanja, however, had been slipping from the Emperor’s grasp for some time, and in 
1755, Emperor Mawlay ‘Abd Allah,419 made his son viceroy of Morocco’s costal 
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regions—charging him with the task of consolidating imperial power and bringing the 
wayward provinces under control. The Prince’s letter made it clear that Morocco would 
not tolerate any unauthorized trade with the Tanja: 
Your proceeding to [the Emperor’s] lands without his permission, and carrying 
away from them what you wish without order, is an act of insolence on your part 
against the Caliphate and a belittling of its rights…If somebody were to come to 
one of your lands and carry away from it that which you could not assent 
to…without your permission, what would you do to him if you were able? 
Doubtless you would meet it with prompt punishment. 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, the Prince alleged that the governor “and those with him 
in Gibraltar concluded a peace with the qā’ids of the ports secretly among 
themselves”…an offense for which Sidi Muhammad threatened “the cruellest of deaths 
without delay or hesitation.”420 
To resolve the situation, the King empowered Captain Hyde Parker to serve as 
British envoy. Three months later, he arrived in Morocco, charged to “put an end to all 
such Differences” and “assure the Prince of our regard for his person and his eminent 
Qualities” and of course, most importantly, to avoid “Inconveniences that may happen to 
the Trade and Navigation of our subjects.”  Instead, Parker refused to enter Marrakesh 
unless 500 horses came to meet him, failed to remove his hat or boots during his audience 
with the Prince, and “by his ill manners and bad conduct…made war instead of peace.”421 
Parker came away convinced that “his majesty’s Subjects can never have a sufficient 
Security from any treaties with this Prince till he has been Convinced by experience how 
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necessary a peace with England is to his own affairs and how much is in the King my 
Royal Master’s power to humble his Pride.”422   
Historians have argued that by the eighteenth century, the “Barbary States” had 
lost much of their bargaining strength against European empires. Nabil Matar, for 
example, argues that the house arrest of Moroccan ambassador Bentura de Zari in 
London in 1713 demonstrates that power had shifted toward Europe by the eighteenth 
century. “No ambassador,” claims Matar, “seemed to have undergone the kind of 
humiliation that the Moroccan ambassador experienced in London between 1710 and 
1713…Bentura fell victim to the imbalance of power between Britain and the Islamic 
Mediterranean that marked the beginning of European imperial ascendency.”423   
What, then, would be the result of Parker’s disastrous meeting with Sidi 
Muhammad in 1756? Would the king follow Parker’s advice and take steps to ”humble” 
the Prince’s  “pride”—presumably with a show of naval might? Although European 
economic and military domination of the Mediterranean gradually lessened the threat of 
capture by North African corsairs, Britain’s acquisition of Gibraltar and Menorca in 1714 
meant that the Barbary States had to be reimagined as (often difficult) allies rather than 
feared adversaries. Britain’s tiny military outposts in the Mediterranean were surrounded 
by hostile European neighbors and had few natural resources. The British often had to 
depend on provisions from Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to maintain their military 
dominance. Because of this, diplomacy with smaller Mediterranean states, especially 
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with the Maghreb, was an important, if not always well-executed business. Following 
Parker’s calls to “humble” the Prince’s pride, Captain Jarvis Maplesden wrote to Sidi 
Muhammad. He told the prince that he was “very sorry to hear of Captain Parker's bad 
conduct and Rude behavior” which he promised to report to the King, who would “be as 
much disgusted at his behavior to you as your Imperial Highness, and Correct Mr. Parker 
accordingly.”424 The fear, prejudice, and chauvinism, that characterized many British 
missions to North Africa made diplomatic relations difficult and often tense. However, 
angry reports from British envoys of cruelty by the sultan, bey, or dey, and suggestions of 
the “good effects produced by ordering Cruisers on his coast,” usually produced 
conciliatory letters of apology rather than shows of force from the British King, Queen, 
or ministry.425 A decade after Parker’s mission, similar calls for gunboat diplomacy from 
Consul James Bruce in Algiers were ignored and eventually led to his replacement.426 
Matar’s contention that Ambassador Bentura de Zari’s confinement in 1713 
signaled a new “imbalance of power between Britain and the Islamic Mediterranean,” 
does not, then, tell the whole story. In fact, imprisonment of British consuls in North 
Africa was a common occurrence throughout the eighteenth century—usually with little 
response from the ministry and no violence from the Navy. Between 1729 and 1758 at 
least five British diplomats in Morocco received similar treatment. In 1729, James Argatt, 
vice consul at Tangier was put under house arrest when the ransom for 23 captives was 
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late in arriving.427 Consul Sollicoffre’s interpreter was burned alive when negotiations 
broke down in 1732.428 Consul Latton was confined under armed guard in Tétouan in 
1749 when he did not pay a debt to the qā’id.429 In 1758 Consul-General James Reed 
committed suicide in Rabat after he and Lieutenant Grosvenor were thrown into a 
dungeon and threatened with death unless they signed over 20,000 dollars.430 Similar 
scenes unfolded in Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, when British consuls ran afoul of North 
African leaders, or tensions over trade agreements or abuse of Mediterranean passes 
arose. William Latton’s frantic letters to merchants in Gibraltar and to Admiral Keppel 
demonstrate the danger many British diplomats felt they were under in such situations. “I 
offer all that I have in the world,” Latton wrote in June 1749, beseeching the British 
government or merchant community to come to his aid, “and leave myself destitute, for 
the dread I am under is not Chymerical but real.”431 While Latton’s somewhat hysterical 
letters are tinged with the prejudiced language of “barbarism” evident in much British 
correspondence from North Africa, his fears of physical violence were not unfounded. In 
1755, Sidi Muhammad would kill William Mounteney, a British merchant he suspected 
of facilitating the illicit trade between Gibraltar and the Tanja, and seize all of his 
property.432 Despite these many “insults and offences,” the ministry tried earnestly, if 
often unsuccessfully, to court the Sultan’s favor. As Ramón Lourido Díaz points out, 
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attempts to make peace with Sidi Muhammad would cost the British government an 
enormous amount—by his calculations £78,853 between 1756 and 1760.433 
 Matar highlights the diminishing power of North Africa in Mediterranean affairs 
by stressing the difference between the “Moors who were powerful and rich, and much 
invoked by Queen Elizabeth, and Moors who were wandering haplessly on the streets of 
London under an indifferent king George I.”434 Nineteenth-century historian Edward 
Salmon assessed Hyde Parker’s mission to Morocco by lamenting the “energies of men 
whose duty it was to safe guard the interests of the Empire from the attacks of the 
greatest power on the Continent” (France) being “frittered away by concern for the amour 
propre of a petty Prince in North Africa.”435 What neither appraisal takes into account is 
that while less formidable in military terms, the Maghreb in fact played a vital role in the 
fight for British ascendancy over the “great European powers” in the eighteenth century. 
Relations between Britain and North Africa had indeed changed since the seventeenth 
century, but it is overly hasty to dismiss the importance of these states while assessing 
British power in the Mediterranean. Provisioning Mediterranean bases that were far from 
England and surrounded by major imperial rivals required fostering trade and positive 
diplomatic relations with North Africa. Further, the threat of North African privateers to 
British merchant shipping meant that Britain made, renewed, and revised treaties with 
North African states regularly between 1682 and 1816—when the leaders of Tripoli, 
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Tunis, and Algiers abolished Christian slavery.436 As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 4, these 
treaties with North Africa not only helped provide support for Britain’s military presence 
in the Mediterranean, but would also drastically widen the group of people who had 
access to the rights, privileges, and documentary identification of British subjecthood. 
Further, the failure of British diplomats to broker peace effectively with the Barbary 
States often necessitated the intervention, mediation, and diplomatic skills of 
Mediterranean peoples who were often not, by any legal rights of jus soli, Britons. 
Nevertheless these intermediaries were vital actors on behalf of the British Empire; 
fostering trade, making deals and composing treaties with the Barbary States that would 
help sustain the Mediterranean colonies.  
Contrary to any notion of British imperial hegemony, even in the eighteenth 
century, British power in the Mediterranean depended on deferential diplomacy with 
North African states to foster peace and trade. As the British goals in the Mediterranean 
shifted from maintaining trade with the Levant to maintaining a strategic naval presence 
that would give them an upper hand in the imperial competitions of the eighteenth 
century, provisioning their military outposts became increasingly important. As late as 
1771, Secretary of State Rochford reminded Consul-General Sampson that a principal 
reason Britain must “keep up a strict friendship with the Emperor is the convenient 
supply of the Garrison of Gibraltar.”437 Although political patronage, incompetence, and 
cultural chauvinism meant that envoys such as Parker often failed in their diplomatic 
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missions, Britain stood steadfastly determined to maintain good relations with North 
Africa. Moroccans like Benzacour might well still receive “unspeakable favours, honours 
& civilities” in London, while in the Mediterranean, local intermediaries would help 
smooth the jagged edges of British diplomacy. 
MEDITERRANEAN DIPLOMACY IN PRACTICE 
By the autumn of 1756 Sidi Muhammad was growing impatient with the creeping 
wheels of British diplomacy. “If the English Consul does not arrive at the 1st of March to 
my Court,” he wrote in a letter to the latest in a long line of short-lived British envoys, 
“then the Treaty’s are Expired, and warr will begin by Sea and Land.”438⁠ For Sidi 
Muhammad, a British consul-general was vital to consolidating his power in Morocco 
and would help him gain control over British trade in Morocco’s wayward northern 
cities. It seemed clear from Gibraltar’s negotiations with the insubordinate governors of 
Asilah, Salé, Tangier, and Tétouan, that the imperative of provisioning the garrison and 
town would supersede any treaties Sidi Muhammad’s father had made with the British, 
and certainly any compunction the British might feel about interfering with Moroccan 
imperial sovereignty. With a consul general stationed at his court, the Prince might be 
able to amputate the more local trade negotiations taking place at the nether regions of his 
empire. By reinstating a consular relationship with Britain on his own terms, Sidi 
Muhammad sought not only to reestablish trade relations with Gibraltar, but in so doing, 
bring the northern provinces back under his control. “I shall not listen any more to your 
promises or Excuses,” Sidi Muhammad threatened, “and my Ships and Galleons at Sea 
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shall look out for you and take you wherever they meet you and Gibraltar shall be 
deprived of all sorts of supply from my Dominions from which they shall not have even a 
Drink of Water.”439  
Consuls, Admirals, Trade and Diplomacy 
 Although consuls in North Africa had developed a significant role in state 
diplomacy, from their inception in the late fifteenth century consulates were linked more 
clearly with serving subjects in merchant communities far from the British Isles than with 
serving the English state.440 Consuls lived in ports across the globe, and helped British 
merchants and captains with customs procedures and paperwork. They were called upon 
to settle disputes among the merchants or sailors of their nation, and most broadly, were 
expected to secure their civil and religious rights abroad.441  
Before the mid-seventeenth century, consuls were largely chosen by the English 
merchants in important port cities, or by trading companies. In 1605 James I extended the 
Levant Company’s charter “for ever,” along with the right to appoint consuls and to 
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assess duties upon merchandise and ships.442 The company chose the consuls for most of 
their factories, and those consuls paid the company security for the rights to collect port 
duties in lieu of a salary.443⁠ In the Aegean, for example, consuls were appointed by the 
Levant Company until 1825.444 In the western Mediterranean a system of “mercantile 
consuls” developed whereby local British traders were responsible for the choice of a 
consul from among their ranks. Two things were paramount to the success of these 
consulates: recognition by the local government and the cooperation of British traders. 
Recognition by the British state was mostly a formality and consuls before the mid-
seventeenth century were not state officials.445  This would all change, however, with the 
new global trade policies of the Commonwealth in the mid-seventeenth century. 
In keeping with his program of state-sponsored overseas commercial expansion, 
Oliver Cromwell and the Commonwealth were the first to link the role of consul 
explicitly to the larger goals of the English state. Rather than serving the narrow needs of 
company functionaries or factory agents, consulates would express the alignment of state 
policy and global trade—an innovation that would be only haltingly realized over the 
course of the next two centuries. In 1649 the Council of State instructed trading 
companies to present the names of anyone employed as ambassadors or consuls for 
approval.446 Some months later, an Act of Parliament directed consuls to “use all good 
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Ways and Means, for the Securing, Advancement, and Encouragement of the Trade 
of England and Ireland, and the Dominions to them belonging; and to promote the Good 
of all Foreign Plantations and Factories belonging to this Commonwealth, or any of the 
Natives thereof.” It also charged them with protecting the rights of English subjects 
abroad and with keeping a “good Correspondency, with Foreign Kingdoms and 
States.”447  This policy, like many of the trade policies adopted by the commercial policies 
of the Commonwealth, continued after the Restoration.  
Despite the fact that they were now considered state officials, both merchants and 
legal theorists continued to see consuls as representatives of merchant communities, 
rather than diplomatic agents of the crown. British merchant Wyndham Beawes wrote in 
his Merchant’s Directory “a consul is no public minister as he has no affairs of state to 
manage.”448 Dutch Jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek concluded that “consuls are nothing 
but the defenders of the merchants of their country and at times also their judges; 
furthermore they are generally merchants themselves, not sent to represent their prince in 
the country for another prince, but to protect the subjects of their prince in the country of 
another prince.”449 In this vein, the House of Commons passed a resolution in 1663 that 
“no consulary Power be continued, or hereafter granted, to any Persons, but at the Desire 
of the Merchants, and by their Nomination.” Although Charles II asserted his royal 
prerogative, declaring that consuls were “Agents to maintain the Privileges of the Nation, 
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and the Articles of Peace made for the Advantage of it,” he promised that “Care shall be 
taken to nominate none, but…as the Merchants shall think fit, in their respective 
Factories.”450  
The number of British consuls grew as England expanded its maritime trade 
throughout the seventeenth century—and by the eighteenth century they served in trading 
ports across the world. Despite this growing global diaspora, consulates remained the 
least prestigious of the diplomatic service—largely comprised of bankrupt traders or 
lower level functionaries rather than gentlemen.451 As M.S. Anderson describes them, 
North African consuls often let disputes “grow into serious quarrels,” and “were not 
always equal to the dangers and opportunities of their position.”452 Because the 
government did not provide salaries with all of its consular posts, the exact number and 
location of consulates is difficult to trace.453 John Dickie has calculated that by 1740 the 
Crown had only fifteen British consuls, thirty-nine by the 1750s, and forty-four by the 
end of the century—although to what extent he includes consuls appointed by chartered 
companies or vice consuls residing in smaller ports, is unclear.454 Consuls chosen by the 
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ministry were largely clustered in the Western Mediterranean where government, rather 
than private companies, was increasingly responsible for facilitating British trade and 
sustaining the colonies. Consuls there became important in supporting the naval presence 
that, in many ways, became the raison d'être for Britain’s meager Mediterranean 
territorial holdings. 455 In 1725, the only crown-appointed consuls stationed outside of the 
Mediterranean were in the Canary Islands, well within the sphere of British ships 
traveling into and out of the straits of Gibraltar.456  
Because consulates were first established by and for merchant communities and 
factories, many consular officials received no salary from the Crown, and depended for 
their income on the port fees they charged for the loading and unloading of British ships 
and for the certification of ships’ papers, and the distribution and monitoring of 
Mediterranean passes. Consuls could, however, significantly increase their income by 
being appointed prize agent in time of war. Although most consuls’ salaries were meager 
or non-existent, consuls in North Africa were an exception from an early date. In 1681 
Charles II ordered the Treasury to consider whether ‘any allowances be made to any of 
his Majesty’s consuls at any place upon the coast of Barbary or elsewhere…for the 
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Encouragement of the sayd Consuls, to enable them to perform their duties.”457 Because 
they often took on roles as diplomatic envoys and were responsible for negotiating the 
release of captives, consuls in North Africa were some of the most highly paid consuls on 
the civil list well into the eighteenth century.458  By 1754 the consuls at Algiers, Tripoli, 
Tétouan, and Tunis had set salaries as well as annual allowances for “extraordinary 
expenses.”459  
 Despite their relatively generous pay, letters from consuls in North Africa to the 
Secretaries of State are rife with complaints about lack of funds. Moroccan consuls 
Latton and Petticrew were each imprisoned for a period of time because of debts they 
owed the Moroccan government,460 and consuls Petticrew and Popham were often 
reluctant to attend the imperial court because of the large sums of money they were 
expected to bring as a gift to the Emperor.461 After paying off a major backlog of 
expenses claimed by Barbary consuls in 1754, the Treasury gave North African consuls 
an additional salary for expenses other than redemption of captives. The ministry hoped 
these extra funds would “prevent all future Bills,” that consuls might forward to London. 
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They did not.462 Indeed it was not uncommon for consuls to go heavily in debt to local 
merchants. Arguments about the extent to which the crown was responsible for 
discharging those debts exposed consuls’ liminal status as both diplomats and individuals 
engaged in a world of private trade. When Consul Stanyford died in Algiers, leaving 
£1,000 in debts to members of the Dey’s court, negotiations between Britain and Algiers 
lasted for three years until the British government agreed to discharge his debts in the 
name of political pragmatism.463  
The Rise of Patronage 
In his 1589 Voyages and Discoveries, Richard Hakluyt wrote enthusiastically of 
the global reach of English trade: “Who ever found English Consuls and Agents at 
Tripoli in Syria, at Aleppo, at Babylon, at Bakara, and, which is more, who ever heard of 
Englishmen at Goa before now?” ⁠464 The spread of consulates throughout global ports 
seems indicative of the growing empire of trade—representing a nation’s merchants and 
their commercial interests in maritime ports around the world. In the context of a so-
called “blue water empire,” the spread of consulates around the world might represent the 
reach of an empire that was “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free.”465 Despite the 
fact that the English state confirmed consular appointments from the mid-seventeenth 
century, many consulates continued to be filled by men nominated by local merchants or 
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charter companies. As the imperial competition of the eighteenth century intensified, 
however, consuls were increasingly integrated into the machinery of imperial warfare. 
They facilitated communication between foreign governments and London, sent military 
and commercial intelligence to governors, admirals, ambassadors, and the ministry. They 
often assessed the legality of prizes taken by privateers in wartime, and could play 
important diplomatic roles, especially in territories with unclear or changing sovereignty 
such as the semiautonomous Ottoman Regencies, or Italian states such as Tuscany. In 
Morocco, the consuls in port cities such as Tétouan, Tangier, Asilah, and Salè facilitated 
the crucial trade with Gibraltar, and were called on to certify the subjecthood of captives 
brought to port by privateers. Unlike consuls in Spain or France, they also played 
important roles as ambassadors—often helping to negotiate treaties. Consuls signed their 
names to ten treaties with the Barbary States between 1662 and 1700, and had much 
closer interactions with kings and courts than British consuls in many other areas of the 
world.466 Sidi Muhammad’s insistence that the British government send a consul was not 
solely for the purposes of facilitating trade—a consul general in Morocco would mean a 
full time diplomatic representative of the crown who could negotiate and ratify treaties, 
and help steady the unstable balance of hostility and cooperation between the two states. 
Despite the rapidly expanding “empire of trade” of the eighteenth century, 
consular posts were increasingly filled through political patronage. Appointments did not 
often take into account the mercantile or maritime experience of the candidate—a trend 
that became more pronounced throughout the eighteenth century. Until well into the 
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nineteenth century there were no requirements for appointment to the consulate. 
Linguistic skill, cultural understanding, experience with trade or merchant shipping—all 
of which were central to daily consular duties—were not requisite for a consular 
appointee. In 1822 The Times wrote that the British diplomatic service was largely 
composed of “men wholly unfit for the office…either military men, court retainers or 
other persons quite ignorant of commercial affairs.”467  
 Generally, the Secretaries of State were charged with choosing the consuls in their 
department, and the competence of these consuls could vary drastically depending on 
each secretary’s experience with foreign affairs and their willingness to put international 
trade or diplomacy ahead of political favors.468 James Bruce, for example, under the 
patronage of Lord Halifax, hoped that his appointment as Consul General of Algiers 
would provide him with a post from which he could, “draw a comfortable salary and save 
his own time for more interesting things,”469 namely exploring ancient ruins in North 
Africa—the illustrations of which he planned to present to King George III on his 
return.470 Bruce took over the consulate during a period in which the recently re-
conquered Menorca was in political and economic disarray and the ensuing confusion 
and corruption generated intense disputes about the abuse of Mediterranean passes. 
Unequipped to handle the mayhem with any diplomatic finesse, Bruce was deeply 
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unpopular with the Dey, the merchant community, and the ministry. The self-satisfied, 
self-righteous, war-mongering Bruce finally resigned in 1764, after the Dey sent envoys 
to London, and Bruce’s calls for naval attacks on Algiers were tactfully ignored.471 
Charles Black: From Mercantile Consul to Political Beneficiary 
 In the career of Charles Black, we see many of the challenges and paradoxes of 
eighteenth-century consulates: the growth of appointment through political patronage 
rather than election by merchant factories, the uneasy links between consuls and 
merchants, and the diplomatic disadvantages bred by cultural ignorance. In Algiers, 
Black’s appointment over longtime merchant Edward Holden, signaled an end to the 
close trade relations with deys that British firms had enjoyed earlier in the century. His 
career, and its rather ignominious end, are an example of the failures of British diplomacy 
in North Africa, and one reason that the governors of Gibraltar and Menorca would have 
to find other avenues of negotiation to ensure the garrisons were properly provisioned.  
Black, originally a merchant trading with his brother Robert at Cadiz, was 
appointed consul there around 1720.472 Charles and Robert were Belfast traders of 
Scottish descent who were primarily engaged in trade with Irish and Scottish merchants 
through the British factory at Cadiz. Black’s experience as a merchant in Spain made him 
an ideal candidate for the position. He spoke Spanish, understood the workings of the 
merchant community there, as well as the intricacies of the relationship between British 
traders and the Spanish government. Like most eighteenth century consuls, he 
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corresponded with the Consul General and Ambassador at Madrid, and gave regular 
reports to the ministry about the state of trade, the movements of merchant ships and 
navies, and the current challenges faced by British subjects abroad. Black’s linguistic, 
cultural and political knowledge was an asset to his work as consul, but his personal and 
professional entanglement with the merchant community led to conflicts between his 
duty to enforce fair mercantile policy as an agent of the crown, and his personal business 
interests. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the fact that many consuls worked 
also as merchants became increasingly problematic, although their meager salaries meant 
that most continued to engage in private trade.473 As Scottish John Millar argued in 1787, 
if a consul “be obliged to seek support as a merchant or factor, his eye must be constantly 
directed to his private advantage; and in this position he ostensibly adopts the doctrine of 
the trader: “Every man for himself, and God Almighty for us all.”474 
 In 1727, a group of merchants from Glasgow brought a case against the Black 
brothers, claiming that they had consigned to Robert Black & co., “very large quantities 
of Tobacco and other wares” which the Blacks had sold without giving the Glasgow 
merchants their fair share of the profits. To make matters worse, the merchants claimed 
that “Charles did Insinuate that he as Consul would have Several more privileges and 
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advantages than other private Traders”—an advantage that the merchants hoped could 
maximize their profits. Even in the 1720s this conflict of interest seemed illicit, and the 
Glasgow merchants alleged that in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety, Charles 
had insisted that the business would be conducted entirely in his brother Robert’s name. 
In their suit, the merchants maintained that although Robert had made attempts to rectify 
the situation, Charles steadfastly asserted that he had no part in the deal. Charles’ 
“ambitious misconduct,” as his brother John would later term it, would, in the end, leave 
Robert responsible for his brother’s debts, strain Black family relations, and sully 
Charles’ reputation in the Mediterranean merchant community—in Cadiz as well as in 
Algiers, the site of his future diplomatic post.475  
While a consul’s own trade interests might taint his ability to act as an impartial 
agent, more concerning to British authorities was the loyalty and national allegiance of 
consuls who were sometimes stationed far from Britain for long periods of their lives. 
The Westcombes, for example, had lived in Cadiz since the 1660s and almost 90 years 
later, a Louisa Westcombe was receiving charity from the British Factory at Cadiz.476 The 
elder and younger Martin Westcombes were consuls there until the outbreak of the War 
of Spanish Succession, and the family stayed in the Mediterranean region well into the 
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eighteenth century. Westcombe’s son, Anthony lived in Corruna and Bilbao, and became 
Deputy Judge Advocate and Deputy Commissary of the Musters for Menorca.477 Even 
more problematic than so many generations living far from the British Isles was the fact 
that merchants, and therefore consuls, sometimes married women from local 
communities, and had children who might be born foreign subjects, potentially calling 
into question their loyalty to the British crown. In 1721, the consul of St. Sebastian was 
accused of “becoming of Romish Principles” after he married a Spanish woman.478 
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century was a particularly volatile time 
for British identity and definitions of loyalty. Between the Glorious Revolution, the union 
of Scotland and England, the Hanoverian succession, and the Jacobite plots and 
rebellions, the boundaries of loyalty, allegiance, and subjecthood were constantly 
shifting. The accession of George I and the rise of the Whig supremacy banished Tories 
from the civil list, while the Jacobite rising of 1715 and subsequent plots of the early 
eighteenth century brought new partisan fervor to the question of the loyalty of British 
subjects, and of British diplomats abroad. Reports about the religious persuasions and 
possible Jacobite sympathies of Britons abroad spread throughout diplomatic circles and 
streamed into the offices of the Secretaries of State.479  
In 1724, Charles Black received an anonymous letter from “Philopatria” claiming 
that the Westcombe family was plotting with Jacobites in France to remove Black from 
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office in order to reinstate the Westcombe consular lineage.480 Philopatria claimed that 
partly “being by process of time, partly from his being married in the Country” and partly 
the “Bigotry” of his professing himself a Roman Catholic, Martin Westcombe had 
“become interely Espagnoliz’d.” Although these kinds of accusations about Jacobite plots 
were rife in this period, Philopatria’s claim was bolstered by the fact that Westcombe 
wrote several times to the Secretaries of States pleading to be reinstated as consul.481 
Moreover a letter from the Earl of Ailesbury (an exiled Jacobite sympathizer) to his 
brother claimed that the Westcombes were in Paris meeting with Jacobite leaders at the 
time of the alleged plot.482  
 To compound the problem of consular loyalty in Cadiz, the strong and 
longstanding community of Irish merchants made the British factory politically and 
religiously suspect. For the merchant community at Cadiz, the very definition of “British” 
became increasingly confusing as the crown began to take a more active role in the 
regulation of British trade and British factories abroad. For example, a 1736 act imposed 
a tax on “all Tonnage Goods imported in British or Irish Ships or Vessels…for the Relief 
of shipwrecked Mariners, and other distressed Persons His Majesty’s Subjects.” In order 
to fairly impose this tax, the law mandated that the British consul and factors should 
appoint two British merchants to appraise the value of any merchandise arriving in port 
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without bills of lading.483 The merchants at Cadiz pointed out that the act mentioned 
British and Irish Ships but only British merchants and factors. The factory asked whether 
the act should be “construed so as to exclude Irish Men or Irish Roman Catholic 
Merchants,” and further whether the act was meant to exclude Irish merchants from the 
factory entirely. Confused about the terminology and its connection to both religion and 
allegiance, the merchants wrote to the crown complaining that if Britishness was defined 
in opposition to Irishness, the consul could no longer tender the oath of allegiance to Irish 
merchants. 
The proper meaning of the word British Merchant is such Merchants as come 
from Great Britain Exclusive of such as come from Ireland or any other Ports and 
the Distinction…between British and Irish ships and the constant use of the word 
British only when merchant or Factors are mentioned shew that the word British 
is to be understood in contradiction to Irish when applied to Merchants or Factors 
and in exclusion of Irish Men.”484    
The exclusion of Irish merchants would be particularly problematic at Cadiz, where they 
had a long history and were in the majority at the British factory. This oppositional and 
geographical definition of “Britishness” was, perhaps, doubly fraught because the crown 
had appointed an Irishman, Charles Black, as British consul at Cadiz. Although Charles 
was a Protestant of Scottish ancestry, the Black family had lived in Ireland since the mid-
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seventeenth century, and had several Catholic and nonconforming members, some of 
whom were, in fact, Jacobites or Jacobite sympathizers.485  
The political and religious turmoil of the early eighteenth century, the diverse 
nature of the merchant communities, and the experience of long periods in Catholic 
countries, then, made defining British loyalty and allegiance among subjects living 
abroad a difficult proposition. Men like Westcombe, who had been appointed under the 
Stuart monarchy, knighted by William III, and had lived in Catholic Spain since 1660s, 
might be expected to have divided loyalties. The wave of Jacobite hysteria, however, was 
not limited to the old guard. Charles Black himself was dismissed from his post after 
accusations that he was married to a Roman Catholic, had professed the religion himself, 
and even kept a priest in his house.486 His protests that he was a strict Protestant and had 
never been married were to no avail.487 
 With the growing hysteria over loyalty, religion, and Britishness, Black was 
removed from office in 1726. During his tenure as consul, however, he had been able to 
find a patron in the rising political star of William Stanhope, who had been Ambassador 
at Madrid. The Blacks were a middling trading family with few political ties in England, 
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but Charles’ foray into diplomatic service and regular correspondence with both the 
ministry and Stanhope raised his political and social profile.488 Even in the face of the 
dark accusations that he practiced the “Popish Religion,” Stanhope’s “long experience of 
his worth, honesty and fidelity” convinced him that Black should be “a great object of his 
majesty's goodness and compassion.” After Black’s dismissal, Stanhope was able to 
convince Newcastle that “the poor man suffered from misrepresentations made against 
him to the government,” and that he should be offered the recently vacated consulate at 
Algiers.489 Black’s appointment as consul to Algiers in 1728 would elevate him from 
factory consul to diplomatic actor, and from unknown merchant to political beneficiary. It 
would also catapult him into a very different kind of Mediterranean consulate where the 
stakes for success were much higher, and the room for error considerable.490     
Black in Algiers 
 While consuls in Spain were chiefly concerned with the daily business of port 
taxes, ships’ papers, and other bureaucratic workings of merchant maritime life, consuls 
in the Barbary States had the added task of certifying the subjecthood of captives and the 
nationality of ships brought into port by Barbary cruisers. They also often had much 
closer relations with the local heads of state and were more often involved in major 
diplomatic negotiations—and crises. For these consuls, cultural knowledge and 
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understanding was doubly important, both because they could no longer rely on the 
generalities of “European manners,” but more importantly because they had regular 
contact with state leaders on matters of slavery and freedom, rather than solely with 
merchants and sailors of their own nation. Unfortunately, few of the consuls had any 
skills appropriate to their duties. 
The death of a consul usually solicited petitions from local merchants nominating 
a resident Briton to take the post. The consulship at Algiers was no different. When 
consul Charles Hudson died, thirty British merchants at Algiers had signed a petition 
nominating his business partner and longtime resident of Algiers, Edward Holden, for the 
post. In exchange for providing the Dey with military and naval stores, Holden and 
Hudson’s firm seems to have had special privileges on exports, including a monopoly on 
the export of wheat from Oran, under the management of vice-consul John Ford.491 
Holden had been serving as interim consul while the position was vacant, and was, the 
merchants represented, a man of excellent character, closely acquainted with the religion, 
laws, and culture of Algiers, and in good standing with the Dey and his council, the 
dīwān.492 Due to the intervention of Stanhope and Walpole, however, the ministry sent a 
consul with no knowledge of North African languages or cultures and who had no 
conception of the chicanery that would greet him there.  
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 When Black arrived at Algiers, he presented the Dey, ‘Abdi Pasha,493 with his 
patent to serve as consul. Unlike ambassadors, who carried a letter from the King, 
consuls required only a patent affixed with the appropriate signature and seals to prove 
their commission.494 Because, however, the Ottoman Regencies did not have their own 
ambassadors, North African leaders sometimes requested a letter from the monarch as a 
sign of the consul’s important status as a diplomat, and as a means of keeping frequent 
communication with the British crown. When the Dey found that Black did not have a 
letter from the King, he refused to accept him as consul, sending him away until he 
carried proper communication from the Crown.495  
It would be easy to interpret the Dey’s actions as a demand for a proper show of 
respect and closer communication with King George.  The deys were the military leaders 
of the port city of Algiers—a dangerous job that they attempted to keep with tight 
control. From the sixteenth century, Algiers became the center of Ottoman authority in 
North Africa, and the base from which the Ottoman Empire waged war against the 
Spanish in the western Mediterranean.496 By the end of the sixteenth century, Algiers had 
been transformed from an insignificant port town into a growing and diverse metropolis 
with as many as 100,000 inhabitants including Turks, Jews, and Christian slaves.497 Rich 
                                                
493 1729-1732 ‘Abdi Pasha was succeeded by Ibrahim b. Ramadan, 1732-1748. 
494 Horn, Diplomatic Service, 240. 
495 Charles Black, Port Mahon, to Newcastle, 30 September 1729, TNA SP 71/6 f. 601; George Logie to 
Newcastle, 24 September 1729, TNA SP 71/6 f. 583.  
496 Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 166. 
497 European sources from the period estimate the population between 80,000 and inhabitants 150,000. For 
a detailed discussion of the demographic sources see Federico Cresti, “Quelques réflexions sur la 
population et structure sociale d’Alger à la période turque,” Cahiers de Tunisie 34, nos. 137-138 (1986): 
161-164 and “Algiers in the Ottoman Period the City and its Population,” in Salma K. Jayyusi, Renata 
  173 
Jewish families gradually became influential in the commerce and government of 
Algiers, and some became key players in British diplomacy. Non-Turkish Muslims were, 
however, the majority of the population and included local Arabs and Berbers, Christian 
renegades, and “Andalusians” who had been forced from the Iberian Peninsula.498   
Over the course of the seventeenth century Algiers developed into a military 
oligarchy and increasingly broke loose from the authority of the Porte. Charles Julien 
argues that this freedom left the military rulers free to pursue piracy more aggressively, 
and provoked reprisals from European powers and conflicts with Tunis.499 In 1671 a 
British squadron destroyed much of the Algerian fleet, sparking a rebellion and the 
instillation of the dey—an officer elected by the military to rule the territory.500 By 1710, 
the Dey took on both the title and responsibilities of pāshā and became the nominal and 
real head of Algerian state.501 The dey’s position as leader, however, was often 
precarious. Between 1671 and by 1818, fourteen of the thirty deys were installed by mob 
violence after their predecessor’s assassination.502 Indeed ‘Abdi sha himself had been 
elected after the previous dey was assassinated in the street by a party of soldiers.503 
Because of their tenuous political position, proper reverence from foreign powers could 
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be a crucial tool in an arsenal of political tactics designed to stabilize their rule. 
Algerian deys, like Tunisian beys, Moroccan sultans, and other North African 
leaders, were famous for demanding gifts from diplomatic visitors. They also often 
cultivated direct and personal communication with the English monarchs—
communication they expected to receive from the hands of a properly anointed diplomat. 
Algerian deys and Moroccan sultans often sent their own diplomats to London with 
letters for the King or Queen, rather than relying on the post. Queen Elizabeth and 
Mawlay Ahmad al-Mansur of Morocco set a precedent for active and bountiful 
communication in the sixteenth century. Queen Elizabeth, as Mawlay Isma‘il would 
describe it a century later, “had a great and firm friendship with my uncle the king Muley 
Hamet Dabby504 that they loved each other very much, sending letters of friendship with 
many presents one to the other, in such a manner that the people judged that they wanted 
to marry each other.” The emperor went on to compare that close diplomatic relationship, 
to what he saw as the current inadequacies of communication by post: “I Servant of God, 
cannot talk with you by post and letters, which come and go. If you want to send some 
person to my palace to talk and negotiate with me, as is the custom of kings, everything 
will be fulfilled with the favor of god on both sides, and peace and good health to you.”505  
In the context of this intimate diplomacy, the Dey’s protest that a mere patent was 
insufficient makes sense. The internal consular politics of Algiers, however, was even 
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more complicated. In the small and isolated merchant community of Algiers, proper 
demonstrations of respect were important for diplomatic relations, but could rarely 
overcome local politics or corruption. Although Holden was the favorite among the 
merchant community to replace Hudson as consul and a close confidant of the Dey, a 
Scottish merchant named George Logie, who had been serving in Algiers as consul to 
Sweden, was desperate to secure the British consulate for himself.506 In the wake of 
Black’s expulsion from Algiers, reports from the local merchant community alleged that 
Logie had given expensive gifts to sway the Dey, advertised Black’s scandalous business 
deals and dubious end as consul at Cadiz, and convinced the Dey to write to London, 
asking that Logie be made consul instead.507 Logie even offered Black the use of his own 
ship to retreat to Menorca to await instructions from London. As soon as Black left, 
Logie installed himself as interim consul, arguing that the Dey and dīwān had begged 
him to take up the post, there being “no other proper person here at present.”508  Although 
Logie’s schemes may have temporarily secured him the consulate, they made him few 
friends within the European community at Algiers. British chaplain Thomas Shaw 
labeled him an “ambitious mace,” and reported that upon hearing that Logie had claimed 
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the post for himself, the French Consul, (a “gentlemen of a known Character”) exclaimed 
angrily, “je chi—ay sur le pavillon anglois”—I shit on the English flag!509 
The ministry in London was unsure exactly how to proceed. The distance, 
slowness, and variability of communication, as well as the vastly different political 
cultures made the true facts of any squabble difficult to parse. Secretary of State Delafaye 
worried that “Black will have a bad time to be consul there, against the Dey’s 
inclination.” However, the slowly unfolding story of Logie’s scheme, aided perhaps by 
his increasingly defensive letters, made inaction impossible.510 After several months, the 
ministry dispatched Admiral Cavendish to settle the problem. With only a sparse 
smattering of British administrators planted on solid land, the Navy had become an 
important diplomatic agent in the Mediterranean, and in many ways was the highest 
echelon of power in the region. Admirals invested with plenipotentiary power often 
served as the final authority in disputes and were the signatories of treaties, hopping 
between port cities to solve the diplomatic crises that might arise in the motley, cheek-by-
jowl morass of the Mediterranean.511  To arbitrate the conflict between Black and the Dey, 
Admiral Cavendish was armed with gifts and a letter from the King. Unfortunately, 
Cavendish, like other British envoys before and after him, fell victim to his cultural 
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ignorance, refusing to remove his shoes (as Parker would do in Morocco more than 20 
years later) before he entered the Dey’s richly carpeted apartment.512 
British envoys like Black and Cavendish, who had little or no knowledge of North 
African politics, language, or culture, were at a distinct disadvantage compared to 
longtime residents like Logie. Logie’s political machinations continued, and in 1737 he 
was accused of conspiring with the Dutch consul to have a competitor expelled from 
Algiers.513 Like the Westcombes, he established his own consular dynasty. His son 
Charles was appointed consul at Tangier in the 1770s, where his knowledge of North 
African culture and politics made him indispensable to, if not always cooperative with 
British merchants.514 In 1774 London merchant Allan Auld complained that despite 
receiving orders to do so, Charles Logie had not accompanied him to Salé where he was 
bringing a lawsuit against a French merchant. Auld contended that he himself was 
“totally unacquainted with the manners, customs, and mercantile language of the 
country,” while his adversary was supported in his case by the French consul who was a 
“perfect master” of the language, culture, and “intrigue of Barbary.” Without Logie’s 
expertise, the case was decided in the French merchant’s favor.515  For Auld, Black, 
Cavendish, and other Britons unacquainted with North Africa, negotiations were difficult 
and sometimes futile. Although consular appointments would be made increasingly by 
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political patronage, Secretaries of States did attempt, intermittently, to place men with 
knowledge and experience of North Africa in consular posts. Long time residents like the 
Logies, however, might continue to take advantage of the ignorance of others for their 
own political or economic gain. 
Despite Cavendish’s gaffs and Logie’s bribes, Dey ‘Abdi Pasha finally agreed to 
accept Black as consul, in exchange for additional gifts sent from Britain. The truce 
would not last long however. Although Black managed to hold on to his position for 
several years, complaints continued from Algiers, including reports that Black was a 
drunk who could be capricious and violent.516 Most importantly, Governor Kane 
complained that Black was not doing enough to secure grain for the garrison at Menorca, 
which was under threat of Spanish and French aggression.517 Finally in 1738 Black was 
dismissed from his position.518 The king appointed Edward Holder, “whose prudent 
Conduct during his long residence in your Dominions,” the king wrote in his letter to the 
Dey “must, we are persuaded, render his Person very acceptable to you, and that you will 
look upon our Choice of him for this Employment as a mark of our sincere Desire to 
cultivate & improve the Peace and Amity which have so long subsisted between Our 
Dominions and your government.”519  
Consular, or even naval diplomacy, could not, it seemed, develop an adequately 
fruitful relationship between Britain and North African States. Letters from North African 
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rulers throughout the eighteenth century are rife with cutting assessments of British 
envoys. Few were dispatched as dryly, or with such gleeful contempt, as those of Sidi 
Muhammad. Deep in yet another round of stagnant negotiations over provisioning 
Gibraltar, Sidi Muhammad wrote to Commodore Spry in 1768: “If the Consul was good 
for anything, he might have settled it; but, poor simple man that he is, he is fit for nothing 
but to amass the salary he receives from the King, and to serve his own family 
purposes.”520 If British envoys seemed destined to fail as often as they might succeed, 
Gibraltar and Menorca would need to find supplementary and alternate routes of 
diplomacy to sustain their garrisons. While Admirals and consuls would continue to 
tackle the problem of North African diplomacy, their failings would bring others to the 
table. 
SUSTAINING THE COLONIES 
The 1730s and 1740s were a perilous time for the future of the young British 
possessions in the Mediterranean. It was no time to pick fights with North African allies. 
Plague raged through the Maghreb, threatening the whole of the Mediterranean. Ships 
were under tight quarantine, and Oran was captured by Spain, limiting the supply of grain 
from the Barbary Coast. The War of Polish Succession pit Bourbon France and Spain 
against the Hapsburgs and Prussia, returning friendly Naples and Sicily to Spanish rule, 
and producing a treaty between Sardinia and France, despite Austrian (and British) 
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attempts to secure a treaty with the kingdom.521 For the British, with the exception of the 
short-lived Spanish siege of Gibraltar in 1727, naval aggression died down to a quiet 
simmer after the War of Spanish Succession. The death of Louis XIV and the accession 
of a child to the French throne had rid Britain of a formidable foe. Further, in order to 
protect the ailing South Seas Company and British merchants in Spain, Robert Walpole 
took up a policy of naval restraint—a policy that persisted despite a growing opposition 
that favored more vigorous warfare.522 Britain’s new colonies were safe for the time 
being, but peace seemed fragile and their survival uncertain. By the end of the 1730s, the 
War of Austrian Succession would follow hard on the heels of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 
pitting Britain against old rivals France and Spain after 25 years of relative calm.  
Despite the fact that Britain managed to steer clear of major warfare between 
1714 and 1739, the shifting political landscape was cause for concern. The 1727 siege of 
Gibraltar was indicative of an atmosphere of Spanish aggression in the Mediterranean. 
After their losses in the War of Spanish Succession, Spain was determined to shift the 
balance of power back in their favor and win back lost territories. In 1732 the Spanish 
Navy blockaded Genoa, threatening to bombard the city if it did not pay a debt of two 
million pesos, and offer homage to the Spanish flag. When Genoa capitulated, Spain used 
this money to raise an expeditionary force to attack the Barbary Coast in an attempt to 
regain the strategic cities of Oran and Mers el-Kébir.523 The British watched Spanish 
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preparations in dismay. “There is greater reason to believe,” Governor Kane wrote from 
Menorca, “that their real design was against Oran, Tetuan and Tangier and all in order to 
distress Gibraltar [,] for Spain does not think any Risque or any Expense would be too 
great for the obtaining of that place.”524 The ministry also heard rumors that the French 
were sending spies to examine Menorca’s fortifications in order to plan an attack in 
concert with Spanish forces.525  
 When the Spanish won back Oran in 1733, Governor Kane wrote to London, 
concerned about an impending attack on Menorca and his current scarcity of provisions. 
Spanish influence in Italy made obtaining provision from Naples or Sicily dubious, and 
the ministry began to contemplate how it would supply Gibraltar and Menorca with grain 
if Kane could not find an alternate plan. To make matters worse, France had recently 
made a treaty with Algiers that reduced Britain’s share of grain from that port. Due to 
continuing complaints from the Dey about Charles Black, Newcastle suggested that it 
would be in the ministry’s best interest to remove him, especially because Algiers’ recent 
alliance with France threatened Britain’s favored position.526 Worse still, the Dey 
threatened to cut off any grain exports to Menorca because he suspected that ships with 
British passes (probably obtained in Menorca) were re-exporting grain to Oran, thereby 
supporting the Spanish garrison with Algerian grain.527  
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Although a Franco-Spanish attack on Menorca and Gibraltar in the mid 1730s 
never materialized, by 1739, the situation of the British colonies in the Mediterranean 
was increasingly unstable, exacerbated by the first hostilities of the War of Jenkins’ Ear. 
In January 1740, Consul Stanyford wrote to Newcastle of a plan to solve the problems of 
provisioning once and for all. The Turks made a failed attempt to regain Oran in 1733, 
but the Dey was still keen to seize control of the territory. The Dey and dīwān, Stanyford 
wrote, had suggested several times that if a British squadron would assist him in winning 
back the Spanish fortresses on the North African coast, “he would putt His Majesty in 
possession of the Town Cittadel harbour & Castle of Mazalquivir [Mers el-Kébir],” and 
give “His Majesty’s subjects the privilege of the trade of that Coast Exclusive of all other 
nations.” This, Stanyford added, “Considering the Great Sacristy of Corn & Provission 
all over Europe att present & the great plenty they now & generally have might happen to 
be the best consequence…with regard to an Immediate Supply.”528  When, in 1744, the 
protracted truce between France and Britain ended in naval warfare off the coast of 
Toulon, it was clear that without support from North Africa, the hub of British power in 
maritime Europe might crumble. As an 1895 article in the Temple Bar described it: “Port 
Mahon, about equidistant from Marseilles and Algiers, thus lay between the ports of an 
open enemy and an untrustworthy friend.”529   
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Grain From Barbary 
By 1757, there were only two British merchants living in Algiers and by 1766 
there was only one.530 The diplomatic failings of British consuls and the paucity of 
British merchants meant that the governors of Gibraltar and Menorca had to find 
alternative means of supplying the garrisons. Although Menorca had more natural 
resources than tiny, rocky Gibraltar, it was never able to fully supply its towns and 
garrison, except in years of exceptional harvest. Generally the island had to import 
considerable amounts of grain and cattle to feed both the civilian and military 
population.531 In 1729, for example, Governor Kane wrote that provisions were 
“absolutely necessary for the security of Minorca” without which the island would be in a 
“perilous condition.”532 In the spring of 1763, provisions for the garrison were so meager 
that there was not sufficient corn for eight days.533 Even a small rise in consumption 
could cause severe difficulties, as happened in 1771 when the arrival of Russian and 
Danish ships stretched the resources of the island dangerously thin.534  
Even more than Menorca, Gibraltar was dependent on importing food from the 
outside world, and most of that food came from across the Strait. Safer and cheaper than 
bringing supplies from the British Isles, supplies from North Africa were more reliable 
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than the sporadic trade with Spain, and more convenient than Faro or Livorno. The 
garrison imported live cattle and grain as well as poultry, vegetables, and fruit from 
Morocco’s northern coast.535 The possibility of the suspension of this trade made the 
British government wary of damaging relations with Morocco.536 This gave the Emperor 
and the qā’ids of the main ports a lever with which to put pressure upon Britain. If 
supplies from Morocco were cut off for any length of time, the garrison might suffer. 
And unfortunately, the supplies obtainable from Barbary, as an officer in 1707 reported, 
depended entirely on “the capricious humour of the Alcaide.”537  
Despite these moments of difficulty, and despite the many diplomatic stumbles of 
British envoys, Menorca and Gibraltar had indeed begun to develop a growing trade 
network with North Africa. From the early British occupation of Menorca, grain was 
imperative to the garrison. In 1712, Admiral Jennings was able to negotiate successfully 
with the Dey of Algiers, extracting his “kind promise to afford supply of provisions…for 
her Majesties’ Forces in Garrison.”538 Equally important to this quest, however, was the 
recognition of Menorcans and Gibraltarians as British subjects, which would afford them 
the protection of a Mediterranean pass. Soon after the Treaty of Utrecht, British 
authorities took steps to ensure that Menorcans and Gibraltarians would be recognized as 
British subjects—and as I have discussed in Chapter 2, they continued to make treaties 
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with an increasingly broad definition of British subjecthood. The ministry also often sent 
letters to consuls and rulers reiterating that they should “be look’d upon as natural 
Subjects,” and “enjoy all the benefits thereof as well as his majesties Subjects in his other 
dominions.”539     
Merchants to the Colonies 
 After the British capture of Gibraltar and Menorca, the new colonies began to 
attract foreign merchants. The Menorcan merchant population was fairly small when the 
British took the island but grew as Menorcans increasingly took the opportunities to trade 
under British passes. By the start of the War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739, there were thirty 
ships trading out of Mahón, most of them engaged in the import and re-export of grain 
from North Africa to the other Balearic Islands, Genoa, and Livorno.540 By 1778 the size 
of the Menorcan merchant fleet had risen to eighty ships, at least half of which were 
involved in the import or re-export of grain.541 Among the merchant population was a 
high number of foreigners—particularly Jews and Greek Orthodox communities the 
British often hoped to attract in hopes of counter-balancing their recalcitrantly Catholic 
native population. In the early 1730s, a Greek merchant named Hage Manuell Sifando542 
was involved in importing corn from North Africa, and had developed a special trade 
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relationship with the qā’id of Bona (Annaba)—a northeastern Algerian port city.543 By 
1740 there were at least 200 Greek families living in Menorca,544 and by 1743, they even 
sought to establish their own church.545 In 1744, a group of Greek merchants petitioned to 
become British subjects,546 and were granted the “same privileges, liberties and 
immunities” as other subjects of the island—a step the government hoped would entice 
more Greek merchants to Menorca and increase its trade.547 By 1750 Greeks made up the 
majority of the 546 foreign civilians—most of whom resided in the new capital of 
Mahón, or in the garrison town of St. Philip’s.548  
Although the number of Jews who had taken up permanent residence in Menorca 
in the first period of British rule is impossible to tally, there was a small Jewish 
community, and a lively trade with Jews at Algiers and Oran. As early as 1717, Moïse 
Parienti and Isaac Soliman, Jewish merchants at Algiers, were trading tobacco and other 
goods with the island.549 In 1720, Naphtali Busnach, a Livornese trader, moved to Mahon 
where he exported wool to Livorno, and probably imported wheat and other goods from 
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Oran.550 In 1723 he moved to Algiers, and it is likely that he continued his trade links 
with Menorca. Hiam Hirschberg speculates that he may have in fact left a family member 
as agent at Mahon.551 Although the Jewish population in Menorca was small and 
relatively transitory in the first period of British rule, a Jewish woman named Peceba 
Azuelos was born in Menorca in as early as 1738,552 and when the French invaded 
Minorca in 1756, they captured fifteen Jews in Fort St. Philips, eleven of whom had taken 
up arms in the fight against the French.553 Only two years into the second period of 
British rule, the Jews of Menorca had begun to build a synagogue554 and by the time the 
Spanish took Gibraltar in 1781, there were more than 450 Jews living on the island.555  
In Gibraltar, both Jews and Muslims came from Morocco, and the Rock’s “free 
port” status also attracted a large number of Genoese, as well as Jews from Portugal, 
Livorno, and London.556 Jewish merchants from Tétouan were the largest group 
supplying the garrison in the early days of the colony, although their future on the rock 
was uncertain until the treaties with Morocco of 1721 and 1729 clarified their legal 
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status.557 In 1712 Jews paid rents on more than a third of the properties in Gibraltar and in 
1714 there were 100 Jews from North Africa and 50 from England, Holland, and Italy in 
the garrison.558 Joshua Hassan argues that Moroccan Jews conducted an entrepôt trade 
with their own country on behalf of European merchants and most importantly, 
controlled much of the trade in provisions for the garrison.559 By 1753, Jews accounted 
for almost a third of the population, and were particularly active in the supply and 
butchering of Barbary cattle.560 Although by 1777 nearly three-quarters of the Jews in 
Gibraltar were born in the town and therefore considered British subjects, many 
continued to maintain economic and social links across the Strait.561  
Jewish Merchant-Diplomats 
For the British in the Mediterranean, Jewish merchants were important, not only 
for the trade networks they developed, but especially in the case of North Africa, for their 
trans-cultural knowledge—a hard-won skill born of centuries of expulsions and 
transplantations. This skill could be key in bridging the cultural and linguistic divide. 
However, in the case of later Jewish go-betweens, such as Jacob Benider, a Gibraltar-
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born British subject and Ambassador to the Moroccan Emperor, the liminal identities and 
multiple allegiances that made them powerful diplomatic allies would, at times, reach 
beyond the scope of the British ministry’s understanding of the expanding, yet 
increasingly codified bounds of British subjecthood.  
North African leaders saw the benefits of making financial and political alliances 
with the Jewish community as well. The Busnach family, for example, who migrated to 
Algiers from Livorno in the 1720s, would become one of the most powerful merchant 
families in Algiers through the early nineteenth century. Naphtali Ben Moses the so-
called “viceroy of Algiers,” was an important intermediary between the Dey and 
European governments before being murdered by a Janissary in 1805.562 For North 
African rulers, non-Muslim intermediaries could play an important role in upholding 
Islamic power and legitimacy. Daniel Schroeder argues that Sidi Muhammad 
conceptualized himself as a leader of both a state and a Caliphate—responsible for 
upholding shari‘a law and conducting jihad, while at the same time engaging 
commercially with Christian powers. Using non-Muslims as intermediaries provided a 
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legal framework whereby a Muslim Caliphate could trade with Christian nations without 
compromising the “ideological underpinnings of the state”563 
The Jews of Algiers 
In the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, Jewish merchants 
from Livorno began to settle in the coastal cities of Algiers. Because they were from 
Europe, they generally fell under the authority of their European consuls, and were 
known as “free Jews.”564 In particular, the Bouchara, Busnach, and Bacri families gained 
increasing economic and political power, and cultivated connections with Livorno, 
France, Spain, Menorca, and Gibraltar.565 The Boucharas maintained an eighteenth-
century dynasty as muqaddam, an Arabic title for civil or religious officials, literally 
meaning “expeditor,” or “assistant.” 566 The position was headed by a Bouchara for most 
of the eighteenth century. The muqaddam managed the Jewish courts, oversaw tax 
collection and the Jewish schools, and, most lucratively, served as the commercial agent 
of the Dey.567 
The Busnaches were also an influential family in Algiers. Naphtali Busnach left 
Mahon for Algiers in 1723, followed closely by Abraham Busnach who arrived in 
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Algiers in 1724.  Although most of the Busnach family stayed in Algiers, Abraham’s son 
David became an agent for the Bey of Tunis, ‘Ali b. Husayn. He worked closely with the 
Bey and the Governor of Menorca in an attempt to grant a monopoly to the British on 
exports from Tunisia’s northern coast.568 He also sent his son, Abraham Hay, to Mahon 
to develop the Menorcan branch of the family business. The Greek and Jewish 
communities in both Menorca and Algiers played an important role, not only as 
merchants and go-betweens, but also more generally as financial backers of the island’s 
trade. Although they often boasted Menorcan captains, many of the ships involved in 
provisioning the island and garrison were owned by financiers who had family 
connections both in Menorca and North Africa. Abraham Hay developed close 
connections with a Menorcan Jew named Abraham Melo, as well as the powerful Greek-
Menorcan Alexiano family. In a scheme to begin a business provisioning the garrisons, 
Hay, along with Theodore Alexiano, Demetrio Visare, a Greek and an official at the port 
of Algiers, and Jayme Vidal, a Menorcan captain, appear to have embarked on a project 
to import grain from Algiers.569 Consul Fraser, however, objected, writing to the ministry 
that he hoped “such Regulations will take place as to prevent Jews, the lowest, meanest 
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and most abject of these subjects from being able to procure” Mediterranean passes.570 
Ironically, Menorcans complained that Fraser had been thwarting trade with Algiers, by 
charging captains high prices at the port, forcing them to trade though his Jewish agent, 
as well as holding ships’ Mediterranean passes for ransom. The Jurats of Mahon drew up 
a long list of complaints from Menorcan captains claiming that Fraser “imposes them 
with various vexations, totally contrary to the Liberty of the trade.”571 Governor Mostyn 
enclosed the complaints from the Jurats of Mahon, ending his letter, “I shall only add, 
that the Trade to Barbary is the Support & sole Dependence of this Island.”572  
Morocco: Trouble in the Tanja 
Trans-Mediterranean family ties were even more important in Gibraltar, where 
families that stretched across the Strait were the lifeblood of both trade and politics. From 
the beginning of Gibraltar-Morocco relations, Jewish intermediaries were central to 
political and economic diplomacy. Several Jews had key roles in drawing up the 1721 
treaty between Britain and Morocco which was vital to promoting trade, provisioning the 
garrison, and for safeguarding British subjects from attack by Moroccan privateers. At 
first, the British sent Captain Norbury to negotiate a treaty with Mawlay Isma‘il. The 
negotiations, however, went badly, with the Emperor complaining that the envoy was 
“incapable of giving a good answer, and unable to discharge any trust, by reason of his 
little civility and great ignorance.”573 After his departure, Moroccan Jews Reuben b. Kiki 
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(Quiqui), and Moses b. ‘Atar, worked on the treaty for several years. In 1721, British 
envoy Charles Stewart, Ahmad Pasha b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allah and “Treasurer of His 
Imperial Majesty,” Moses b. ‘Atar all signed the document, ratifying the treaty between 
the two states that would serve as the prototype for subsequent agreements.574 Ibn ‘Atar 
continued a relationship with both Stewart and Admiral Byng and helped redeem several 
hundred British captives.575 
From the establishment of the English colony at Tangier, Moroccan and English 
politics and trade in the Mediterranean were intertwined. Sultan Mawlay Isma‘il, who 
had driven the English from Tangier in 1684, was able to expand his sovereignty to the 
modern borders of Morocco. Unlike previous dynasties, Mawlay Isma‘il and his Alawite 
dynasty did not have the support of any of local Berber leaders. Instead he enforced his 
dominion with an army of black slaves. The 1721 peace treaty had been an important step 
for British trade with Morocco, but upon Ismail’s death in 1727, the country was thrown 
once more into a state of instability. Between 1727 and 1757 struggles for power in 
Morocco—particularly between Mawlay ‘Abd Allah and his brother Mawlay al-
Musta‘di—meant that control of the empire changed fifteen times in those thirty years. 576 
This instability gave greater power to the governors of northern port cities, freeing them 
to negotiate their own agreements to provision Gibraltar—the very thing that Sidi 
Muhammad would try to eradicate when he took power in the 1750s.  
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John Braithwaite, who was present in Gibraltar during the Spanish siege of 1727 
and accompanied Consul Russell on a diplomatic expedition to Morocco during the 
outbreak of the wars between contenders for the crown, reported that the “divisions 
among the Moors were a great Advantage to our Garrison of Gibraltar, during the Siege, 
both Parties industriously courting our friendship.” From Mawlay Isma‘il’s death in 
1727, merchants in Gibraltar, and indeed the governor himself, began to treat the 
governments of the port cities of the Tanja as autonomous entities. “If we are to trade 
only with the Loyal Subjects of Muley Abdallah,” a group of merchants and inhabitants 
of Gibraltar wrote in a 1754 Remonstrance to the Governor, “we must give over all 
commerce with his Country; for we dare venture to affirm that there is not a single sea 
port in his whole Dominions in real Subjection to him, and as it is from those ports we 
must have our supplies & merchandize…” In their representation, the merchants argued 
that although the 1750 treaty with Mawlay ‘Abd Alla was meant to “secure our 
Navigation from his Cruisers of the country & procure supplies for this garrison,” in 
reality Mawlay ‘Abd Alla only had authority over inland and southern Morocco. “If he 
has not authority enough to command his own Subjects,” they wrote “we must, for our 
own sakes, treat with those who hold the Reins of Government in the different Ports, 
without considering whether they are friends or Foes of the Emperor.”577  
In the 1750s, the governor of Gibraltar himself entered into such negotiations with 
the Governor of Asilah, Mawlay al-Musta‘di —the Emperor’s brother and long-time 
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competitor for the throne. In August 1755, Governor Fowke wrote to Secretary of State 
Robinson that negotiations with al-Musta‘di to trade with Asilah had been beneficial to 
Gibraltar, because competition between these independent port cities had driven down the 
price for supplies down in Tangier and Tétouan as well. “It is a fortunate Circumstance 
on this occasion,” Fowke wrote, “that the Port of Asilah is open to us for the Exportation 
of all kinds of provisions; for had we not that Resource I am apprehensive that those of 
Tetuan & Tangier would, from an Opinion of our standing in need of Supplys from them, 
be very outrageous.” Fowke, who had been sending al-Musta‘di “several little Presents of 
such things as I could meet with that I thought would be agreeable to him,” asked the 
secretary of state for a “small Token of His Majesty’s Esteem” to be sent to the Prince 
“who has on all occasions shown so sincere a Regard & Respect for our Nation as merits 
some notice.”578  
Despite the increased competition between Morocco’s Northern Ports, the qā’ids 
as well as the Emperor were well aware of the virtual monopoly they often had on 
provisions for the garrison. In the early 1750s, relative peace with Spain encouraged 
Gibraltar to attempt to circumvent high prices and political problems and famine in 
Morocco by purchasing provisions from Spain. Governor Bland proposed that the 
Ambassador to Spain, Benjamin Keene, should try to negotiate a deal whereby the 
garrison at Gibraltar “might be supplied with live Cattle and other Fresh Provisions.”579 
At the time, North Africa was in a major drought, and Bland was also in negotiations 
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with the Governor of Tangier to supply the port with English grain in return for 
Moroccan cattle.580 Again, after Sidi Muhammad’s threats in 1755, to cut off all 
provisions from Moroccan ports, Governor Fowke wrote to Keene “begging the favour of 
him to use his Interest at the court of Madrid for procuring an order” of provisions to 
“prevent any Distrust or Uneasiness that may happen in this Garrison for want of the 
usual Supplies of fresh Provisions from Barbary.”581 Provisions in any great quaintly 
from Spain, however, were seldom forthcoming.  In the midst of this political unrest, 
Jewish merchants played an important role in mediating between the British and the 
qā’ids of Tétouan and Tangiers. They helped supply food to the troops in the fortress of 
Gibraltar, and granted loans and credit for the redemption of British captives. Abraham 
Benider, for example, a native of Tétouan, had learned English “to great perfection” as a 
resident of Gibraltar, and served as an interpreter for the Moroccan Ambassador in 
London as well as for the British fleet.582 He was also “very serviceable...in procuring 
provisions both for the Fleet and Garrison.”583  
With the maturation of the Jewish community at Gibraltar, increasing numbers of 
Moroccan Jews were becoming natural-born British Subjects, and were progressively 
well-versed in the English language and in British diplomatic culture. Invaluable as go-
betweens, many were appointed as vice consuls and interpreters. Jacob, Abraham 
Benider’s Gibraltar-born son, was appointed British vice consul at Tangier in the 1760s, 
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and later Salé.584 When the new Consul-General, Charles Logie, removed him from 
office in 1772, Sidi Muhammad recognized Benider’s diplomatic potential and sent him 
to London as a Moroccan Ambassador. In his letter of introduction, Sidi Muhammad 
wrote of him: “he loves you and serves you ... because he is our servant and yours.”585 
Despite the importance of go-betweens like Benider in fostering diplomacy with North 
Africa, the fact of Benider’s status as a British subject made him unacceptable as an 
envoy for Morocco; while Sidi Muhammad saw Benider’s background as an excellent 
opportunity for mutual understanding, the ministry saw it as an intolerable case of 
divided loyalties.586 Liminal identities were crucial to diplomatic workings in the 
Mediterranean region, but in London, the idea of a British subject acting as a foreign 
ambassador who might simultaneously represent Moroccan, Gibraltarian, and larger 
British interests was beyond the scope of the ministry’s imagination.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Some have envisioned the eighteenth century as a period of European imperial 
expansion and North African decline. This dynamic does not take into account, however, 
the fact that British power in the Mediterranean was built upon strong diplomatic 
relations with North Africa. North African states were essential to British survival as a 
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colonial power in the Mediterranean. However, cultural, linguistic, and geographic 
distance, as well as deeply ingrained cultural chauvinism had long created diplomatic 
difficulties between England and North Africa. In the eighteenth century, the system of 
political patronage that began to replace knowledgeable merchant-consuls with 
inexperienced and often incompetent officials only compounded these difficulties. Thus 
the consular system that developed in the eighteenth century often proved inadequate in 
fostering the trade that was so essential to maintain Britain’s Mediterranean garrisons. 
Despite this, the political and geographic realities of the British possessions in the 
Mediterranean meant that North African rulers such as Sidi Muhammad could not be 
dealt with through military might or aggression. In January 1756, before Moroccan 
Ambassador Benzacour arrived in London with his letter to King George, and before 
Hyde Parker’s disastrous diplomatic mission to Morocco, a group of merchants sent 
nervous letters to the ministry, with suggestions for the upcoming diplomatic mission to 
Morocco. They warned that whoever would be sent to redeem hostages and draw up a 
treaty should bear a letter from the King, be “Invested with full power” and “proper 
credentials,” and be accompanied by “some person who has some knowledge of the 
customs of that country” who was also “conversant in the Language.”587⁠   
While the British rarely found British envoys who were knowledgeable about 
North African customs, or “conversant in the Language,” they did begin to develop 
relationships with local intermediaries who could help smooth the rough edges of Anglo-
Maghrebi diplomacy. While British envoys with “little civility and great ignorance,” such 
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as Norbury and Parker often gave offence in North Africa, merchant diplomats such as 
Moses b. ‘Atar and Benider were able to navigate the cultural divide more easily. 588 
North African Jews in particular, were valuable go-betweens for British diplomacy. 
Jewish merchants often had close connections with North African leaders, for whom they 
helped develop trade connections with European states. As the Jewish population in 
Gibraltar grew, mercantile and family networks developed across the straits and would 
prove essential not only to trade, but to diplomacy as well. Contrary to any notion of any 
all-encompassing British imperial hegemony, British power in the Mediterranean 
depended on deferential diplomacy with North Africa. And just as the British manned the 
ships that would provision their garrisons with diverse Mediterranean people, diplomacy 
itself was increasingly conducted by local intercessors, who might effectively help 
Britain court the Maghreb. 
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Chapter 4. A Sea of Wax and Ink 
WAITING FOR THE MAIL   
  In the summer of 1778 the battle raging between England and her rebellious 
American colonies had turned into a global struggle. Britain had recently declared war on 
France, French privateers were busy capturing British merchant vessels throughout the 
Mediterranean, and on the island of Menorca, Governor Murray waited impatiently for 
the mail. French privateers had already captured five or six Menorcan ships and crucially, 
had detained the packet boat carrying letters from London. The war had also crippled the 
island’s trade and put 800 Menorcan merchant seamen out of work.589 The Jurats sent 
remonstrances to Governor Murray, requesting that he commission Menorcan privateers, 
who might give the island’s seamen some employment. With no trade and no licenses to 
plunder enemy vessels, Menorcan mariners had begun seeking work on French ships.590 
Without instructions from London, however, Murray was hesitant to take action. He had 
received word from Secretary of State Lord Weymouth in July that the Crown had 
decided to commission privateers, but licensing Menorcans to act as British privateers 
would require official letters of marque from London—documents that were, Governor 
Murray assumed, aboard Menorca’s mail ship, the Earl of Bessborough packet, which 
was trapped in Livorno by the French blockade.  
Murray was in a quandary. Communication was key to maintaining the chain of 
command in the British Mediterranean, and he was anxious not to overstep his authority. 
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The blockade had not only damaged British trade, it had also amputated the hierarchy at 
the heart of imperial war-making: direct orders from London.  Murray, left alone on an 
island of angry Jurats and traitorous sailors, wrote copious letters to the Secretary of 
State begging for direction. He wrote to the Governor of Gibraltar, the Admiral of the 
Mediterranean fleet, and the consul at Barcelona asking for advice. He even employed an 
armored row boat to sail to Livorno to retrieve the mail—all in vain.591 After agonizing 
for three months he decided to issue his own privateering commissions to Menorcan 
ships.592 In his nervous letter to Secretary of State Weymouth he wrote, “if the mode is 
defective, the idea is at least pious, and therefore if I err’d I rely upon the King’s 
Forgiveness.”593 At first glance, Murray’s hesitation seems puzzling. Why did he delay so 
long if he knew that the Crown had issued commissions two months before? Why delay 
if it was clear that the letters of marque were lost, indefinitely detained, or quite possibly 
at the bottom of the sea? The answer is as simple as it is surprising, but it is vital to 
understanding British imperial power in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was a 
world in which the difference between privateering and piracy, the boundary between 
safe passage and slavery, the line between British subject and alien enemy were all drawn 
quite literally in ink and wax on parchment and paper.  
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 “The state,” Kenneth Banks writes of the French Empire, “could only be as strong 
as its most recent dispatches.”594 But it was not just dispatches and the information that 
they contained that was the source of British strength in the Mediterranean. In a region 
with few “natural born” Britons and where the Crown controlled meager territory, 
parchment itself extended British sovereignty into the sea—protecting British trade and 
combating Britain’s enemies. In the case of Murray’s missing letters of marque, the form 
of these documents themselves was vital to their validity—expressing British power 
through signatures and seals—a formal and authenticated expression of sovereignty for 
which Murray’s own decrees could be no substitute. By their very nature, these 
documents transferred the power to make war from the state to its subjects, establishing 
the bearers as subjects of the British Crown who were commissioned to fight on its 
behalf. Parchment, ink, wax, and the power they carried were key to British authority in 
the Mediterranean. These documents were not simply the record of the communications 
of rulers and subjects—they were a technology of empire. As Miles Ogborn puts it: 
“Writing was not simply a commentary upon what happened, it was very much part of 
the action.”595  
 The circulation of such documents was facilitated by the development of British 
bureaucracy. By the eighteenth century, the overseas mail services connected Britain to 
Europe, the colonies, and increasingly the world; the Admiralty and Board of Trade kept 
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constant communication with their representatives abroad; the Privy Council read 
memorials and remonstrances sent from the colonies and mailed back to them its decrees. 
Charged with the management of a growing empire, the British government relied on an 
increasingly professional administration and on the development of what Konstantin 
Dierks calls  “documentary culture”—an explosion in “letter writing, record keeping, and 
printing that enabled an unparalleled interconnection of city to nation, nation to empire, 
and empire to world.”596  Through these technologies of empire, the British could manage 
and connect vast territories and populations. John Brewer has famously marked the 
period between 1649-1714 as the rise of the “fiscal military state.” According to Brewer, 
England’s rise to global dominance was achieved through a new level of organization and 
financial administration.597 As Christopher Storrs points out, the number of full-time 
employees in this “fiscal bureaucracy” rose from 2,524 in 1690 to 8,292 in 1783.598   
This burgeoning bureaucracy necessitated and created ever-expanding reams of 
paperwork for administrative bodies such as the Board of Trade, Admiralty, Treasury and 
a host of other government departments that managed the expanding empire. Even a 
glance at the Navy Board correspondence reveals the astounding proliferation of 
paperwork over the course of the eighteenth century. A volume from the 1770s bulges at 
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twice the size of one from the 1720s, and covers a shorter period of time. Bureaucracy, 
empire, and paper went hand in hand.599  
 Some historians and sociologists have also associated this growing bureaucracy 
and the paperwork it produced with a transition from a “traditional” to a “modern” state. 
According to Max Weber, modern governments are founded on what he calls “the 
files”—documents that are the “material implements” of bureaucracy.600 This 
documentation is also essential to Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopower”—the 
surveillance and regulation of subjects.601 By creating and maintaining these files, the 
state gained access to information about the histories and identities of its subjects—
information it could use to regulate and surveil the population. The modern state, 
according to theorists like Anthony Giddens and John Torpey, carries out its surveillance 
through administration and documents such as identification papers.602 As Edward Higgs 
emphasizes, however, there were more beneficial aspects to the new forms of 
documentary identification. Written documentation of identification not only “measured 
and manipulated” subjects in the interest of the state, but was also the underpinning of the 
rights of those subjects—and was a written guarantee of those rights.603  
                                                
599 Clive Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (Rochester NY: Boydell 
Press, 2004), 99. See for example National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM) ADM/B. 
600 Max Weber, Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology Vol. 3 (New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1968), 957. 
601 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collègede France, 1977-78 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
602 John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of 
Movement,’” Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (1998): 247; Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism Vol. 2, The Nation-State and Violence: Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 47; 45. 
603 Edward Higgs, Identifying the English: A History of Personal Identification 1500 to the Present 
(London: Continuum International Publishing, 2011), 7. 
  205 
 Historians of Modern Europe have associated technologies of identification with 
the industrial revolution and the nineteenth century, when workers flocked to the cities 
from the countryside, breaking the networks of personal relationships that characterized 
rural life.604 Moving from villages in which they and their families had spent their whole 
lives, this newly anonymous urban populace would require proof of who they were and 
whether they could be trusted.605  But anonymity was not unique to the industrial city.  
The sailors, travellers and merchants who traversed the early modern globe were 
similarly removed from the local networks of thick and longstanding personal 
relationships that characterized rural life. Paper and parchment, ink and wax, served not 
only to identify or protect the bearer, but also to extend the power of the sovereign into an 
international space. Although personal passports would not fully develop until the French 
Revolution, their predecessors can be seen in ships’ papers, passes of safe conduct, letters 
of introduction, Mediterranean passes, and letters of marque. 606  
 This chapter argues that paper, parchment, ink, and wax were not only ways to 
convey information, but were technologies of empire-building in their own right. Their 
circulation into, out of, and throughout the Mediterranean created the British 
Mediterranean world. It was not only letters and dispatches that organized and 
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disseminated British power throughout the Mediterranean. In a community in which 
peoples of diverse origins increasingly claimed British subjecthood, and in which British 
territorial claims were negligible, documents were both a vital tool for administrative 
communication and a tangible instrument through which British power and protection 
flowed. Mediterranean passes, letters of marque, and ships’ papers extended the powers 
of the sovereign into an international space, defining who could and could not partake in 
the rights and protections of British subjecthood. The movement toward documents, 
rather than national origin, culture, or language as the marker of subjecthood would allow 
a wider range of people to claim rights and protections as British subjects, both legally 
(as inhabitants of the colonies of Gibraltar or Menorca) and illegally (by obtaining a 
documents through forgery, trickery, or luck).  
Paper Empire: Letters of Rule and Trade 
 “Statesmen and ambassadors,” writes Fernand Braudel, “whom we usually 
imagine with weighty matters on their minds, are often preoccupied by the arrival or 
delays of the mail.”607 In December 1776, the recently appointed British consul to Genoa, 
John Collet, wrote to William Dean Poyntz, British chargé d’affaires in Turin, to 
introduce himself and to assure Poyntz that he would honor Lord Weymouth’s orders to 
keep a regular correspondence. Collet wrote that he would “not fail” to send Poyntz any 
intelligence that came his way.608 Like Braudel’s frustrated correspondents, Collet’s 
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letters are full of complaints about delays in the mail. In his letter to Poyntz, Collet 
grumbled that because the Spanish courier fell ill on the road, he had received news only 
the day before that a British frigate had captured an American ship off Cape Finisterre 
several weeks before.609 Attacks on mail ships, wartime blockades, or the illness, robbery, 
or capture of couriers meant that the vital circulation of information could be slow and 
complicated. Consuls, merchants, and governors often relied on each other for news. 
By 1776 news had become increasingly important in British life, both at home 
and abroad. Eighteenth-century Britain was in the midst of a full-fledged communication 
revolution.610 Newspapers brought reports daily from around the growing empire and the 
world, and the postal system allowed people to connect to friends, family, and business 
partners with a rapidity never seen before.611 The early modern explosion in letter writing 
and record keeping was aided by a tremendous rise in literacy rates. Although England 
had “long been a society with both significant literate and illiterate elements,” from about 
the sixteenth century literacy was no longer confined to the gentry, nobility, clergy, or 
even the middling sort.612 The proliferation of literature written in the vernacular “made 
the whole population potentially members of the literate culture.”613 The growing 
complexity of trade and the importance of bills, contracts, and other legal and mercantile 
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documents made reading an increasingly valuable skill. Also, from the sixteenth century, 
more and more children bound for skilled and semi-skilled work entered grammar, petty, 
dame, parish, or subscription schools, where students were taught basic literacy and 
numeracy, if not necessarily complete literary competence.614 Northwest Europe in 
particular, underwent a major shift after the fifteenth century, when ninety five per cent 
of men and all but a few women were illiterate. By 1800, more than half of adult males 
could sign their names, and even more could probably read a simple text.615  
Britons in the Mediterranean were even more likely to be literate given that most 
were government officials, merchants, or sailors. Although literacy was not essential for 
common sailors, it was a crucial skill for any ambitious man who wanted to move up the 
ranks.616 A boatswain, for example, had to be able to check manifests, read bills of 
lading, and write receipts for merchants’ goods. Robert Alwyn, boatswain of the 
merchant vessel Elizabeth, was dismissed in Genoa because he “wrote very indifferently, 
very slowly, cuild not spell English.”617 Mates were required to keep logbooks, and 
needed numeracy to calculate the ships’ latitude and the day’s distance and course.618 
Marcus Rediker has calculated that between 1700 and1750, ninety five per-cent of skilled 
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crew and officers were literate enough to sign their name when called before the 
Admiralty court. Literacy among common seamen and unskilled workers, however, was 
much less common, but still at about 70 per-cent.619 Of course, the levels of literacy could 
range drastically between small fishing boats and Royal Navy ships. While some 
logbooks only contained the most rudimentary calculations needed for navigation, Royal 
Navy Lieutenant Phillip Carteret scribbled stanzas of Milton and salacious lines from 
Pope in the cover of the logbook of the Guernsey while cruising the Mediterranean.620  
 Eighteenth-century readers and writers were aided by another crucial technology 
of empire: the development of the British postal system. Overseas mail not only 
maintained the chain of command in far-off places, it facilitated coordination between 
manufacturers, wholesalers, merchants, and retailers, enabling the expansion of global 
trade.621 The Post Office packet service—mail ships and boats named for the packets of 
letters they carried—was as instrumental to this communication between Britain and her 
officials overseas or in her colonies and to the business of trade.  
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 British overseas mail service began in the sixteenth century and carried royal and 
government correspondence.622 Prior to the seventeenth century, business correspondence 
and private letters were sent as “ships’ letters” aboard merchant vessels.623 By the early 
seventeenth century, the British government began to take charge of the circulation of 
personal and merchant letters, developing the postal service into a for-profit scheme. 
Ships’ letters carried aboard merchant vessels became integrated into the postal service: 
merchant vessels were to give ships’ letters to the post-master at their port of arrival in 
England and from there the letters would be forwarded to London for distribution via the 
Royal post.624    
The Postal Act of 1711 consolidated the English, Irish, Scottish, and colonial mail 
services, centralized the administration, and treated the circulation of mail domestically 
and overseas as a single system catering to the empire as a whole.625 The Postmaster 
General appointed agents in various foreign and colonial ports. He also made treaties 
with foreign postmasters to set routes and prices for British mail traveling overland 
through foreign countries. A 1783 treaty between the “Post Master General of Great 
Britain” and the “Intendant General of the Posts of France” specified that English mail 
traveling to or through France should be sent twice weekly from Falmouth to arrive by 
packet ship at Calais. From Calais, the French post office would bring it to Paris for 
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distribution via the regular French post.626 The many “ruptures” caused by eighteenth-
century imperial wars, however, often interrupted these treaties and agreements.627  
By the early eighteenth century the post office had well-established routes to the 
Mediterranean. Overland routes began from Atlantic port cities like Corunna, Calais, and 
Lisbon. A packet ship also ran between Menorca and either Marseilles, Livorno or 
Genoa—depending on the current diplomatic situation.628 Problems of communication 
were endemic to the Mediterranean colonies in times of war. Menorca, so close to France 
and Spain, was liable to blockade and attack. Although not technically an island, 
Gibraltar was cut off from the mainland under the Treaty of Utrecht. During wars with 
Spain, it might be under constant bombardment across the border and blockaded by ships 
in the straits. Both colonies were strategic strongholds, and governors (who were also 
commanders of the garrisons) needed orders. Admirals too, often depended on packet 
service to communicate with London. In wartime, packet boats supplied Gibraltar by way 
of Lisbon (instead of overland through Corunna or other Spanish ports), making Gibraltar 
an important hub of communication with the Mediterranean Fleet.629  
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War in the Mediterranean—where so many competing imperial powers jostled 
shoulder to shoulder—meant that packet ships faced great danger at sea. Not only did 
they carry crucial information about the plans and movements of the Army and Navy, 
they also often carried bullion to pay troops and any merchant freight that captains could 
muster.630 At the beginning of the North American rebellion, British merchants in 
Portugal “much alarmed and given the greatest reason to be apprehensive for the safety of 
their effects” petitioned that the Lisbon packets be armed.631 The Earl of Bessborough 
packet—the ship governor Murray awaited so often during the American War was in 
even greater peril. With the French in possession of nearby Corsica, privateer attacks on 
the packet were routine, and Captain Shrieves, commander of the Bessborough, had to 
ply sailors with extra money to convince them to embark on such a dangerous 
enterprise.632 Despite the danger, and the slim rewards, Shrives promised: “I shall do 
every thing in my power for the good of the service, as I flatter myself that no man can 
have it more at heart.”633 The Bessborough withstood several attacks, but mail service 
between Menorca and mainland Europe remained unpredictable, and within a year of 
writing those brave words, Shrieves would be dead, killed in a privateer attack.634 
Out of communication with London, British officials in the Mediterranean relied 
on each other for news and advice. Consul Collet sent Murray his “best and fastest 
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advices” on the rare occasions that he could find a neutral vessel that might reach the 
island. He also sent news and advice to London when Menorca was blockaded. During 
Murray’s distressing isolation in 1779, Collet promised Secretary of State Weymouth that 
if he should hear any important news he would  “punctually communicate the same to 
your Lordship as I do constantly to Mr. Poyntz at Turin.”635 Desperate for the government 
dispatches, however, Murray engaged the Judge of the Vice Admiralty court, George 
Sutherland to smuggle dispatches from London with him through France on his way back 
to Menorca from England. Traveling through Genoa, and with the help of Consul Birbeck 
in Nice, Sutherland and his son boarded a neutral Sardinian vessel, disguising the 
dispatches as pieces of rope, and hiding them “under old sails and cordage.”636 Despite 
Sutherland’s valiant efforts to bring the dispatches to Menorca, he was captured and 
imprisoned in France. Unable to destroy the dispatches in time, they fell into the hands of 
the French.637 
Letters and dispatches were not the only documents that held together the British 
Mediterranean world. The eighteenth century was also a period of a great proliferation of 
print culture. Newspapers, broadsides, books, and pamphlets, drew readers in far corners 
of the empire into what Benedict Anderson describes as “imagined communities”—
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uniting them into a virtual nation of common language and literature.638 Jürgen Habermas 
argues that print and the development of the press also had major effects on the 
development of merchant networks and the public sphere. Long-distance trade created 
not only traffic in commodities, but in news as well. Merchants corresponded with factors 
and agents across the globe and depended on whatever news they could gather that might 
help them decide the price of their goods or find new markets. Habermas argues that the 
circulation of news was vital for the development of merchant networks, but that at the 
end of the seventeenth century, private and secretive merchant correspondence gave way 
to a more public form of communication: the press.639 Although the proliferation of print 
culture and the press had dramatic effects on what, how, and how much eighteenth-
century readers consumed, studies of merchant letters such those by Francesca Trivellato 
and David Hancock have demonstrated that private merchant correspondence and 
personal relationships continued to play a crucial role in the lives of merchant 
communities long after the rise of print technology and newspapers.640 Although 
newspapers were an efficient way to receive information from far off places, as any 
eighteenth century reader knew, first-hand information from a trusted friend was usually 
more reliable, and for merchants, the networks they created facilitated bonds of 
familiarity and trust that could only be cultivated by personal letters. 
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Newspapers and letters often worked in tandem: printed material might be sent 
alongside glosses and critiques in private letters, while private letters from those who had 
witnessed or taken part in important events were often printed in the public press.641 The 
dissemination of printed news helped keep merchants informed about events that might 
affect their trade, but also announced the delivery and collection of the post and the 
arrival and departure of packet boats.642  
Government officials, too, sometimes looked to the press for their news.  
Secretaries of State often distributed the government mouthpiece, The London Gazette, to 
diplomats and governors to publicize important events. But information printed in the 
public press lacked the authority of the written (and authenticated) word. Newspapers, 
which lacked the accouterments of authority and authenticity—seals and signatures—
could neither verify news nor invest recipients with any power to act. In 1779, a year 
after Murray’s long wait for the letters of marque against French vessels, his trouble with 
the mail began again.643 Although at first the Spanish had remained neutral, by July 1779 
Murray heard from the London Gazette that war with Spain had broken out in June and 
that King had issued letters of marque against the Spanish—letters that once again could 
not reach the island because of the French blockade. Acutely aware that true power could 
only be conferred by properly authenticated parchment, wax, and ink, the judge of the 
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Vice Admiralty Court denied Murray’s request to grant temporary letters of marque 
against the Spanish. Newspaper reports of war were useless, he ruled, without the 
authority of the “Great Seal of Great Britain.”644 Ironically, Secretary Weymouth had in 
fact declined to send the official commissions to the island, deeming it too dangerous for 
such precious documents to be sent on a foolhardy mission through the post. Instead he 
had sent only copies of the orders. “The original will remain in my office,” he wrote, “’til 
a proper opportunity offers for conveying it to you.”645 Although newspapers could 
disseminate the information printed on their pages, they could not transmit authority; 
documents that bore the proper signatures and seals, however, might be too valuable to 
trust to a mail system compromised by wartime blockades.  
For merchants, government officials and other Britons living in the 
Mediterranean, correspondence required a careful balance of news and gossip, secrecy 
and formal orders. Speculation about impending wars traveled in all circles and ranged 
from real and important intelligence to futile conjecture. In November 1776, Genoa Vice 
Consul Joseph Brame wrote that the Spanish post brought letters from Cadiz where 
“Opinions about a War were various, tho’ west India products were rising.”646 In June 
1779, Collet wrote to Poyntz that “a particular friend” received a letter from a “person of 
some consequence in Spain” assuring him that attacks on Gibraltar and Menorca were 
imminent.647  
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Despite the gossip and conjecture that might circulate in merchant or diplomatic 
circles, for government officials, secrecy was paramount to protecting military and 
diplomatic strategy. Officials would go to great lengths to keep sensitive information 
private. Stealth and secrecy were important in the Mediterranean, both because of the 
valuable information that letters held, but also because of the great power vested in the 
documents themselves—documents that gave the bearers the right to wage war, or in the 
case of Mediterranean passes, to escape it. Letter-writers in the Mediterranean took 
precautions so that their mail would not go astray and so that important information 
would not fall into the wrong hands. Letters sent by regular mail were often brief and 
seldom contained details of political or military significance. Those details were relegated 
to letters that would be personally conveyed by trusted associates and often passed 
through various consuls at important port cities such as Livorno, Barcelona, or Genoa.648 
The most secret government documents would be written in cypher—a numerical code 
meant to keep unwelcome eyes from grasping their meaning.649 When, in 1770, Governor 
Johnston of Menorca sent a letter to London complaining of the sorry state of the troops 
and fortifications, the Secretary of State sent him back a stern reply: “I was extremely 
sorry to see a letter of that kind come through France by the Common Post; as there is not 
the least Doubt but the contents of it are known there.”650 So important was this secrecy 
that captains of packet ships that carried government dispatches were ordered to sink the 
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  218 
mail if the packet was in danger of capture.651 In spring 1779, for example, dispatches 
from Consul Collet to Lord Weymouth were lost when the Ostend Packet, mistaking a 
British cruiser for an enemy ship, threw three mails overboard—adding, no doubt, to the 
growing communication crisis of the American War.652  
Over the course of their three-year correspondence, Genoese consul Collet and 
chargé d'affaires Poyntz kept each other apprised of the movement of American, French, 
and Spanish ships in the Mediterranean and sent each other copies of the circular letters 
that kept British consuls abreast of new orders or policies from London. They gave 
advice about how to deal with the complicated system of Mediterranean passes, sent 
copies or extracts of interesting and important correspondences, and provided each other 
with the odd bit of gossip about the lives of others in the small circle of British merchants 
and officials in the Mediterranean. From the tone and tenor of their letters, it is clear that 
the two formed a surprisingly friendly and intimate relationship—without ever meeting 
face to face. When Collet heard in 1779 that Poyntz would soon be leaving his diplomatic 
post in Turin he wrote: “The kind, and friendly manner in which you have so obligingly 
Conermitted me to correspond with you, makes me interest myself in what may regard 
your future situation. I flatter myself you will not quitt Italy without calling at Genoa […] 
I have long desired a personal interview to confirm to you how much I wish to cultivate 
your acquaintance.”653 
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These long-lived correspondences between virtual strangers were not at all 
uncommon—even among families, especially the merchant families whose members 
spread all across the world—creating networks of familial trust and global trade. For 
example, Esther Black wrote from Dublin to her brother Alexander living in Cadiz: “I 
have long wished for an opportunity of beginning a correspondence with you, as I see 
very little likeyhood of our meeting to converse face to face…when you are tired with 
casting up large sums & settleing accoumpts,” she wrote, she hoped he would “sit down 
& scribble over a piece of paper which would be a most agreable preasnt to me.” Esther 
went on to say that her peculiar family arrangement made “people stare sometimes when 
I tell them I have brothers & a sister that I really don’t know, otherwise than as we 
converse by letter.”654 The Blacks were a family of Scotch-Irish merchants, who traded 
wine, linen, and other goods primarily with southern Europe and later the West Indies 
and India. Esther was one of thirteen brothers and sisters who were scattered across the 
globe—several of whom had never met in person.655 For Esther and her family, the 
familial bond could be expressed (and cultivated) only on paper.  
MERCHANT NETWORKS: THE BLACK FAMILY 
Letters held together not only a network of British administrators, but also a web 
of far-flung merchants, creating virtual communities of trust and trade—communities 
built on the pages of circulating paper. Merchant families, such as the Blacks, maintained 
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both their trade and family ties through regular correspondence. The circulation of 
correspondence was key to managing orders, debts, and personal business from afar. 
Merchants also depended on one another to maintain strong business contacts and make 
important introductions—often entirely through letters. While governors and diplomats 
attempted to maintain the often permeable web of British authority through constant 
communication, merchants like the Blacks turned to letter writing to advise each other 
about how best to avoid the wars, laws, and imperial competition that could hurt their 
trade or imperil their lives. 
The Blacks’ impressive network of letters and letter writers circulated vital 
instructions for their international business interests: accounts of monies spent and owed, 
instructions for the purchase of goods, and news of the travels of business associates, 
goods, and family members—mirroring in miniature, the authority distribution systems of 
the imperial state. Like the government itself, correspondence allowed the Blacks to carry 
out the administrative necessities of both business and family life over great distances. 
Another vital part of Black family strategy was developing and sharing strong merchant 
contacts through regular correspondence, references, and introductions.  
Francesca Trivellato argues that merchants developed bonds of trust over long 
distances by employing an epistolary style that relied heavily on expressions of 
friendship, love, and affection—sentiments that built bonds of trust and implied 
reciprocity.656 Maintaining trust over long distances was key to successful mercantile 
trade, and the Blacks did it by expanding their merchant network through their 
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multitudinous progeny, cultivating a wide and diverse circle of correspondents, flexible 
national and cultural allegiances, and through their voluminous letters—many of which 
expressed values of love and obligation along with the details of their trading business. 
The Blacks were prolific correspondents, particularly the patriarch John Black, a 
wine merchant in Bordeaux, who held together his scattered family by constant letters, 
peppered with instruction on faith, moderation, and prudence in the pursuit of trade. The 
family had close ties with Cadiz through their factory, Bowman Black & Company. 
John’s brother Charles, who was also involved in the trading house, had been the British 
consul there before his disastrous tenure as consul at Algiers.657 The factory at Cadiz gave 
the Blacks access both to the Atlantic trade from the Spanish colonies, as well as to 
British ships on their way into and out of the Mediterranean sea. Cadiz had a thriving 
community of British merchants. Developing strong contacts with British merchants at 
Spanish and Portuguese ports was important for any serious London merchant, and many 
of them had worked in trading factories in Spain after their apprenticeships to foster 
business contacts. Indeed the Blacks sent the young Alexander to Cadiz after his 
apprenticeship with his brother-in-law, Isaac Simon, to work at the counting house of his 
uncle Robert’s company.658  
For the Black family, commercial and family correspondence ran together. News 
of John Black’s “too too scattered… patriarchate” flowed continuously though his 
hands—the hub of a virtual familial space built on gossip, advice, complaints, and 
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descriptions of life—all traveling the world on paper and parchment. 659 The Blacks often 
expanded their circle of trading contacts through marriage, integrating important trading 
partners into their family network.660Alexander was one of several Black who had been 
apprenticed to Isaac Simon at Dublin, and the Dublin Blacks were closely involved in 
trade with John at Bordeaux and Robert at Cadiz. The Blacks also kept up these 
connections by “sending their love and regards” to other family members or trading 
partners with whom the family worked closely. Letters to Alexander or Robert invariably 
sent love and regards to “Mr. Bowman,” partner in the factory at Cadiz. John and his wife 
Margaret made Bowman the godfather of their son Joseph661 and even attempted to make 
a match between Bowman and their daughter Jane. The courtship, however, seems to 
have been an abject failure—Jane, having “an utter aversion to Spain,”662 as well as 
conflicts with her future mother and sister in law.663 Although the failed match created 
some tensions within the Black network, a series of letters between John Black and 
Joseph Bowman eventually healed the rift.664 Constant communication was so important 
for the family that the elder John Black’s letters are full of exhortations to keep in better 
touch. As he wrote to his son Alexander: “if you knew how exceedingly desirable it is to 
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me to hear often of yours as well as of all the too dispersed branches of my family’s 
health & welfare I flatter my self you would nott soe long have kept silent…”665   
 The family correspondence also allowed the Blacks to carry out the administrative 
necessities of both business and family life over great distances. They transmitted their 
authority through their signatures and seals, and on occasion, instructed family members 
to stand in their stead. John, living in Bordeaux, sent via post his consent for his son in 
Cadiz to marry. Unable to attend the wedding himself, he instructed his cousin Robert to 
“in my name sign the marriage contract.”666   
 For the Blacks, the authority of a signature might be transmitted from afar, and 
the opinions of family members present in far away places might trump the need to 
consult books, papers, and official documents. When Robert Black died in Cadiz, 
Alexander’s brother, Robert’s namesake and heir, wrote to Cadiz asking Alexander to 
consult a lawyer and some of his  “most intelligent friends,” in order to the settle his 
uncle’s estate.  “[I’m] perfectly satisfy’d,” Robert wrote to his brother, “that you will act 
in every respect to the best of your judgment for my Interest and that it is much better for 
me to have you there to act for me than that I should be there and manage for myself.” 
Robert instructed Alexander to write him as soon as he sorted out the estate, sending him 
a letter via Barcelona (where many ships would be traveling from Cadiz in the 
summer).”667 When Alexander sent the glum news that Uncle Robert’s estate was deeply 
in debt, his brother wrote back: “your writing me so is as satisfaction as if you were to 
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send me all his books & papers.” Black opinion was divided, however, on whether the 
brother’s word was as good as authoritative documentation. John Black Sr. instructed 
Robert to send for all the papers in the hands of their agent in London, believing that his 
brother’s financial situation could not have been so dire, and determined to see official 
proof in writing.668  
 Another vital part of Black family strategy was developing and sharing strong 
merchant contacts through regular correspondence, references, and introductions. Writing 
to Cadiz in 1744, John Jr. described several new contacts, and wrote that he and his father 
“sincerely wish his or any other of our correspondents” would be useful to his uncle’s 
trade.669 This networks of communication could be further promoted by benevolence and 
reciprocity based not only on familial ties, but also on national bonds. After his uncle’s 
death ended the family trade in Cadiz, Robert suggested that his brother Alexander take 
up trade in Alicante, where, he had heard through a contact in Barcelona, “a gentleman 
who had been establish’d at alicant and was in a way of makeing a handosme fortune 
there in a short time was leately dead at Dublin.” Robert suggested that with his 
knowledge of the Spanish language, culture, and trade, Alexander might make a good 
living by taking up the merchant’s contacts and going into business in Alicante.670 His 
ties to both Spain and Dublin, Robert postulated, might serve to more easily cultivate a 
trade network there. With such an international pedigree, in fact, the Black had several 
national and cultural allegiances on which they might rely.  Writing to his uncle Robert in 
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Cadiz, John Jr. described a trade contact, Mr. Ross, as an example of “that remarkable 
benevolence the Scottish people reaprocally shew each other and of the principle they so 
firmly & generally adhere to, of preferably promoting their country men’s interests.”671 
 Eighteenth-century merchants made new contacts via letters of recommendation, 
and even, in some cases, self-introduction. For example, in mid-eighteenth century 
France, so important were letters to the network of trade that merchants could purchase 
pre-printed form letters of self.672 None of these appear among the Blacks’ papers, 
although the length of time it took for Alexander to find a new position after his uncle’s 
death seems to indicate that the various contacts his brothers, father, and friends 
suggested were not fruitful. On the other hand, when Alexander finally did leave Cadiz, 
his brother John wrote to him to thank him for “procuring the acquaintance” of several 
merchant houses some of which “to whom [I] wrote last post.”673  The contacts procured, 
cultivated, and developed must be maintained, even when a member of the family left the 
trade, and was to be maintained by recommendation and letter.  
 Letters between members of the Black family also allowed them to more safely 
navigate the dangers of the eighteenth-century maritime world by calling on their wider 
networks for intelligence about trade or war. Besides exporting wine from Bordeaux, and 
importing linen to Cadiz, the family ran a smuggling operation on the Isle of Man. The 
Dukes of Atholl had suzerainty over the island, and while the British crown had authority 
over matters of defense, the internal affairs of the island were principally the business of 
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the Lord of Man. Much of this business was smuggling. The island was not subject to 
British tariffs, and was therefore an easy base from which to smuggle goods to Britain.674  
In 1765, however, with the crown poised to take control of the island, Robert wrote to 
Alexander, now in London, asking him to “get intelligence” about what orders the Lords 
of the Admiralty might give concerning the seizure of those goods imported before the 
transfer of power. In order to get a leg up on his local competitors with expedient and 
exclusive information, he instructed Alexander to send any information he could gather 
with a boat pilot who would sail immediately and agree not to take any other letters to the 
island. 675    
As the century wore on, Europe’s repeated bouts of warfare interrupted the trade 
and communication of many merchants in maritime Europe. The Blacks tried, 
increasingly unsuccessfully, to use letters, documents, and their broad and mutable 
national allegiances to avoid the inconveniences and dangers wrought by national rivalry. 
Their wartime smuggling efforts sometimes involved false documents. During the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear, John Black wrote to his brother Robert to ask whether Seville oranges, 
lemons, and raisins could be brought to Portugal and provided with “sham certificates of 
their being Portuguese growth,” so as to circumvent a ban on trade with Spain. Certified 
as Portuguese fruit, they would be loaded into a neutral ship, and from there carried to 
Scotland.676   
                                                
674 J. R. Dickinson, The Lordship of Man under the Stanleys: Government and Economy in the Isle of Man, 
1508-1704 (Manchester: Carnegie Publishing, 1996). 
675 Robert Black, Douglas Isle of Man, to Alexander Black, London, 13 February 1765, HL HM 49207. 
676 John Black, Bordeaux, to Robert Black, Faro, 26 November 1740, PRONI D 7I9/5. 
  227 
Like the fruit of questionable provenance, the Blacks often tried to make their 
way in the world by subtly shifting their multiple identities and alliances. The political 
instability of the eighteenth century wars required that the Blacks cash-in on their layered 
allegiances to survive in a century of global warfare. As merchants, juggling and shifting 
these national identities was valuable and sometimes crucial for global success and 
survival. An international lot, the Blacks had an unstable national identity. As Scots, they 
had only recently come in to the British fold; as Belfastians, they were Protestants on an 
island of Catholics: as Bordelais or as Cadiz merchants, they had to navigate carefully the 
perils of Britain’s near constant wars with France and Spain.  
The male line of the Black family had emigrated to Ireland in the early 
seventeenth century,677 and proudly traced their heritage back to the Lamont clan in 
Scotland. John Black’s father, although born in Ireland, spent his career in France, 
Holland and the West Indies.678 John Black Senior himself lived in Bordeaux for over 
fifty years and spent almost all of his working life there.679 Robert Black spent much of 
his working life in Cadiz, and used his connections with Ireland to profit (however 
temporarily) from the healthy trade with the island. All of John Black’s children were 
born in France, and were, by the right of jus soli, French subjects. Many of their letters 
refer to Bordeaux as home. Growing up in France, their mother Margaret taught them 
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English herself, “there being no school for that purpose at Bordeaux.”680 Their letters 
often switch seamlessly between languages and idioms. As French subjects, they 
celebrated Louis XV’s recovery from illness in 1744: “We have had thanks giving’s for 
the recovery of our good prince,” John Jr. wrote to his uncle in Cadiz, “whose mild & 
happy government makes his life most valuable & of the last importance to his 
subjects.”681  
Equally difficult to pin down is the Blacks’ religious and political persuasions. 
Nominally Protestant, the Blacks were a mixed, and sometimes suspect lot. In a period of 
tremendous fear of Jacobite insurrection against the monarchy, Scottish Highlanders, 
Irish-Catholics and the French were all under suspicion by most Britons. As I discussed 
in Chapter 3, Alexander’s uncle, Charles Black was dismissed from his post as the British 
Consul at Cadiz in 1726682 accused of becoming Catholic, being “married to a papist,” 
and that he “kept a Priest in his house at Cadiz.”683 Through his connections with Spanish 
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ambassador William Stanhope,684 he was able to obtain his position as Consul at Algiers, 
but suspicion continued to surround him, and by extension, his family.685  
Whatever complex and contradictory feelings the Black family may have had 
about their national or cultural identity, it is clear that like many involved in trade, they 
employed a flexible sense of national allegiance and subjecthood to promote their 
economic and personal safety. They used their various allegiances and identities to 
cultivate connections and correspondences vital for the survival of the family’s 
transnational trading empire.686 In a letter to his brother Robert in Cadiz, John Black 
wrote that of son Alexander’s travels:  
His late progress has given an opportunity to know friends & their characters in 
the place of their abode besides you know that seeing a little of the world by 
traveling opens the ideas of the mind & takes of[f] the prepossessions & 
prejudices those are subject to who are only acquainted att home. 
 
These experiences served a practical purpose. John Black was clear that Alexander must 
“now make proper use” of these advantages: presumably in the service of trade.687 The 
Blacks used their world experience as well as their various allegiances and identities to 
cultivate their business interests.  
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As for so many other people trying to make their way in a world of competing 
empires, war was the fulcrum around which expressions of national allegiance hinged. In 
Cadiz, in 1750, Alexander’s French subjecthood was irrelevant to his trading interests 
there and he was considered a British merchant employed at a British factory. In 1761, 
when Spain looked poised to enter into war with Britain, however, identity, allegiance 
and subjecthood became essential tools for self-preservation. In December, John Jr. 
wrote, in French, to his brother Alexander at Cadiz:  
“You should not worry of misunderstandings between Spain and England. 
You can be seen as English in Cadiz, having remained so long in an 
English house, but you’re not, any more than we here. I will send by the 
next mail your legal baptismal certificate, with all the formalities and 
authentications. Meanwhile do not fail to introduce yourself to the Consul 
of France, to claim and beg him to grant you his protection as subjects of 
the King.”688  
 
Born in Bordeaux, Alexander, like his siblings, was a French subject (a fact that John Sr. 
had taken advantage of by signing legal documents that put all of his French property in 
their names.)689 In 1750, working at a British trading house and shipping goods to Ireland, 
Alexander could comfortably settle into an unobtrusive, if uncertain, British idntity. The 
changing political climate, however, would necessitate his relying on an alternate 
identity—that of a French subject. Living as he had for then years as a British merchant 
in Cadiz Alexander’s protection as a French subject could not, however, be fostered 
solely by an audience with the French consul. It must be proven though formal and 
authentic paperwork. Whatever Alexander’s complex allegiances, identities, and 
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sentiments, it was “formal and authentic” paperwork that would become increasingly 
important in defining, proving, and at times subverting subjecthood in the multicultural 
world of the eighteenth-century Mediterranean. 
SUBJECTS ON PAPER: DEVELOPING DOCUMENTARY SUBJECTHOOD 
 Formal and authentic paperwork was increasingly important in proving 
subjecthood—and the Blacks were not unique in their attempts to use documentary 
identity to navigate the perils of war. Paperwork had been the lifeblood of the British 
Empire since its inception. English monarchs issued charters for  “the advancement of 
our honor, and dignity Royall, the increase of the revenues of our Crown, and general 
wealth of the Realme”690 or to “make Habitation, Plantation, and to deduce a colony of 
sundry of our People.”691 As Joseph Strayer argues, “the founding of the colonies was a 
conspicuous example of well-to-do men performing a function that seemed desirable to, 
but beyond the resources of, early modern states.”692 With these charters, private and 
commercial entities such as the East India Company, or the Levant company, were 
transmitted the power of a state through the medium of formal and authentic 
documents—documents that were imbued with the power of the sovereign.693 This 
practice was the foundation of the rapidly expanding British Empire. It also cultivated an 
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British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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imperial system that outsourced violence and warfare to its subjects, a move Janice 
Thomson argues not only allowed rulers to avoid the expense associated with empire 
building but also gave them plausible deniability if their subjects exerted violence in 
politically problematic ways.694  
By the mid-eighteenth century the Mediterranean was abuzz with mariners of 
different origins, faiths, and tongues who claimed the rights and protections of British 
subjecthood. Indeed, with such a diverse set of subjects, documents would become the 
only way to lay claim to those rights. Crucial to the “formal and authentic” nature of 
these documents was the use of signatures and seals as markers of authentication. As 
Menorca’s Governor Murray well knew, captains without letters of marque—the hefty 
and beautifully illustrated parchment issued by the Lords of the Admiralty in London—
would be considered no better than pirates. Indeed Governor Murray’s long wait for the 
letters of marque was prolonged further when the letters, ready to be sent off to colonial 
destinations, were found to be marked with the wrong seal and had to be corrected before 
they could be dispatched, protracting their departure by a week.695 Despite the pressing 
need for these commissions in the colonies, the importance of the proper symbols of 
authority took precedence over expedience.  
Commissioning private warships to work for the English government began in the 
Middle Ages and by the eighteenth century, various prize acts had codified the system.696 
                                                
694 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns  : State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence 
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  233 
The commissioners of the Lord High Admiral were responsible for the administration of 
these acts, a power exercised through the High Court of Admiralty and its colonial 
subsidiaries, the Vice-Admiralty Courts.697 These courts ruled on a variety of maritime 
cases, the most important of which were prize cases, which determined the legality of the 
seizures of enemy ships at sea. Other nations also had their own prize courts, and tricky 
cases often generated a large amount of diplomatic correspondence—especially when the 
national origin of the ships, cargoes, captain, crews, or owners were in dispute. British 
diplomats, such as William Poyntz, were often involved in facilitating the transfer (and 
sometimes translation) of paperwork between prize courts. Poyntz, as well Consul Collet 
often corresponded with Judges Sutherland and Collins at the Menorcan Vice Admiralty 
Court, providing them information about the veracity of a ship’s claim to Sardinian or 
Genoese neutrality.698 
Key to the legality of all seizures, of course, was a proper license to privateer—a 
letter of marque. To obtain this license, the commander, owners, or someone acting on 
their behalf must visit the Admiralty Court in London and produce a “warrant from the 
Lord High Admiral…for the granting of a commission or letter of marque.” He would 
make a declaration before the Admiralty judge consisting of a “particular true and exact 
account of the ship or vessel” to be commissioned. This declaration was to include the 
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Street Trust Company, 1928), 1. See also “Acts Relating to Prizes 1707-1832,” TNA HCA 30/524. 
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698 For example, précis of a memorial by count Perron of Turin, in regard to the case of the Virgen de 
Roserie, captured by John Cymaris and the crew of the Tartan. See Joseph Collins to William Dean Poyntz, 
30 January 1779, TNA CO 174/12 f. 53. 
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name of the ship, its tonnage, crew size, and arms, as well as the names of if its 
commander, officers, and owners. The Admiralty kept a register of this information, 
which gave them an accurate account of the privateers operating, and defined the person 
or persons responsible for the conduct of a ship’s privateering activity.699 A bond and two 
reputable guarantors were required to assure the good conduct of the captain and crew.700 
The parameters of their conduct, and the limits of a privateer’s power, were 
conveyed to the captain in the “instructions to privateers” compiled by the Lords of the 
Admiralty and issued with the letter of marque.701 Although the instructions contained a 
stable core of regulations, they were also modified over time—additional orders issued to 
meet the particular circumstances of war. In 1762, for example, the instructions contained 
specific instructions with regard to Sicily, because of complaints from the King of Sicily 
that “many inconveniences may arise from hostilities being committed in the Gulf of 
Naples by privateers belonging to either of the Powers at war.” The instructions went on 
to “strictly enjoin the commanders of all ships…to abstain from any act of hostility 
against the ships and subjects of the French king within the Gulf of Naples during the 
present war.”702 
Both privateers and merchant ships also carried important paperwork, including 
the ship’s manifest—which listed the cargo, passengers, and crew, bills of lading 
(receipts of the goods shipped on board), along with bills of health, which certified that a 
                                                
699 Starkey, Privateering, 23. 
700 Starkey, Privateering, 24. 
701 See for example “Instructions to Privateers,” 27 March 1777, TNA HCA 26/60. 
702 Instructions for privateers against France, 4 June 1762, in R.G. Marsden ed., Documents Relating to Law 
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ship and its last port of call were free of disease.703 These papers were not only essential 
to the smooth operation of maritime trade, but also helped establish the nationality of a 
ship during a seizure, as well as later in a prize court. Given the diverse and international 
nature of ships’ crews, and (as in the case of the Scottish-Irish-French merchant 
Alexander Black living in Cadiz) the international characters of many of the merchants 
vying for space aboard a ship, these bills were vital for proving a ship’s nationality 
should it be taken by a privateer. It was not only important that ships carry this 
paperwork to prove their nationality, but also that privateering captains carefully examine 
it before bringing a prize into port.  
In January 1779, Juan Cymaris’ armed rowboat the Tartan (the boat which 
Murray had hoped might fetch the mail from Livorno) captured yet another prize in the 
Mediterranean waters off Menorca—a ship named the Virgen de Rosarie. Cymaris and 
the crew of the Tartan had captured its first vessel while attempting to pick up Governor 
Murray’s mail in September and by the end of December, Caymaris and the crew of the 
Tartan had captured eight ships.704 Although the Virgen de Rosarie was flying neutral 
Sardinian colors, and carried a pass from the Viceroy of Sardinia, Judge Collins found by 
examining the ship’s papers and questioning the master that there were six Frenchmen 
one Maltese, and one Genoese on board. The only Sardinian subject, Cymaris argued, 
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was Simon Boccioni,705 the ship’s master.706 Through Boccioni’s deposition in Menorca’s 
Vice Admiralty Court, Judge Collins concluded that the ship had been transferred to 
French owners, and that a Frenchman posing as one of the crew was in fact her true 
captain. Wary of angering neutral Sardinia, however, the judge wrote to William Dean 
Poyntz in Turin, asking for his advice about the marine regulations of the Vice Admiralty 
Court there. Judge Collins granted Boccioni sixty days to bring further evidence that the 
vessel was Sardinian. Collins confided to Poyntz, however, that he was doubtful that 
Boccioni would be able to produce such proof, especially since the Sardinian pass the 
vessel carried clearly stated that at least half of the mariners on board must be Sardinian 
subjects.707  
After six months at Port Mahon and after letters and papers had been conveyed by 
William Poyntz between the Vice Admiralty Courts of Menorca and Sardinia, the fate of 
the Virgen de Rosarie was finally determined. In July 1779, Judge Sutherland, recently 
freed from captivity in Marseilles, looked over the evidence in the case and ruled that the 
seizure had been unlawful. He granted Boccioni the “right to claim demand and sue for 
damages, Loss, costs, and prejudices arising…by reason of the seizure and detention” of 
the Sardinian ship.708 Complicated cases like Boccioni’s often took months to resolve and 
being liable for the damage and lost wages of an unlawful prize could be financially 
devastating for privateer captains and owners.  
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 It was often difficult, however, for privateers to definitively determine the 
nationality of a ship at sea. If documents had been hidden, or captors heard contradictory 
evidence from the crew, they were instructed to submit for examination “all such papers, 
passes, sea briefs, charters, bills of lading, letters and other such writings” found on board 
the captured vessel, making oath that the documents were “brought in as they were 
received and taken without any fraud, addition, seduction, or embezzlement.’709 For 
example, when George Cockburn captured a ship near Port Mahon, he found his 
examination of seaman Thomas Scott to be “so contradictory to what the ship’s papers 
manifested” that he suspected that the sloop “was not the property of British Subjects and 
that she was upon an illicit trade.” Closer examination of the paperwork in court, 
however, showed that although Scott was using the Mediterranean pass of another 
master, other papers proved that his ships was British.710 
 Although proper paperwork was crucial in determining prize cases, proper papers 
did not, of course, always save ships from attack, and privateers did not always heed 
valid documents. Ships of war sometimes slipped over the line from privateer to pirate. In 
1746 the British Concordia was blown off course near Cadiz, on route to Gibraltar and 
Malaga. When the Concordia met with a British privateer, the crew was met with hostile 
cannon fire, instead of news or guidance. When the privateer’s captain boarded the 
Concordia and found her papers proved her to be friend instead of foe, he simply ignored 
the documents, and the crew helped themselves to “thirty pieces of checked Linnen” and 
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“likewise plundered and carry’d away several things belonging to the master” for their 
trouble.711 
  
 
Bill of Health, Lovely Peggy, Algiers, 1756 
An example of a bill of health for a Gibraltar vessel bound from Algiers to Port Mahon 
with a lading of corn. Bill of Health for the Lovely Peggy of Gibraltar, James Woodward 
Master, from Consul Aspinwall at Algiers. 
 
12 January 1756, Patents de Sanitat, AM PL 53.  
                                                
711 Decision of Richard Dacres, Deputy Judge Advocate for Gibraltar, The Concordia, 22 September 1746, 
GGA, Civil Court Registers of Protest, 1743-1747 f. 120.  
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Mediterranean Passes and “Passing” 
 Letters of marque gave British subjects the right to make war in the sovereign’s 
name. Conversely, Mediterranean passes protected British ships from attack.712 These 
passes became a key vehicle by which sailors could claim the rights and protections of 
British subjects—not only from attack by North Africans, but also as part of a body of 
documents that might keep them safe from (law abiding) British privateers. This paper-
based proof of national allegiance allowed a multitude of people from all over the 
Mediterranean to claim British protection, legally and illegally. 
 Engraved on heavy parchment, Mediterranean passes were beautifully decorated, 
often with maritime scenes. The passes contained the name ship and master, the tonnage, 
the number of guns and men on board, and the date of issue. Like letters of marque, the 
passes themselves were reinforced by other paperwork. Any ship bearing a 
Mediterranean pass must be British-built, or captured from an enemy and “made free.” 
Masters of a vessel must be British subjects or Protestant Denizens, and at least two 
thirds of the crew British subjects. In addition, captains were required to swear an oath 
confirming where the ship was constructed and the nationalities of the owners and crew. 
The Admiralty kept a register of passes along with the details from the oaths and other 
certificates.713  
                                                
712 Mark Salter discusses letters of marque as a mirror of “safe conduct passes” in Rights of Passage: The 
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 The text of the passes read: “Suffer the ship…to pass with her Company…The 
said Ship appearing unto Us by good Testimony to belong to the Subjects of His Majesty 
and to no Foreigner: Given under Our Hands and the Seal of The Office of Admiralty.”714 
Passes were issued only upon the deposit of a bond, to be returned to the Admiralty after 
their expiration. Any pass not returned would mean that bond was forfeited, a fact that in 
the unpredictable world of winds, squalls, and attacks, caused more than a few appeals 
from captains and owners for leniency for ships late in their return.715 
  In the multilingual Mediterranean, a system emerged that did not require 
mariners to speak the same language or even be able to read. Before their issue, the 
passes were decorated with intricate illustrations and then cut in half in a distinctive 
scalloped pattern. The bottom half went aboard British vessels and the tops were 
distributed to the captains of the Barbary Cruisers. When these captains boarded British 
ships, the two halves, reunited, completed the image and proved the authenticity of the 
pass.716 The Admiralty changed their form and cut several times to ensure that expired 
passes could not fall into the wrong hands.717 
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715 See, for example GGA VAC Requests, Protests etc. 1749-1751. 
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Mediterranean Pass, Ellen Snow, 1748 
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An example of a scalloped Mediterranean pass. The passes were printed on a single sheet 
of vellum, and cut in a distinctive scalloped pattern.  
 
Mediterranean Pass for the Ellen Snow, 13 April 1748, TNA ADM 1/383.  
The pass system dated back to the seventeenth century, but Britain’s acquisition 
of new Mediterranean colonies radically altered the cultural, religious, and linguistic 
make-up of the British subjects who sailed that sea. British subjects were no longer 
distinguishable by language, culture, or place of birth. The Mediterranean, then, by the 
mid-eighteenth century was abuzz with mariners of different origins, faiths, and tongues, 
claiming the protection of British subjecthood. While important for the survival of the 
garrisons, and a practical necessity to maintain British rule in a sphere in which Britain 
had neither much territory nor many settlers, the expansive definition of subjecthood 
would create an opportunity for diverse people to use Mediterranean passes for their 
protection. Far from controlling groups and individuals through surveillance, the paper-
based protection enabled a wide group of people to claim British subjecthood.  
Despite treaties that made explicit that all inhabitants of the Mediterranean 
colonies should be “considered and esteemed British Subjects,” North African privateers 
were often galled to find their longtime enemies such as Maltese or Spaniards, Corsicans 
or Genoese sailing freely under British passes. By the eighteenth century, North African 
privateers had made treaties with many of the major European powers and often relied on 
capturing ships, slaves, and goods from smaller nations. The fact that sailors and captains 
who did not live in either Gibraltar or Menorca illegally made use of these highly coveted 
passes made the murky question of subjecthood even more fraught. After complaints 
from North Africa and the capture of several Menorcan and Gibraltarian vessels in the 
  243 
1720s, the Privy Council had ordered that passes of a “particular form” and only lasting 
one year should be issued to the inhabitants of Gibraltar and Menorca.718 Despite this 
change, the pass system in the Mediterranean was prone to abuse. Passes were bought 
and sold, erased and reused, forged and falsified. “Captain of the flag” or “capitano di 
bandiera” quickly became its own occupation in Gibraltar and Menorca. These British 
subjects legally obtained Mediterranean passes because they were residents of a British 
colony. Instead of using the passes to safely provision the garrisons, however, they would  
serve nominally as captains of foreign ships, providing them with the safety of a 
Mediterranean pass in return for a lucrative salary, and no actual sailing or navigational 
duties.719 
Easier to fake or find than Mediterranean passes were the handwritten 
passavants—temporary passes that governors and consuls were in the habit of writing 
when the official passes were delayed in their journey from London or otherwise 
unavailable. The aftermath of the Seven Years’ War caused a surge in passavants. With 
the British government staggering back into power in 1763, Lieutenant-Governor 
Johnston resorted to writing passavants for Menorcan ships, so that they might safely 
supply the Garrison while the complicated matter of applying for official Admiralty 
passes was being resolved. To North African privateers, however, these passavants were 
suspect because the captains of Barbary cruisers did not know each governor or consul’s 
signature or seal, and they did not have the matching “other halves” that authenticated the 
                                                
718 Committee Report on complaints of the merchants touching money paid for mediterranean Passes,” 18 
December 1729, TNA Privy Council (hereafter PC) 2/91 ff. 114-115. See Benady, “Settee Cut,” 286. 
719 Benady, “Settee Cut,” 292. 
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Admiralty passes. One angry Tripolitan privateer, when presented with a Menorcan 
passavant, “trampled upon [it] swearing that is was good for nothing but for making the 
vessel a good prize.”720  
 In 1764, the Dey of Algiers made a formal complaint to the Privy Council 
against Governor Johnston of Menorca, accusing him of “granting Mediterranean passes 
to foreigners and enemies.”721 The Dey seized several Menorcan ships and their cargo. In 
August, Consul James Bruce, wrote to London that John Stephanopli, Captain of the San 
Vincentio, had arrived at Algiers from Genoa with a pass written by Governor Johnston. 
“The Dey,” wrote Bruce “without communicating his intention in any way to me, sent 
and took his passport from him, and directed the ship and funds on board to be seized and 
confiscated, the captain and crew stript of every thing, and immediately condemned to 
slavery.”722 Because of the proliferation of these handwritten passavants in the 
Mediterranean, the Dey “was resolved to seize every vessel that had not an Admiralty 
pass.”723 
Despite the complaints about the proliferation of passsavants, Consul Bruce 
argued that their transitory nature in fact provided greater proof of subjecthood. If an 
enemy again seized Gibraltar or Menorca, Bruce argued, the precious Admiralty passes 
might “be distributed among hands not qualified to bear them”—a situation that had 
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indeed come to pass during the Seven Years’ War, when many Menorcans sold old their 
British passes to Genoese or Corsican mariners.724 The durable and long-lasting nature of 
the Admiralty passes, Bruce claimed, did not grant them greater authority. Instead, it 
meant that they might outlive the tenuous and shifting nature of British power in the 
Mediterranean. Although the Privy Council gave many orders to suppress the use of 
passavants, the realities of Mediterranean life made waiting for official Admiralty passes 
from London unrealistic.725 Governor Cornwallis responded from Gibraltar: “I shall pay 
the strictest Obedience to the order of Council as soon as Mediterranean passes are sent 
out.” However, “in the mean time,” Cornwallis wrote, “it will be absolutely necessary to 
continue the use of Passavants or written Passes for the vessels employed in furnishing 
the Garrison with Provisions, or we shall be totally without supplies.”726 
Complaints about the Mediterranean pass situation came directly from Menorca 
as well. One Captain Duncan complained that Johnston had refused to grant him a pass, 
but that it was “generally known” that Johnston had a large stash of passes which he was 
distributing illicitly. Duncan had heard (from gossiping with from the governor’s 
secretary) that Johnston had even granted a pass to a Mallorcan ship. Duncan reported 
that when Consul Bruce arrived at Algiers he “seemed greatly astonished” at the 
governor’s “exposing His Majesty’s subjects to slavery and danger with such useless 
certificates as passavants.” The Dey confided to Duncan that there were then eight ships 
in the port with British Mediterranean passes, “and not one real Retainer on board any of 
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them but mostly Genoese.” Duncan’s ship, on the other hand, had “a British Captain 
Crew and Property furnished only with a passavant.” Johnston countered that the 
Admiralty passes he could distribute from Mahon were only for residents of the island, 
and accused Duncan of spreading vicious rumors at Algiers that the government of 
Menorca was selling Mediterranean passes to foreigners for a dollar.727  
 To quell the furor, the Privy Council took up an investigation of the pass system 
in the Mediterranean. They read the Dey’s complaints about passavants and pass fraud, 
which included descriptions of daily visits to the port by Spanish, Genoese, and 
Portuguese ships sailing under passes issued in Menorca. Even the consuls of Livorno 
and Venice weighed in, writing letters that were entered into evidence. The Venetian 
consul reported seeing “all kinds of Italian vessels having different Saint’s names under 
British Colours, arriving in different ports within the Mediterranean.” Consul Dick at 
Livorno forwarded a report from Mrs. White, the widow of the former Consul at Tripoli. 
She reported that a ship taken by Tripolitan cursers under a passavant issued by Governor 
Johnston had shipped directly from Genoa, never having been to Menorca, that it was “in 
every way equipt like a Genoese Privateer.” Of the twenty-one sailors on board, only two 
were Menorcan. 
 The Jurats of Menorca complained as well, accusing Johnston and his Advocate 
Fiscal, Juan Segui, of selling passes. They sent José de Olmedo728 to London to be a 
witness before the Privy Council. Olmedo was a shoemaker from Menorca who saw that 
                                                
727 Gideon Duncan against Governor Johnston, 1764, TNA PC 1/7/146. 
728 Anglicized in British reports as “Joseph Deolmedo.” 
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“many foreigners Greeks and others” were making a mint marketing themselves in Genoa 
as “Captains of the Flag.” Olmedo alleged that although he neither owned nor captained a 
vessel, had no knowledge of navigation, and indeed had never sailed in his life, he had 
received a pass by the “intersession of the Fiscal”—implying that Segui had pushed 
through his patently fraudulent request. With that pass, Olmedo traveled to Livorno, 
where he served on board the Virgen de la Misericordia as the Capitano di Bandiera. For 
two years Olmedo and the Genoese captain and crew traveled the Mediterranean, safely 
protected as “British subjects.”729  
 In a deposition taken in Menorca, Olmedo claimed that he did not know the laws 
pertaining to passes or British subjecthood, and that he did not have “any information nor 
can he from any belief relating thereto or to any matters enquired after by this 
Interr[ogation].” Of course the logic of obtaining a British pass to sell to a Genoese ship 
belies his claim. Importantly however, it seems more than likely that Olmedo, despite his 
protestations of innocence and testimony against the conduct of Johnston and Segui, 
actually harnessed the bureaucratic system behind these passes himself. While the 
ultimate goal was a full fledged Mediterranean pass, the process by which captains and 
owners went about applying for such a pass was founded on a bevy of other, less difficult 
to obtain (and sometimes easier to forge) paperwork such as Bills of Health and Ships’ 
Manifests. The warrant for the seizure of Olmedo’s ship stated that the pass was issued 
February 22, 1764 and that “he assured by his declaration that this Pink really belonged 
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to his majesty’s subjects; his Declaration was confirmed by acts he presented legalized by 
the British Consul residing at Genoa & also by the Declarations of those who said were 
also concerned.”730  According to the warrant, at least, Olmedo was probably well aware 
of the process of applying for a pass and was able to obtain the requisite paperwork and 
testimony in order to negotiate the system and obtain one illegally. 
The Privy Council also heard from Governor Johnston, and his Advocate Fiscal, 
who was in charge of reading and organizing documents upon a captain’s application for 
a Mediterranean pass. In the end, the investigation did indeed turn up quite a few abuses. 
Despite the (possibly valid) accusations against Johnston, it was clear that the residents of 
Menorca had become skilled at navigating the system for their own ends. Lorenzo 
Pons,731 a native Menorcan, was found to be sailing a sixty-ton pink732 that was the 
property of a Genoese subject, as was Lorenzo Miret733 whose crew was likewise entirely 
Genoese. Worse, his ship was not found in the island’s registers, although they did 
indicate that he was using an old “lost” pass.  José Alaguero734 was using a pass issued 
for a Menorcan xebec called the Virgin de las Misericordia to protect a Genoese Pink. 
Pierre Antonio Puitsgros735 seemed to be involved in an even broader and more 
                                                
730 Interrogation made by Edward Clarke, agent of Colonel Johnston, 12 August 1765, TNA CO 174/1 f. 
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complicated pass scam. He and several others took oaths that his xebec736 belonged to 
British owners, although they had all, in fact, colluded to obtain a pass for a Spanish 
merchant. 737  
These abuses were possible, of course, because of the diversity of British subjects 
in the Mediterranean. By the 1760s, it was common for Mediterranean peoples who 
spoke no English to claim British subjecthood, but the movement toward this 
“documentary subjecthood” was uneasy and halting. In 1738, the crew of the Menorcan 
vessel San Antonio de Padua was enslaved in Algiers after a group of Spanish captives 
attempted to hijack the ship to make their escape.738 The Dey, confused about the ship’s 
nationality, asked Consul Charles Black “why the natives of Minorca under the pretext of 
being English” were granted passes. When Black ascertained that the ship indeed had a 
valid British pass, the Dey replied that the captain could not even speak English, 
compelling him to “repeat a few words in that Tongue” to make his point.739 In the 
seventeenth century, English sailors like Ned Coxere had made language, rather than 
paper, their passports. As we have seen, polyglot Coxere was able to evade the press gang 
and trade with the Spanish by pretending to be Dutch and then escape Spanish captivity 
with his fluent Spanish.740 Allegiance in the Mediterranean had always been flexible and 
those skilled at languages could use them to their advantage. By the mid-eighteenth 
                                                
736 A xebec was a trading ship navigated with sails and oars and used almost exclusively in the 
Mediterranean. Young & Brisbane, Nautical Dictionary, 460. 
737 “Information,” [1766?] TNA CO 174/1 ff. 71-72.  
738 Charles Black to Newcastle, 31 March 1738, BL Egerton MS 2528 f. 91. 
739 The register of Mediterranean passes listed Olmedo as receiving a pass on 15 November 1737. See 
Pinfold to Nicholas Haddock, 3 May 1738, BL Egerton MS 2528 f. 103; “Deposition of John Pons,” 1738, 
BL Egerton MS 2528 f. 112.  
740 Edward Coxere, “Adventures by Sea by Edward Coxere,” [after 1684], Friends Library, MS VOL S 281 
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century, the acquisition of two Mediterranean colonies, the demands of provisioning the 
garrisons there—often in the midst of wars with hostile neighbors—and a delicate yet 
important diplomatic relationship with the North African states, meant that the rights and 
protections of British subjecthood must be extended to a diverse group of people. Claims 
to those rights could increasingly be made only with formal documents.  
Mediterranean passes were not only sold or obtained with false documents, they 
were also forged. The 1731 Act to prevent counterfeiting the Passes, commonly called 
Mediterranean Passes alleged that “divers wicked and ill-disposed Persons,” had been 
forging passes, “counterfeited the Seal of the said Office and the Hands of several of the 
Commissioners for executing the said Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain” so 
that they could sell them “in Parts beyond the Seas, or elsewhere.” It dictated that the 
punishment for forging, altering, or erasing passes should be death “without Benefit of 
Clergy.”741 Despite this, and numerous laws and injunctions about improper 
Mediterranean passes, inhabitants of the Mediterranean continued to forge, recycle, and 
sell passes. In 1768, Nicolas Traverso,742 a native of Genoa, was caught with a 
Mediterranean pass he carefully had scraped clean of ink and doctored with the name of 
Francisco Dodero,743 a Gibraltarian who was notorious for widespread forgery and 
misuse of passes.744 
                                                
741 John Raithby, The Statutes Relating to the Admiralty, Navy, Shipping, and Navigation of the United 
Kingdom 1225-1822 (London: G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1823), 156. 
742 Anglicized as “Nicholas Traverso.” 
743 Anglicized as “Francis Dodero.” 
744 Extract of a letter from Consul Fraser in Spry to Stephens, 23 November 1768, TNA ADM 1/383; Spry 
to Stephens and “Examination of Nicholas Traverso,” 23 November 1768, TNA ADM 1/383. 
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Other documents might be forged as well. In the summer of 1726, a young sailor 
came to Gibraltar aboard a merchant ship from Venice. He came before Governor Kane, 
and without speaking, produced a sturdy sheet of vellum with an impressive-looking seal. 
The document, signed “Joseph Hudson, Consul,” reported that the young man was named 
John Wood, that he had been aboard a Dutch merchant ship bound from Amsterdam to 
Barcelona, and when North African privateers seized the ship, taking him prisoner, 
burning his arms and cutting out his tongue. It was difficult to determine the young man’s 
country of origin, because the torture left him speechless, but the captain and crew of the 
Dutch ship avowed that they had brought him from Falmouth and that he was an 
Englishman. The consul set him free, and provided him with a document telling his sad 
tale, endorsing it with a large seal. The document asked “the Christians in their mercy” to 
“shew their charity unto him in this his journey to his own land.” Governor Kane, seeing 
immediately that the document was a forgery, called for a surgeon to examine the young 
man’s tongue. Before the surgeon came, however, the boy slipped away, leaving his 
document behind.745 
 
 
                                                
745 Richard Kane to Charles de la Faye, 4 July 1726, TNA CO 91/4 ff. 204-207. 
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Forged Letter of Introduction, “Joseph Hudson,” 1725 
Included in a letter from Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar Richard Kane to Secretary of 
State Charles de la Faye, 4 July 1726, TNA CO 91/4 f. 208. 
 
 
 
There is no question that the document is a forgery. The consul at Algiers was 
named Charles Hudson, not Joseph, which Kane well knew because of their frequent 
correspondence about matters of trade and Mediterranean passes. Given the multitude of 
nationalities claiming British subjecthood, in many ways John Wood’s story seems 
strangely out of sync with the realities of British subjecthood in the Mediterranean. 
Language (and by extension national origin or cultural heritage) was no longer the mark 
of a British subject in the Mediterranean—where British subjects might speak Italian, 
Ladino, Catalan, Spanish or Portuguese. Subjecthood was not based on a shared identity 
  253 
or common ancestry, but rather on passes, letters of marque, and other certificates that 
allowed certain people to aid in the upkeep and protection of British naval interests and 
commercial trade in the Mediterranean. Why then did the supposed John Wood fabricate 
the story about his missing tongue?  
Certainly language could no longer define the “British subject” in the eighteenth-
century British Mediterranean and culture or place of birth did not limit access to 
subjecthood. Most of the day-to-day governing in Menorca took place in Spanish and 
Catalan. Governor Kane’s so-called “government by the pen”746 consisted of decrees 
written in clumsy Spanish, and translated into Catalan for the members of local 
government. In Gibraltar, although English brought the diverse community together as a 
lingua franca, it was in no way a requisite for being an “inhabitant” and therefore privy to 
many of the rights of British subjecthood.   
Despite this, speech and particularly testimony, continued to be a vital element in 
the process of imbuing documents with power and ascertaining their authenticity. All 
captains swore oaths pledging allegiance to the Crown, sailors were required to answer 
questions about their national origins in prize court to be checked against the ship’s 
papers and the statements of other mariners. In London, debates in parliament, counsel 
between king and ministers, and the pronouncements of legal verdicts were not written, 
but in fact spoken,747 leaving it to scribes and secretaries to transmit royal and 
parliamentary authority to the far corners of the empire. The power of the spoken word 
                                                
746 See Chapter 5. 
747 Harold Love, The Culture and Commerce of Texts: Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 159-174. 
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and testimony was so important that José de Olmedo came all the way to London in order 
to testify before the Privy Council in a language they didn’t understand. Perhaps then, 
“John Wood,” the presumptive Venetian sailor, feared that his testimony might 
undermine the false claims so carefully laid out on paper and authenticated with 
signatures and seals. 
In the end, however, and certainly by the 1760s, testimony of was little help 
without paperwork to validate it. Gibraltarian Antonio Mollido,748 and his schooner, 
Syren, for example, were forced to stay at the Spanish port of Mers el-Kébir due to bad 
weather. While stuck in port, their Mediterranean pass expired, and Mollido, his crew, 
and passengers were arrested. After a flurry of communication between British and 
Spanish authorities, their freedom was procured. They set sail on board a Spanish ship 
that was soon captured by a Moroccan cruiser. Without their pass and unable to prove 
that they were inhabitants of Gibraltar, and not Spanish subjects, Mollido and his crew 
spent years in slavery in Morocco. Only a steady stream of letters from the British 
authorities freed them.749 As British subjecthood extended to more and more people who 
were neither born in Britain nor her white settler colonies, language might have become a 
less important marker of subjecthood, but paperwork became indispensible. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In a section of La Méditerranée entitled “Distance: the first enemy,” Braudel 
describes a sixteenth-century Mediterranean world in which frustrated letter-writers 
                                                
748 More likely “Molido,” a common Spanish name. 
749 Cornwallis to Egremont, 9 February 1763, TNA CO 91/14. 
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complained bitterly about delays in the mail.750 Two hundred years later little had 
changed. The sea is fickle. Unfavorable winds and storms, pirate or privateer attacks, 
warfare and blockades could all delay the mail, hindering communication with far-off 
England and even with the nearest ports. Letters held together an invisible and sometimes 
tenuous web of British authority in the Mediterranean. Letters between consuls, 
merchants, colonial governors, and imperial authorities bound together a fluid and 
shifting British Mediterranean. It was a maritime domain created and recreated through 
regular correspondence, and by bits of paper and parchment that circulated the sea aboard 
packet ships, in the hands of consuls and messengers, and in the form of letters of marque 
and Mediterranean passes. It was not just the information that these documents contained, 
but indeed the objects themselves that lay at the heart of British authority, and 
conversely, threats to that authority. As the empire expanded its sovereignty across the 
seas, it became increasingly dependent on documents and the reliable circulation of those 
documents to establish, exercise, and manage that sovereignty.  
The British colonies in North America were part of a territorial empire that was 
filled with British colonists. But the British Empire in the Mediterranean was a loose and 
mobile world created by a few people born in the British isles, moving flotillas of Royal 
Navy vessels, a dispersed network of British officials, and populated by linguistically and 
culturally diverse people. The movement toward “documentary subjecthood” allowed a 
wider range of people to claim the rights and protections of British subjecthood, both 
legally and illegally. Bits of parchment and paper, ink and wax, circulating the sea, 
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became vital elements in maintaining British sovereignty in the 
Mediterranean. Conversely, these documents were also tools that a diverse array of 
inhabitants could use to navigate a perilous world. 
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Chapter 5. Navigating Authority, Negotiating Subjecthood 
In 1773, Anthony Fábrigas, an inhabitant of Menorca, brought a case against 
Lieutenant Governor John Mostyn in the Court of Common Pleas in London. He charged 
that the Governor had imprisoned and deported him without a proper trial. Governor 
Mostyn argued that the “ancient laws of Minorca” justified his actions, but Fábrigas 
maintained that he was entitled to the full protection of British laws because he was a 
“free-born subject of England.”751 The court found that although Menorcans lived under a 
legal system that had been developed under “the usages and customs of Spain,” and 
Queen Anne had affirmed the protection of their traditional fueros, Menorcans were still 
entitled to sue for damages in English courts, and to seek the wider protection of English 
law. ⁠752 ⁠ 
 Although Governor Mostyn had justified his treatment of Fábrigas under the 
“ancient laws of Minorca,” in other cases, Menorcans themselves invoked these “ancient 
laws” to protect their rights. Almost thirty years earlier, in 1745, Admiral Medley needed 
seamen to sail small vessels that would supply the British fleet stationed at Mahon. 
Finding no volunteers, Governor Wynyard authorized the admiral to press Menorcan men 
into British Navy service. However, according to their ancient fueros, Menorcans were 
immune from impressment. Wynyard conceded that while impressment had been 
“Seldom practiced here, and possibly may make some little Noyse amongst the people,” 
it was fair that Menorcans  “share the same fate with the rest of His Majesty’s Subjects in 
                                                
751 T.B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials, vol. 20 (London: T.C. Hansard, 1816), 82-238. 
752 Howell, State Trials, vol. 20, 232-36. 
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all Other parts of His Dominions in cases of emergency.” ⁠753 Rather than simply stirring 
“some little Noyse,” however, the activities of the British press gangs caused full-fledged 
riots on the island. The Universitat of Mahon complained in autumn 1745, that “a great 
number of Seamen from His majestys ships landed at Mahon armed with Clubs and 
Cutlesses, pressed all persons and Committed several other great Outrages.” Again in 
February, about 200 Sailors “landed from His majestys ships at mahon pressing all Sorts 
of People, comitting many acts of Barbarity.” ⁠754 Writing in the early twentieth century, 
Menorcan historian Francisco Hernández Sanz described how angry Menorcans fought 
the press gangs during what would be remembered as “the year of the stonings.” ⁠755 
According to Hernández, Menorcan peasants all over the island, 
In defense of their freedom… armed themselves with sticks and poles; There were 
fatal encounters for English: in San Clemente some sailors were scattered over the 
field stoned to death; in San Felipe women with stones too, forced back a boat 
carrying sailors attempting to land on the coast of their town. ⁠756 
 
Although as in Fábrigas’ suit, many memorials and petitions would point to Menorcans’ 
rights as British subjects, a petition to the Privy Council about the 1745 press riots argued 
instead that Menorcan rights should be respected because of the unique “Privileges of the 
                                                
753 Wynyard to Newcastle, 25 January 1745/6, The National Archives (hereafter TNA) Colonial Office 
(hereafter CO) 174/2 f. 28. 
754 Medley to Corbet, 28 April 1747, TNA Admiralty (hereafter ADM) 1/382.  
755  “s’ any de sas pedradas,.” See Francisco Hernández Sanz, Compéndio de geografía é historia de la isla 
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algunos marineros muertos á pedradas; en San Felipe las mujeres, á pedradas también, obligaron á volver á 
bordo á un bote cargado de marinería  que intentaba un desembarco en la costa de aquel pueblo.” 
  259 
said Island”—the ancient fueros that Queen Anne had promised to protect in 1712. ⁠757  
Legal historian Lauren Benton points out that European empires were often 
characterized by “layered sovereignty” and “legal pluralism”—a phenomenon that was 
pervasive in the Mediterranean colonies. Benton argues that the “layered quality of 
imperial rule,” (which, in the case of Menorca, inelegantly integrated aspects of British 
law, military administration and traditional local government) “spawned contests over the 
prerogatives of officials, the definition and rights of subjects, and the articulation of 
colonial administration with the law of indigenous or conquered people.”758 These 
spheres of law and power were not only overlapping and ill defined, but often 
contradictory. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Treaty of Utrecht protected the rights of 
Catholics in Menorca, and by extension the traditional ecclesiastical government. 
Simultaneously, these religious protections were antithetical to British law. Further, the 
enduring civil government came into conflict with the new system of military authority—
a system of rule which itself was often incompatible with British common law and the 
established rights of British subjects. These complex contradictions, as well as silence 
from London on the proper parameters of military power or the role of civil government, 
created contestations between British governors and local religious and civil authorities. 
As one commenter on the Fábrigas case put it: 
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The fact most undoubtedly is, that Minorca, a conquered country, preserves its 
ancient (the Spanish) laws, till the conqueror chuses to give them others; and 
therefore as England has not given them others, it is true the Spanish laws do 
prevail in Minorca, both in civil and criminal matters, among themselves: but it is 
equally true that they have the protection of the English laws against their 
governor, who cannot be amenable to their local laws, and that however 
despotically a Spanish governor may formerly have acted, it cannot be the law of 
Spain, or of any country (because it is contrary to natural justice) that a man 
should be condemned and punished without either trial or hearing.759 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the civilian populations of both Gibraltar and 
Menorca would continue to have uneasy relationships with the British military authorities 
that, despite layered sovereignties, so often had the final word in quotidian decisions both 
big and small.  
Although Gibraltar had no traditional civil or religious institutions, there too the 
extent of military prerogative in civilian life and law and was unclear and contested. In 
order to navigate these muddy waters of unclear jurisdiction, layered sovereignty, and 
legal pluralism, Menorcans and Gibraltarians began to negotiate functional definitions of 
subjecthood within local civil courts, with the Governor, and with the Crown. They 
expressed their rights, privileges, and obligations in multidimensional ways and took 
myriad and sometimes conflicting approaches to protecting their rights or seeking justice.  
LEGAL PLURALISM IN MENORCA AND GIBRALTAR 
In 1718, General George Carpenter, Governor of Menorca, sent a memorial to the 
king.  “It is found from daily Experience,” he wrote, “that it is necessary some new 
model of Government should be formed for that Island, whereby the Commander in 
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Chief may know how to act.”760 This plea would be repeated by his successors 
throughout British rule in Menorca. From the early eighteenth century, both colonies 
were treated more as strategic military garrisons than as overseas territories with civilian 
populations. Governors of Gibraltar and Menorca (and their Lieutenant Governors who 
did almost all of the actual governing) were army officers. How to govern the diverse and 
often puzzling civilian populations outside their garrisons posed a challenge—especially 
because the ministry gave them few instructions about the extent of their authority over 
civilians and civil administration.   
In Menorca, the existence of deeply entrenched and enduring civil and 
ecclesiastical legal and governmental bodies created constant negotiations between 
British and Menorcan authorities over the extent and limits of the Governor’s power. To 
make things more difficult still, for the first forty years of British rule in Menorca, 
governors received no specific instructions about the parameters of gubernatorial 
authority. When these instructions finally did come, they came too late—just three years 
before England would lose the island to the French for the duration of the Seven Years’ 
War. When the British regained control of the island after the war, the carefully laid plans 
for civil regulations were generally abandoned. In Gibraltar, the absence of significant 
territory outside the fortified garrison, and the lack of any preexistent local government or 
courts, meant that the formation of a civil government was slow and halting—despite 
Gibraltar’s rapidly expanding and diverse civilian population.  
As Crown Colonies, the monarch ruled these territories through the Privy Council 
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with the close advice of the Secretary of State for the Southern Department throughout 
the eighteenth century. Instructions to governors were expressed as Orders in Council, or 
relayed through letters from the Secretary of State.761 Further, the Board of Trade—a 
special committee of the Privy Council responsible for the administration of overseas 
colonies—provided advice and helped create basic colonial policy. The distance that 
letters had to travel, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the general lack of 
interest within the ministry in administering the Mediterranean garrisons as colonies, 
meant that governors often had wide latitude in their dealings with the civilian 
populations, over whom they often seemed to become de facto despots.  
However, during the years of British rule, civilians vigorously used diverse legal 
arenas to register protest or seek justice, employing diverse legal arguments to assert and 
protect their rights. In Menorca, where most inhabitants’ status as “British Subjects” was 
solidly enshrined in British law, the islanders were often vociferous in proclaiming their 
rights as his or her “majesty’s natural subjects.” In Gibraltar—where the Governor had 
tight control of the town and where the civilian population was, at first, itinerant and 
almost entirely foreign-born—the rhetoric of subjecthood was less ostentatious, but still 
carefully cultivated and shrewdly negotiated. 
Menorca’s  “Ancient Rights and Privileges” and Civil Government 
Menorca’s fueros—often translated into English as “rights and privileges”— 
would be a constant site of conflict between British and Menorcan authorities. These 
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fueros were royal privileges and concessions to the islanders dating back to the tenth 
century when the Moors had conquered the island. They had continued to amass through 
the years of Spanish rule. Between 1231, when Aragon conquered Menorca (ending the 
rule of the Caliphate of Cordoba), and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Menorcan privileges 
had developed into a massive and complex legal code.762 The fueros gave Menorcans a 
series of concessions, including the right of the local government to send 
representatives—known as syndics—to air their grievances to the King without the 
approval of the Governor, and also exempted the Jurats—local magistrates—from 
prosecution during their term of service. The fueros also exempted Menorcans from 
corporal punishment, and from impressment into military service. Most important of all 
the fueros was: “No order to be admissible or obeyed in Menorca which flouts any of the 
fueros of the island.”763 Although Philip V had pushed for an outright recognition of 
Menorcan fueros during the Utrecht negotiations, the final version of the treaty only 
promised that Britain would protect Menorcan’s “bienes y honores”—their “estates and 
honors.”764 Did this include Menorcan fueros? If so, British sovereignty over the island 
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would be constrained by a 300-page tome written in medieval Catalan and composed of 
550 documents and laws dating back to the thirteenth century—a possibility that most 
British governors found difficult to accept.765 The unclear language of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, as well as promises by Stanhope and Queen Anne to protect Menorcan “rights 
and privileges,” would, over the following century of episodic British rule, haunt any 
arguments about the extent of British sovereignty and jurisdiction over Menorca and its 
inhabitants.  
The re-conquest of Menorca by the French during the Seven Years’ War and its 
return to Britain in 1763, would provide an opportunity for some to argue that the 
provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht were null and void. Therefore Britain could shake the 
chains of its diplomatic obligation to Spain and impose unfettered British rule over the 
island. When Lieutenant-Governor Johnston arrived on the Island in 1763, he raised the 
ire of Menorcans when, in a speech to the Jurats, he announced that “the Rights & 
Privileges …given by the 11th article of the Treaty of Utrecht cease not being provided 
for by the Treaty of Fontainebleau.”766 After furious complaints from the Jurats, the 
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ministry made it clear that the protections of the Treaty of Utrecht should remain in 
place.767  
Almost as precious to Menorcans as their fueros was their civil government—the 
Universitats—representative councils that had been instituted in the early fourteenth 
century. The island was divided into four sections each of which had a Universitat made 
up of magistrates or Jurats who were chosen at random each year from a list of qualified 
candidates.768 There was also a Universitat General, which was made up of the 
Universitat of Ciutadella and delegates from the other Universitats.769   
With its Catholic population, ancient civil and ecclesiastical government, and 
religious protections provided by the Treaty of Utrecht, Menorca was, in some ways, an 
early incarnation of the religiously and culturally plural British Empire that would 
emerge after the Seven Years’ War. At the time, however, the challenges posed by the 
possession of Menorca were relatively novel. In North America, for example, colonists 
had developed laws and institutions similar to those in Britain and claimed many of the 
same legal rights as Britons at home. In Menorca, the existing civil and ecclesiastical 
government, as well as the vague protections provided under the Treaty of Utrecht, meant 
that British governors were faced with an unfamiliar system, and locals who were 
vehemently protective of their traditional way of life. Reluctance by central British 
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authorities to define the parameters of British power made the situation all the more 
difficult and confusing for colonial governors and Menorcans alike.  
Civil Government in Gibraltar 
With the departure of the Spanish government and civilians in 1704, and the 
official cession of the Rock to the British in 1713, Gibraltar fell solely under the rule of a 
British military governor, answerable only to the Crown and ministers in London.770 In 
fact, a proposal for civilian legal regulation did not come until 1720, and the Rock would 
not develop any autonomous civil government until 1817. Gibraltar’s status as a garrison, 
the lack of an enduring civil society or government, and the absence of any populated 
hinterland (as there was in Menorca) meant that the road to civil government was long, 
bumpy, and would not come to full fruition until the nineteenth century. The fact that few 
of the new civilian inhabitants were, in any strict legal sense, British subjects, further 
complicated the question of civil jurisdiction. Were inhabitants to be treated as foreign 
merchants and referred to their consuls to mediate disputes? What protections, if any, 
were they entitled to? And how might they defend their rights against the will of the 
Lieutenant-Governor—the Garrison’s Commander-in-Chief?  
Because the subject-status of the new inhabitants of Gibraltar was, at best, 
confusing, the first rigorous arguments for civil law took shape in discussions around the 
adjudication of merchant disputes. In the first decade of British rule, it was customary to 
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refer such disputes to the appropriate consul. 771 However, in 1718, a quarrel between the 
Genoese consul and a British merchant lay bare the shortcomings of this scheme. 
Genoese consul Giambattista Sturla and British merchant William Hayles had an 
argument about the payments due from a joint investment in the privateering vessel 
Europa.772 To settle the quarrel, the governor asked John Beaver, a merchant, notary 
public, and only British legal practitioner on the Rock, to act as Judge Advocate.773  
Beaver adjudicated the case, ordering Sturla to pay a sum that Hayles found insufficient. 
When Hayles vigorously objected, Beaver had him confined for contempt of court. 
Although Hayles appealed to the Privy Council in London in 1721, his appeal was 
dismissed when the council found that Judge Beaver had acted “justly and 
unexceptionably.”774  
The controversy brought the issue of civil government in Gibraltar to the fore. 
Early hopes that Gibraltar might become a lively trading center, as well as the need to 
provision the garrison by sea, made the creation of a Court Merchant (a merchant court) a 
pressing issue. Judge Beaver wrote to the Board of Trade complaining about the lack of 
any formal civil justice system in Gibraltar. He argued that proper trade regulations and 
civil government in Gibraltar would attract “Numbers of His Majesty’s Subjects,” 
complaining that “as it at present stands, the Advantages of its being a free Port are 
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chiefly reap’d by Foreigners, who, besides the Garrison, are almost the only Inhabitants.” 
Beaver noted that, “The greatest misfortune to this place is the Want of a well-constituted 
Civil Power, from which Merchants and other Dealers might have speedy Relief against 
all unfair Practices, and which might summarily decide all controverted Cases.”775 
Hayles also complained to the Board of Trade about the lack of civil government 
in Gibraltar. In 1720, he organized a petition for the establishment of a civil government 
in Gibraltar from leading merchants in the City of London including Sir John Eyles and 
Sir Peter Delmè.776 In the petition to the Board of Trade, the merchants complained that 
Sturla and other traders residing in Gibraltar owed them $25,000, which was “all the 
estate your petitioners have in the world.” They protested that Gibraltar had “no Court of 
judicature where your petitioners have process at law against the said persons,” and that 
although they had “often applied themselves to His Majesty’s Governor,” for relief, they 
had no success. The governor claimed that he had no authority to force the payment of 
merchants’ debts.777  
In 1720, the Privy Council ordered that a commission be created “for Establishing 
a Court of Judicature for Determining of Private Causes, between Party & Party within 
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the Town and Territory of Gibraltar.”778 By November they had established Gibraltar’s 
First Charter of Justice. It established a Court of Common Pleas for settling civil actions, 
especially concerning matters of concern to Merchants—contracts and debts. The court 
would be made up of the Judge Advocate, and two merchants appointed by the judge. To 
this court, the Privy Council gave “full power and authority to hold plea of and to hear 
and determine in a summary way all pleas of debt account or other contracts trespasses 
and all manner of other personal pleas whatsoever.”779 Even with this new court, the 
ambivalent boundaries of civil law and military jurisdiction persisted—especially 
because The Judge Advocate was always a garrison official.780 Moreover, the right of 
appeal was to the governor, thus inextricably weaving military authority into the structure 
of civil justice. 
Although this charter gave the Judge Advocate the role of adjudicating cases 
concerning bankruptcies, wills, and debts, the Rock still lacked a civilian criminal court. 
The only criminal cases tried were military court-martials.781 As a result, even “the 
greatest and most enormous Crimes, committed by the Civil Inhabitants,” went 
unpunished except by “turning the Delinquents out of Town.”782 The lack of a criminal 
court, and the continuing influence of military power in civil cases, prompted renewed 
complaints from merchants and inhabitants. A pamphlet entitled Gibraltar a Bulwark to 
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Great Britain argued that Gibraltar could be an important center for trade with North 
Africa, but that trade “cannot flourish under a Military Power; for it is of such a Nature, 
that it [cannot] thrive without the cherishing Warmth of a Civil Government…The 
Merchant who does Business at Gibraltar, assuredly suffers by the want of a regular 
Court of Justice there.”783 It also suggested a court be established to administer the oath 
of allegiance, seize goods, and imprison inhabitants “in Cases of Contumacy, or ill 
Behaviour.” While the Governor should “aid and assist this Officer on all lawful 
Occasions,” the pamphlet argued, he should not “interfere in any Case whatsoever except 
where the Military Matters make it necessary, and then only join Himself, or any other 
sufficient Land Officer, to be assistant in the Decision of the Controversy.”784 
 A further petition from a group of merchants in August 1721 objected that they 
were  “discouraged to continue the trade for want of a Form of Civil Government 
established there being at present under that of a military one whereby your Petitioners 
are not secure in their properties.” The merchants complained that although “your Maj 
was pleased to grant ye Royall Letter patents for that purpose it is yet not withstanding in 
the hands of military magistrates.” Further, “the settling of a Civill Judicature there will 
Contribute very much to the advantage of Trade in Generall and to the entire Satisfaction 
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of all your Majetys Subjects.”785  
In 1722 a committee of the Privy Council formed to address the continuing 
complaints about the judiciary and the lack of civil government in Gibraltar. They 
considered these complaints, including one from Hayles who claimed that while the 
Spanish, French, Genoese, and Dutch were afforded their own Consul and lawyer, “at 
least two hundred of His majestys Subjects Inhabiting in Gibraltar” suffered without a 
proper civil court, and were “more ill treated than Strangers.” Indeed the paucity of 
British subjects among the inhabitants in this early period was a cause of concern in the 
debate around how to establish any form of civil government. If British subjects were 
such a small percentage of the population, would it make sense to draft a constitution 
based on English common law? The committee concluded that the situation warranted 
further consideration. However, as an abstract of the proceedings compiled in 1730 dryly 
phrased it, the committee “agreed to meet again on the monday following to consider 
further thereof But it does not appear that their Lordships met any more upon it til Six 
years afterwards.”786 
 The issue of civil government in Gibraltar languished until after the 1727 siege. In 
1728 the Board of Trade met several times to discuss proposals for a civilian 
constitution.787  The resulting draft charter of 1728 was based on the charter of English 
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Tangier, but limited the Corporation to Protestants and did not exempt military personnel 
from the jurisdiction of the civilian courts. The Freemen of the City (the British 
Protestant merchants in Gibraltar) were to elect a mayor, six aldermen, and a common 
council of twelve for life.  In this scheme, the governor and the military would not have 
the right to arrest civilians. Instead, all the members of the Corporation would be justices 
of the peace and five of them would form a court to hear serious crimes. Five justices 
would also meet weekly to hear civil complaints. Rather than the governor, the right of 
appeal would go directly to the Privy Council.788 Despite this and several other proposals 
that would more clearly disentangle civil and military authority, nothing came of the 
plans. The governor and his secretary personally received all money from duties, 
licenses, and rents on the Rock, and were not prepared to give away the lucrative activity 
of personally managing the civilian and commercial affairs of Gibraltar.789  
Jurisdiction within the broader imperial legal system also became an issue in this 
period. In 1732, merchant and interpreter Solomon Namias was killed while on a 
diplomatic mission to Morocco. Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd Alla found out Namias was a Jew 
and not an Englishman as he had assumed, took offence at his demeanor, and ordered 
him to be burnt alive.790 After Namias’ death, his London trading partners applied to the 
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Court Merchant in Gibraltar for the release of his goods to cover his debts. The court 
ordered it should be done. However, London merchant David Lopez Pereira, another one 
of Namias’ associates, applied instead to the Prerogative Court of Canterbury—the 
ecclesiastical court that dealt with wills and estates in England. Lopez asked to use the 
money Namias owed him against his debts to the other merchants. The court agreed. 
With two conflicting orders, Solicitor General Dudley Ryder was called on to establish 
which court had superior jurisdiction. He found that when the English took Gibraltar, the 
(presumably Spanish) “Civill Law prevailed there” and that the establishment of the new 
court “was not intended to Introduce a new System of Laws.” Therefore, Ryder ruled, the 
Prerogative Court of Canterbury had no jurisdiction in the case. Ryder claimed that the 
outcome of Lopez’s case, “whether in Gibraltar or other parts of Spain [emphasis mine], 
or in Barbary or in any other parts of the world” depended on “the Laws of these 
respective Countries who may grant administration of their own to the persons or 
effects…within their respective Jurisdictions by Laws which we are strangers to.”791 
Because the charter for a civil court in Gibraltar had not laid out a clear set of laws, or 
explicitly extended the laws of England to Gibraltar, the Rock was, according to Ryder, 
not subject to the laws of England, but instead to Spanish civil law. It should, for all legal 
purposes, he seemed to imply, be considered a different country with “Laws we are 
strangers to.” Of course Ryder’s claim that the Spanish civil law should continue to 
prevail was highly problematic. If English civil law did not extend to Gibraltar, and the 
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Rock had no enduring civil laws or government, the governor was left with extraordinary 
power over the lives and fortunes of the civilians. 
Another attempt to establish a functioning civil government in Gibraltar came in 
1740. The second Charter of Justice would bring English law to Gibraltar and set up a 
system of civil and criminal courts to be administered by a Chief Judge and four 
merchants.792 Unfortunately, the appointed judge, Robert Robinson, never took his post, 
and the plan languished. When, after four years, Robinson was still living comfortably in 
London, the Treasury finally put a stop to his £500 a year salary. Although an outraged 
Robinson published an implausible defense of his actions, the new court was never 
realized. 793  
When Governor Bland took office in 1749, he bemoaned Gibraltar’s lack of civil 
magistrates and complained about the overwhelming civil and judicial responsibilities 
that fell to the governor. “The Field which the Governor of Gibraltar has to Range in,” 
Bland wrote, “is rather too extensive for any one Man to Improve and Cultivate in the 
manner it ought to be.” This broad array of responsibilities meant that while the governor 
might be “Employ’d in the Care of one part, some of the others will Run into Disorder 
and Confusion, and instead of yielding what should be profitable, produce nothing but 
Bryers and Thorns.”794 Bland also complained that there were no civil magistrates to 
police the town, no civil court to prosecute crimes, no magistrate of health, “nor has the 
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governor any Legal Civil Power invested in him to punish Civil Crimes, but what he is 
graciously pleas’d from his own imaginary Power to assume to himself without any 
known Law or Written authority for his Exercising such Power.” Bland saw problems 
with this “imaginary Power,” claiming that it provided a latitude that “a Wise, a Prudent 
Governor would willingly avoid, lest it sho’d lead him into many Errors.” As military 
men, Bland argued governors could not have the required expertise to be “Competent 
judges either to Try or Determine Civil Cases.” According to Bland, governors could 
only reasonably pass judgment in such cases after they had been properly “examined & 
proved & the Points of Law argued and Settled.”795 
In the face of these challenges, Bland set about creating his own set of regulations 
for the Rock. Bland’s regulations consisted of 10 articles “relating to the King’s Revenue, 
the People’s Property, and the Civil Police of this Town.” Codifying these regulations, 
Bland hoped, would prevent his successor from encountering “the same disadvantages 
that I did by finding on my arrival here every thing in confusion and no Instructions of 
any kind left me.”796 In Article 10, which related to the governor’s power in civil affairs, 
Bland proposed that the authority of the current court should be extended to allow it to try 
cases that involved “Frauds, Pilfering, Personal Assaults and Abuses and other Breaches 
of the Peace, not extending to life and member.”797 
A committee of the Privy Council and the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, 
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concluded that in fact, more radical change was needed. The resulting Third Charter of 
Justice of 1752 would appoint three justices of the peace: the governor who acted as 
chairman at quarter sessions, the Judge Advocate, and one merchant. It allowed the 
existing Court Merchant to extend its jurisdiction to have “full power to grant probates of 
wills and administrations of the personal estates…within the said town.”798 It also, 
finally, created a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction to “hear determine and punish all 
murders Felonies Forgeries perjuries Trespasses and other Crimes 
whatsoever…(Excepting Treasons and misprisions of Treasure).”799 In these cases, a 
Grand Jury system would determine whether the case was triable, and a Petty Jury would 
hear evidence and deliver a verdict. The jurors must all be British subjects and the judges 
were to be given “the same Powers to Punish as Justices of Peace in England.” Those 
judges were to be the Governor, Judge Advocate, and “one British merchant”—a 
requirement that, given the unclear subject-status of most of the Rock’s inhabitants, was 
difficult to fulfill.800 Judges were not only to take the oath of allegiance, but also to make 
a formal declaration against the doctrine of transubstantiation, confirming that they were 
not Roman Catholics—another challenging dictate among a population of so many 
Genoese, Spaniards, and Portuguese. In spite of the exclusion of Roman Catholics from 
the office of Justice of the Peace and the insistence that juries should be made up of 
British subjects (of any religion), the law would, in theory, apply equally to all 
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inhabitants, except soldiers of the Garrison. Thoroughly civilian courts however were not 
established until 1817.801 Until then, successive governor held the position of Chief 
Justice of Gibraltar.802 
One of the first cases to be tried under this new system was the case of a Jewish 
porter named Samuel Soto who was accused of breaking into his employer’s storehouse 
and stealing his goods. When the new court condemned Soto to death, Soto called not on 
the rights of British subjecthood, but rather his rights as a subject o the Sultan of 
Morocco. Leaders of the Jewish community in Gibraltar petitioned the qā’id of Tétouan, 
who made it clear that he would be displeased with the execution of a Moroccan subject 
in Gibraltar. Colonel Herbert argued that because Soto committed the robbery before the 
institution of the new judicial system, because Soto’s was the first death penalty case, and 
because “the poor Wretch has lain many months in prison,” the crown should show 
mercy. “I beg your Lordship will intercede with His majesty,” Herbert wrote to the 
Secretary of State, “to spare his Life.” Herbert argued that doing so would “have a very 
good effect on the rest of the Inhabitants.” More importantly, perhaps, Herbert worried 
that because the Jewish community had called on the qā’id of Tétouan to claim Soto as a 
Moroccan subject, his execution might “might involve both your Lordship and me in a 
great deal of trouble”—trouble, perhaps, like a termination of supplies from across the 
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straits.803  
Civil Government in Menorca 
As in Gibraltar, clear regulation of gubernatorial authority and the organization of 
civil law was slow to develop in Menorca. And as in Gibraltar, it seemed clear from the 
start that these were required to foster a peaceful, prosperous, and functioning colony. In 
1712, Queen Anne appointed Henry Neal to be “Surveyor of the Island of Minorca,” 
instructing him to make a thorough appraisal of many aspects of her new possession, 
including “how a Civil Magistracy is to be settled for the security of Traders and good 
Government of the Island.”804 Writing to a friend from Mahon, Neal reported that he 
hoped the island’s produce and revenue would increase “once a Civil Magistracy is 
settl’d,” but confided that “at present there is nothing but a military Government and 
many disorderly things committed, which makes the people very uneasie.”805 Unlike 
Gibraltar, however, Menorca did have an existing civil government: its Universitats and 
Jurats. With the island passing to the British, however, it was unclear what jurisdiction 
the Universitats would retain, and which powers were now in the hands of the military 
governor.  
In preparing his report for the ministry, Neal turned to the advice of important and 
influential Menorcans. Juan Miguel Saura y Morell, had led the rebellion of 500 in 
support of Charles III, had joined Stanhope in his expedition to Menorca, and been 
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named Governador de los Paisanos (Civil Governor) by the Duke of Argyll.806 Also 
advising Neal were Saura’s council, Lorenzo Beltran, and Abogado Fiscal, Royal y 
Provincial (Attorney General and Crown Prosecutor) Rafael Alberti y Garibaldo.807 Their 
report described the separation of civil and military power on the island during Spanish 
rule, in which “For maintaining of Peace & quietness…between the Country People and 
the soldiers,” a separate civil and military court had been established. These courts “each 
had its peculiar Officers” who had “Cognizance of the things belonging to their Courts.” 
Importantly, their report stressed that under Spanish rule, “the Military tribunal did not 
interfere with the Civil Tribunal nor the Civil with the Military.” Saura, Beltran, and 
Alberti advocated the maintenance of the system of the Universitats suggesting that “for 
maintaining the quiet and Tranquility of the Island ‘tis requisite” that the Royal offices—
such as the Abogado Fiscal or Asesor (Chief Justice and General Council)—as well as 
the Universitats be maintained “with the same authority & Exemptions as they have 
hitherto Enjoyed them…so as every man in his place may quietly and freely goe on and 
do the Business of his office, as well in things that concern the Royal service as those of 
Publick good & Utility.”  
Answering questions about the relationships between the islanders, the soldiers, 
and the military authorities, Saura, Beltran, and Alberti complained of many abuses by 
the military, including the felling of fruit-bearing trees for the garrison’s firewood and the 
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many “Thefts, Misusages & affronts which the officers and Soldiers of the Garrison of 
this Island do commit.” They described British soldiers “Rambling all the Island over, 
and in a headstrong manner getting into Vineyards, Orchards, Gardens &c and trampling 
down the Sowed Corn, Stealing the fruits, breaking the Fruits Trees, Killing of the 
Cattle.” They also complained that soldiers and officers often took islanders’ beasts of 
burden “for their pleasure or otherwise from one town to another, and instead of paying 
the Hire, doe frequently beat the owners not treating them as subjects of our lady Queen 
but as a Conquored People.”808 
In order to remedy the situation in Menorca, Saura, Beltran, and Alberti 
encouraged better communication between the British military government and the 
Menorcan civil government. They wrote that they hoped “there may be a good 
Correspondence (as is necessary) Between the Troops of Her Majty (whom god preserve) 
& the Country people that they may live in Brotherly Love & with Reciprocal friendship 
since they are both subjects of one & the same sovereign.”809  Despite the general anger 
at being made subjects to a Protestant king, Menorcans, with expertise from centuries of 
occupation, were already wielding the important rhetoric of British subjecthood.  
Many of the early interactions between Menorcans and the new British 
government were tinged with mutual suspicion. The British were concerned that 
Menorcans would never be ideal, desirable, or loyal subjects, and the Menorcans were 
fearful that the British would not protect their fueros, and would treat them as a 
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conquered people rather than as subjects. In a letter to a friend, Neal stressed that the 
problems of the island arose from the fact that it lacked a civil government:  
“The produce is chiefly corn, wine, wool and cheese, and might be improved very 
considerable […] if once a Civil Magistracy is settl’d, but at present here is 
nothing but a military Government and many disorderly things committed, which 
makes the people very uneasie. As to the people in generall they are well inclin'd 
to the Queen, and are willing to submit to any Laws she shall think proper for 
them to live by except a military power and hope in a short time here will be some 
instructions from England to prevent any disorders for the future.810”   
 
But there would be no instructions from England. Despite Neal’s report and a few false 
starts, London was silent about the matter of civil government, leaving the governors and 
Jurats to parry for power in a flurry of remonstrances, representations, and responses—
vying for action from London to rectify their specific grievances.  
Given the problems on the island, the ministry was keen to more clearly delineate 
the spheres of civil, military, and ecclesiastical government. In April 1714, Secretary of 
State Bolingbroke wrote not only to Neal, but also to Lieutenant-Governor Kane, Chief 
Engineer Brigadier Durand, and Admiral Wishart, telling them that he intended to “settle 
the Military, Civil and Ecclesiastical Government of Minorca this summer,” and seeking 
their “expert advice in their respective spheres of responsibility.”811 Secretary of State 
Bolingbroke suggested that two Menorcan representatives come to London to consult on 
how best to structure British rule, and ordered Kane to call together the “People and 
Inhabitants of the Island who are of the most consequence & open to them the Queen’s 
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intention to secure them their Civil and their Religious Rights, not only pursuant to the 
Stipulation of the late Treaty of Utrecht with them, but in the best & most perfect manner 
possible, in order to make them easy and happy under Her Majesty’s Government. These 
persons shall bring along with them a full Stale of those Laws and Customs, & of all the 
Privileges of the Island.” 812  
To carry out this mission, the Universitat General chose the island’s Paborde 
(Church Provost), Manuel Mercader—who was also the Vicario General (Vicar General) 
until 1715—and Francisco Sanxo, a prominent lawyer who Kane would appoint Asesor 
in 1715. These syndics, however, did not reach London until August 1714, shortly after 
the death of Queen Anne. With a ministry more concerned with the problems of the 
Hanoverian succession and the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, the issue of civil 
administration in Menorca languished.813 
Without direct instructors from London, Lieutenant-Governor Kane was left to 
fend for himself. In the absence of any directives, he improvised. Kane began to 
implement his own projects for reforming the civil government of the island through 
what he would later refer to as his “government by the pen.”814 Over the course of his 
rule in Menorca, Kane implemented many reforms, all without explicit authority to do so. 
He outlawed the carrying of arms, making the penalty for doing so (or for stoning the 
troops) public whipping—a punishment from which Menorcans were specifically exempt 
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according to their fueros. He imposed social reforms—banning gambling houses and 
confining prostitution to outlying districts.815 He also made important economic 
reforms—imposing a tax and license scheme on brandy to raise revenue for the repair of 
public roads and buildings,816 taxing foreign ships entering the harbor to trade,817 
establishing a currency exchange rate,818 and fixing prices on many foods and goods.819 
In April 1716 the Universitat General elected Juan de Bayarte Ametller to 
succeed Mercader as syndic in London, a move that proved contentious in Menorca. 
Kane refused to approve Bayarte’s election as syndic and, upset that the Universitats had 
conducted the proceedings without his supervision or consent. He went so far as to deny 
Bayarte a passport to travel to London and seized the official papers of the Universitat 
General.820 Bayarte, however, managed to obtain a passport from interim Commander-in-
Chief Colonel Parker while Kane was away in London. When Bayarte reached London in 
1718, he published complaints against Governor Kane and gained a hearing in the House 
of Commons.821 
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A pamphlet on the “The Distress’d Condition of Minorca,” written by “a Member 
of Parliament,” (although almost certainly crafted by Bayarte himself), argued that in 
Menorca, “the Ecclesiastical and Civil Rights of the People have been occasionally 
suspended and dispenced with,” and that Menorcans were suffering “under a Military, not 
a Civil government, and consequently are Subjects to an Arbitrary Power, and not 
Partakers of the English Laws and Constitution, to which they have a Title whenever they 
shall demand it.” Attempts to silence Menorcans complaints, such as Kane’s denial of 
Bayarte’s passport, the pamphlet argued, meant that Menorcans were denied their “most 
valuable Right, the Right of petitioning to, and being heard by their Sovereign.”822  
The pamphlet made the case for Menorcan rights on several grounds: that  “both 
the Ecclesiastical and Civil Laws, Privileges, and Rights of the Island have 
been…abolish’d, contrary to what was by his Grace the Duke of Argyle, in her late 
Majesty’s Name, promised.” It also argued that the suspension of these rights and 
institutions was contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht: “the Chief Commandants not thinking 
themselves obliged to regard wither Royal Agreements or Promises, have made Laws of 
their own accord, and overthrown the Regularity of the ancient and former Method of 
Government.”823 It also appealed as subjects to their sovereign, arguing that if Kane was 
unwilling to hear the complaints of his “injur’d and distres’d fellow Subjects,” then 
certainly England’s “good and gracious Prince, who covers the Miserable from the Rage 
and Persecution of the Oppressor in Foreign Countries, would never suffer his own 
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Subjects to groan under the Tyranny of wanton, wicked and abandoned Men, if he knew 
their Melancholy Condition.”824  
The Privy Council considered the charges of abuse of power brought against Kane 
by the Jurats in 1717 and 1718, and by the House of Commons in 1720. They were 
dismissed as “frivolous and ill-grounded,” and Kane was “honorably cleared” of all the 
allegations.825 However, the complaints laid bare the unclear and overlapping spheres of 
power in Menorca, and the Privy Council formed several committees to examine the 
problem.826 The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary at War, 
and the Master General of Ordnance were charged with reporting on the island’s 
ecclesiastical government, civil government and laws, military government, and 
fortifications respectively. Menorca’s revenues, naval affairs and commerce were to be 
examined by the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Board of Trade.827  
While committees got to work examining the governance of the island, Kane 
returned to Menorca. Although he had been cleared of the charges against him, the extent 
of his civil powers were still no more clearly defined. From 1719 until his death in 1736, 
he continued to govern by decree, despite active opposition from the Jurats and their 
continual complaints to the Privy Council. In his efforts to unilaterally reform civil affairs 
in Menorca and consolidate power, Kane also began to centralize authority in Mahon—
the home of the British garrison and the colonial governor. In 1722 Kane transferred the 
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primary courts and the meeting of the Universitat General from Ciutadella to Mahon.828 
In 1728 he decreed that the annual Insaculación (allotment) of Jurats would take place in 
Mahon.829 These acts weakened the influence of the Universitat General, and effectually 
made Mahon—the seat of British military authority—the capital of Menorca. By moving 
power away from the longstanding political center of Ciutadella, he could effectively 
marginalize the traditional Menorcan elite. 
Kane carried out his reforms of civil government without the ministry ever 
defining the extent of gubernatorial authority. However, despite his autocratic style of 
governance, Kane repeatedly lobbied the ministry to draft regulations for Menorca that 
might clarify the arenas and extent of the governor’s authority. On leave in London from 
1728-1730, Kane and Governor Carpenter again raised the issue with the Privy 
Council.830 Once more, international and domestic interests outweighed the squabbles 
between a military commander and locals the small island. After the Anglo-Spanish war, 
Walpole had finally made what he hoped would be a more lasting peace with Spain. 
Fearful of Spanish and foreign Catholic opposition, and hoping to avoid any further 
allegations that the British had breached the Treaty of Utrecht, Walpole decided the time 
was wrong to make any official attempt to clarify the spheres of government in 
Menorca.831 It would be another twenty years, the successful prosecution of a governor, 
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the elopement of two nuns, and attention from the pope before Westminster would finally 
codify what legal jurisdiction the British government had over the lives of Menorcans.  
RELIGION AND AUTHORITY IN MENORCA 
The Ecclesiastical Government 
 In Menorca, the infringement of military authority upon religion and ecclesiastical 
government caused even thornier problems. From the beginning, both governors and the 
ministry were uncomfortable with the Treaty of Utrecht’s protection of religion in 
Menorca—not simply from sheer religious bigotry and Protestant fervor (which played a 
large role in their rhetoric, if not always their policy), but also because the deeply 
entrenched ecclesiastical government had at its head, not only a foreign Pope, but perhaps 
even more subversively, the Spanish Bishop of Mallorca. Central to British concerns was 
the idea that because of the Catholic Church’s hierarchy, Menorcans could never be loyal 
subjects, as their allegiances would forever be tied to Britain’s longtime enemy, Spain. 
Major Whitford’s 1740 account of the fortifications of Fort St. Philip voices common 
fears about the loyalties of Menorcans:   
The Island of Minorca might be made almost impregnable, were the inhabitants in 
the British interest…At present the Islanders from their Religion are influenced 
by the Priests, that they are insensible of the blessings they enjoy; & such is their 
aversion to Heretiks, that they prefer poverty & oppression under a Roman 
Catholic Prince to riches and freedom under a Protestant one but particularly on 
all occasions of differences the concessions are prompted to exert their authority 
among those Bigots. Could a method be found out, either to convert them to the 
Protestant Religion, by our own clergy, banishing all the Priests, & educating the 
children in English schools…The expense wou’d in some measure be made up by 
a smaller number of regular troops being sufficient to defend the Island. The 
advantage the British reap in the possession of Minorca is from the use of the 
Harbour of Mahone: But as matters now are, the Minorquines being in the interest 
of the Enemy, the moment they land, as by the best information could be had, 
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their number will be so superior, that our own troops must be shut up in the castle 
of St. Philipps thereby the Harbour is lost…832  
 
Whitford’s account voices the common British assumption that Menorcans should be 
grateful for enlightened British rule—an enlightened rule that was tied closely to 
Protestantism. Menorcan religion was not simply a matter of heresy, but was a challenge 
to British control of the island itself. Indeed all of Whitford’s proposals for making the 
Menorcans loyal subjects—expelling the priests, regulating education, and converting the 
local population, were debated or attempted over the course of the three periods of British 
occupation, but to little avail.  
 Before the British occupation, the Menorcan church was part of the See of 
Mallorca, and the Bishop of Mallorca appointed a Paborde (Provost) and Vicario 
General (Vicar General) to carry out the day-to-day business of the Menorcan 
Bishopric.833 There were also two Menorcan ecclesiastical courts, which were entirely 
independent of the civil courts and outside the control of the Universitats or the governor. 
The Tribunal del Santo Oficio, an Inquisition court, prosecuted breaches of faith or 
morals—particularly blasphemy and witchcraft. A commissioner from mainland Spain 
presided over the court, which was independent of any other court in Menorca and whose 
verdicts could not be appealed.834 The Curia Eclesiastica heard cases involving canon 
law, quarrels between clergy or parishes, domestic and marital disputes, as well as civil 
and criminal cases brought against anyone who had taken holy orders and who was 
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therefore, according to the fueros, exempt from prosecution in the civil courts. Its judges 
were the Vicario General, the Asesor, the Abogado Fiscal, and the Procurador Fiscal.835 
Any appeals were referred to the tribunal of the Bishop of Mallorca.  
After the British occupation of the island, the inquisition court was dissolved, but 
the Curia Eclesiastica (Ecclesiastical Court) caused a problem. For Menorcans, the 
practice of their religion required that they engage in their Church’s hierarchy. Appeals in 
ecclesiastical cases must naturally be presented to their bishop—the Bishop of Mallorca.  
However it was an anathema to the British that appeals from any court in British territory 
should be heard in Spain.836 For civil cases, the Privy Council had become the court of 
appeals for Menorca. But how could the Privy Council be responsible for hearing cases 
involving Catholic canon law?  
There were many contradictions between the laws of Great Britain and the 
“Privileges, Immunities, municipal Laws and the ancient, established, unalterable Custom 
and Practice of the Island.” 837 However, the clergy presumed that because of the 
religious protections provided by the Treaty of Utrecht and the promises of General 
Stanhope, the Duke of Argyll, and the Queen to honor the islanders’ fueros, the 
ecclesiastical courts would remain intact. Governor Kane, however, believed that his 
duties to uphold the authority of the British monarchy, safeguard the security of the 
island, and ensure the moral welfare of the garrison required him to temper the power of 
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the clergy and decrease the influence of Spain. In England, the king was head of both 
state and church. To Kane, therefore, it could never be “consistent with the civil 
government and laws of Great Britain” that the clergy of a British territory could be 
subject to the spiritual authority of a Spanish Bishop.838  “If the Church of Minorca shall 
be continued under the Direction of the Bishop of Majorca,” Kane believed,  
“he will have such a Power over the consciences of Your Majesty’s Subjects of 
that Isle, as will incline them to a continual Dependence on the Crown of Spain, 
and keep them in that Interest; and consequently Your Majesty may expect 
frequent Complaints from the Court of Madrid, at the Instigation of the Court of 
Rome. Nor will those that Your Majesty shall be pleased to appoint as Your 
Governors there, be ever at ease in their Administration.”839  
 
 Fearing this foreign influence Kane sought to regulate the Menorcan church “until 
the Queen’s pleasure be known.” The regulations focused on extracting any potentially 
dissident Spanish influence from the ecclesiastical hierarchy and protecting the Protestant 
scruples of the English soldiers of the garrison. Kane took it upon himself prohibit priests 
from administering sacraments to members of the garrison. He also banned all foreign 
clergy from preaching on the island and demanded that the Menorcan clergy swear and 
oath of allegiance to the King. Further, he issued orders to prohibit Menorcan clergy from 
recognizing, taking ecclesiastical instructions from or paying tithes to the Bishop of 
Mallorca. He also forbid any further tribunals of the inquisition, or appeals of the Curia 
Eclesiastica to the Bishop of Mallorca.840 When the Bishop proposed a visit his 
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Menorcan flock, Kane denied his request.841 After the Curia Eclesiastica sentenced a 
resident of Mahon to prison because his daughter had married a “dissolute man,” Kane 
proposed that all prison sentences handed down by the court should be reviewed instead, 
by the governor—a request that must have only heightened the feeling that not in was not 
only the island that was governed by military authority, but the islanders’ religious lifes 
was as well.842  
In response to Kane’s regulations, Manuel Mercader, the Vicario General of 
Menorca, presented 25 proposals for the future of ecclesiastical authority under British 
rule. Mercader suggested, among other things, that Catholicism be protected on the island 
“to the entire Satisfaction of the Ecclesiastical Prelate,” and that, as in Gibraltar, neither 
Jews nor Moors be permitted to reside in Menorca. Mercader also proposed that no 
Catholic be allowed to convert, no foreign missionaries be received, mixed marriages be 
prohibited, that the Bishop of Mallorca should be allowed to visit, and that no sons of 
Catholics be taught in Protestant schools. These proposals also reasserted that no member 
of the clergy could be subject to punishment by civil or military authority, and that the 
governor could not interfere with the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Further, 
Mercader proposed that the governor himself should have to “swear before Bailiff in the 
Court, that he will keep, Maintain, and Observe, all the privileges, Constitution and 
Customs, as well Spiritual as Temporal” of the island.843 
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Kane ignored these proposals and continued to rule by decree in the ecclesiastical 
and well as the civil realm. Fearful of an influx of foreign clergy who might foment 
discontent among the islanders or act as spies, he expelled several of them from the 
island, including Vicario General Cristóbal Rubí del Villar, who had been appointed to 
the post by the Bishop of Mallorca in 1715 and was opposed to many of Kane’s 
reforms.844 Anger about Kane’s religious decrees, his expulsion of Spanish clergy, and 
tension between the islanders and garrison continued to fester.845 In April 1717, the 
Spanish Ambassador, Marqués de Monteleón, made 28 articles of complaint against the 
restrictions Kane made on the Menorcan church and harassment by British soldiers.846 He 
aimed to prove that aspects of Kane’s policies and government were in breach of the 
protection of Catholic worship guaranteed by the Treaty of Utrecht. The articles 
complained of soldiers who stole the clappers from the bells at the parish church in 
Mahon, stripped bars off the convent gate to flirt with the nuns, intruded on the convent 
of St. James to examine the consecrated hosts, and perpetrated a multitude of other insults 
and abuses. Kane dismissed these accounts as nothing more than the kinds of mischief 
that happens when “so many young men happen to be together.” He claimed that the 
clappers were taken away by “some People in a Frolick in the Night-time,” that the 
flirting sailors were “far from being disagreeable to the Ladies,” and caused  “more mirth 
in the convent than uneasiness,” and that the trespassing soldier was little more than a 
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curious young man on his first visit to “a Roman-Catholick country.” Such incidents did 
not, Kane claimed, constitute any breach of the Treaty of Utrecht.847 
In response to the Spanish Ambassador’s complaints about the regulations he had 
imposed on the clergy, Kane also pleaded for a clearer explanation of his powers: “I have 
hitherto acted without any instructions from Court that the King will be pleased to 
determine whether the orders I gave to the Clergy (which were only until his Maj 
pleasure be known) be approved or disapproved & He would be pleased to consider how 
a commanding officer shall act for the future in respectt to the Church least through 
inadvertency he may do those things that shall be judged a Breach of the Peace of Utrecht 
or run the risque of losing his head.”848  
Despite the prolonged lack of instruction from the ministry, interest in the 
religious future of Menorca was very much alive in the metropole. As Brent Sirota 
argues, the Anglican Church in the early eighteenth century adopted a  “blue water 
policy”—an active interest in Britain’s maritime and commercial empire. This policy, he 
argues, “allowed an established (and downright telluric) church plotted in the insular 
dioceses of England and Wales to begin reckoning the far-flung populations affected by 
English global commercial and strategic interests within its moral purview.”849 As such, 
Anglican activist groups such as the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge 
took a keen interest in Menorca. These activists had lobbied for what the group’s 
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secretary Henry Newman called “the more effectual establishment of the Protestant 
interest in Minorca.”850 Anglican attention to Menorca heightened when, in 1718, 
William Wake, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was slated to lead a committee of 
churchmen to finally make recommendations for the regulation of Menorca’s 
ecclesiastical government.851  
Kane and Wake worked closely on the proposals for ecclesiastical reform, and the 
Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge began corresponding with Kane 
regularly. Henry Newman praised Kane’s work on ecclesiastical reform as “an instrument 
raised up by Providence to be the means of abundance of good in those parts which 
increased.”852 In the end, the committee’s proposals were very similar to Kane’s original 
regulations. They proposed banning foreign priests,853 cutting ties with the bishop of 
Mallorca, banning the inquisition, and prohibiting clergy from proselytizing, marrying, or 
baptizing any British subjects without the governor’s permission. They also made the 
clergy liable to civil prosecution and required them to take an oath of fidelity to British 
crown. They also proposed that Menorcans should be allowed to convert to Protestantism 
without consequence,854 and, most radically, that Menorca should be put under the care of 
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an English Bishop appointed by the king.855 The recommendations of the committee 
vindicated Kane’s decrees, but he disagreed with their conclusion that the Menorcan 
church should be put under the jurisdiction of an Anglican bishop. He believed that 
Menorcans would violently reject anyone other than a Catholic Bishop, and hoped to 
appoint Mercader to this post. Ironically, because he was born in Valencia, Mercader was 
not eligible for such a post according to Article 1 of the committee’s recommendations 
that “no Clergyman whatsoever, Regular or Secular, be hereafter admitted as a member 
of the Churches or Convents of Minorca, or have any Benefice there, or receive any 
Revenue from thence, but the Natives of the Island.”856 
Despite these bold proposals for reform of Menorca’s ecclesiastical government, 
(as with the issues of civil government) “the affairs of Great Britain did not permit that 
work to go forward.”857 The Whig ministry of George I never relished the prospect of a 
religious struggle on an island that had been secured for strategic and commercial 
purposes, and London’s interest in the ecclesiastical affairs of Menorca languished. 
Concern about overstepping the bounds of authority laid out by the Treaty of Utrecht, and 
frustration that the ministry failed to issue specific instructions would plague governors 
for the entirety of the British occupation of Menorca.858   
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The Nuns and The Pope 
 After Kane’s death in 1736, the remaining twenty years of the first period of 
British rule in Menorca saw no improvement in the relations between the governor and 
the civil or ecclesiastical governments. The major difficulty continued to be the contrast 
between the Menorcans’ belief that the Treaty of Utrecht did not give the governor any 
authority to interfere in matters of civil or religious government, and the stance of the 
Governors who saw it as their duty to intervene if they considered it to be in the interest 
of “His Majesty’s service.”859 
 Because of the religious and political tensions on the island, some in Britain 
hoped to populate the island with more “desirable” subjects. Early in the era of British 
rule, Colonel Daubuis put forth  “A Plan for settling the Island with a Sett of Substantial 
and Industrious inhabitants,” a proposition that was largely ignored, even when it was 
again taken up by his son-in-law years later.  The plan proposed “to settle immediately a 
numerous Colony of substantial and Industrious Protestants in the Island of Minorca”860 
Such plans were proposed for British colonies throughout the Empire, although they 
rarely succeeded. One plan to populate a new British colony did succeed, but ironically it 
was not with Protestants, but instead with Menorcans. In the 1760s, Andrew Turnbull 
formulated a plan to populate the colony of Florida by providing passage to about 1,000 
Menorcans, who migrated there in 1768.861  Although no plan to repopulate Menorca 
ever succeeded, the British authorities did encourage the migration of religious minorities 
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(particularly Greek Orthodox), believing (rightly in many cases) that as non-Catholics 
(and immigrants to a new land, rather than natives of an occupied territory) they would be 
more sympathetic to the British government. 
The oppositional positions of the military and civil governments and of Catholic 
and Protestant subjects discouraged any substantial British civilian settlement and 
prevented all but a few mixed marriages. There were, however, a handful of interfaith 
unions. The most sensational and scandalous were those of the three Menorcan nuns who, 
in 1749, under cover of night, escaped the convent of St. Claire (where they had been 
brought up since children) with the help of their ladder-wielding British lovers.  
Margarita Sintes and Margarita Gomila had become engaged to British soldiers: 
Lieutenants George Kelly and Roger Schaak. A third nun, Margarita Alberti, evidently 
tired of a life locked away in a convent, escaped with them. The three nuns came from 
important families in Ciutadella, and when their flight was discovered, their families, 
Menorca’s Clergy, the Vicario General, and the Jurats demanded Governor Blakeney 
punish the soldiers and secure the women’s return to the convent. Blakeney, somewhat 
bemused by the “three rash giddyheaded girls,” and unwilling to force them to return to 
their irate relations or the convent against their will, was nonetheless unsure exactly how 
to handle this religious and cultural tinderbox.862 He permitted two priests to visit them, 
and also removed them from Captain Kelly’s house, putting them under the care of 
“Captain Rollo’s Lady” and ensuring “that at night the doors and Windows of the room 
where the ladies lay should be sealed up in sight of the Clergy,” to prevent the women 
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from carousing with their British beaus.863 Meanwhile the Jurats hounded Blakeney with 
memorials, the women’s families threatened to complain to England, and the clergy 
threatened to complain to Spain and even the Pope.864  
Blakeney’s somewhat tortured response to the Vicario General speaks volumes 
about the vast cultural gulf between governors and the islanders, and the thorny problems 
of British sovereignty in a Catholic realm. Blakeney found it “inconsistent with my Duty 
to his Majesty to expose any of his subjects to such risks, as it was with my own Honor to 
become a remote cause of Barbarity & a tool of persecution for the sake of a religion, 
which by the Treaty of Utrecht, we are bound to permit & and preserve by such mild 
measure as are consistent with British Law.” [I must] “uphold the British Constitution,” 
Blakeney wrote,  
As I have the honor to represent a king who is the refuge for Protestant subjects of 
other Princes, with what face can I deny protection to his own subjects who are 
willing to be receiv’d into that faith. As I was born and bred up in a free country, 
how can I find fault with any one for having fled from bondage and asserted that 
liberty which I have always looked on as the Birthright of all mankind.865   
 
Blakeney’s correspondence with the Vicario General not only reveals the uneasy 
relationship the military government had with the local civil and religious authorities, but 
also the extent to which the language of British subjecthood became important in the 
debate around the women’s future. For Blakeney, “British Law,” the “British 
Constitution” “born and bred in a free country” “liberty” and birthright” were opposed to 
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“barbarity” “persecution” and “bondage.” Although Menorcans had access to many of the 
practical rights of subjecthood, most of them were separated from Blakeney’s conception 
of “Britishness” by a vast sea of cultural and religious ideology.  
The former nuns, however, skillfully accessed the language of both subjecthood 
and Protestantism—although whether through coaching by the Anglican clergy, their 
hosts, their husbands, or their own experiences with the rhetoric of British rule it is 
impossible to tell. In a memorial, Margarita Senta, invoking the “laws of Great Britain,” 
asked the Governor’s protection and requested that she be allowed the “Conversation of 
an English Chaplain for my being instructed in the Protestant religion, delivering from 
the impertinence of the popish clergy, who persecute me by saying scandalous things of 
my husband as contrary to the truth, as they are to the Honor of the English Officers.”866 
Margarita Alberti asked that she be able to “enjoy the same privileges with the Protestant 
Subjects of a British King whose particular glory it is to reign over a free people and not 
slaves.”867 
 The scandal of the escaped nuns, along with years of tensions between governors 
and the clergy, resulted in the religious provisions in the Regulations of 1752. In an effort 
to clarify the unclear spheres of religious, military, and civil sovereignty on the island, 
the regulations stipulated that religious controversies were to be settled by the governor 
in consultation with the Vicario General and other “chief ecclesiastics” without appeal to 
any external authority. Inspired by the sensational story of Sintes, Gomila and Alberti, the 
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regulations required that no woman be allowed to become a nun until she was at least 
twenty-six years old. If it was proven that she had been coerced into the convent, the 
governor was to have the power to discharge her from the convent and dispose of her 
dowry. Additionally, the regulations stipulated that no young people were to leave 
Menorca to be educated in any Catholic country.868 The paternalistic aspects of these last 
two regulations suggest that by controlling the religious futures of the youth of Menorca, 
the British could create a new generation of ideal subjects—free from the “Barbarity, 
bondage and persecution” of the “popish clergy.” 
The Empire Steps in: Regulating Authority in Menorca 
 The religious and ecclesiastical articles of the Regulations of 1752 were part of a 
major program of new laws and rules that would attempt to define the spheres of military, 
civil, and ecclesiastical government in Menorca. The governors who had succeeded 
Kane—Pinfold, Anstruther, and Blakeney, had continued to struggle with the 
ecclesiastical and civil authorities of the island. However, the fact that all of the 
governors were accused (and in the case of Anstruther convicted) of corruption, 
embezzlement, and of imprisoning and dismissing opponents, shows that military-civilian 
relations in Menorca had further deteriorated.869  
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Although each new governor in Menorca received his share of complaints that he 
was interfering in civil government, Anstruther was particularly active in attempting to 
control the Universitats. He terminated and imprisoned five Jurats and syndics, who were 
only liberated after they appealed to the Privy Council in 1739.870 The Jurats also 
complained that Anstruther forced them to sign documents against their will and 
interfered in local elections by replacing nominated candidates with his own contenders, 
many of whom were foreigners.871 The Jurats also complained that he had continually 
refused to reply to any memorials critical of his administration.872  
In his petition to the Privy Council against Anstruther, syndic Juan Mir heavily 
employed the language of subjecthood, comparing “the Blessings of the most mild and 
Indulgent administration” enjoyed by “His majestys other Subjects,” with the tyranny and 
despotism experienced by Menorcans. He claimed that Anstruther applied taxes and 
import duties “in such a Hard Cruel and Unprecedented manner that the like was never 
known or Experienced in any Civil Government,” claiming that “the whole Island is 
brought to the very Brink of Ruin all their valuable Priviledges are broken and the 
Inhabitants Reduced to the utmost state of misery.” Mir asserted that while other British 
subjects enjoyed “the fullest Enjoyment of Liberty and Prosperity,” in contrast,  
The Inhabitants of Minorca are the only part of His majestys Subjects who are 
deprived of those most valuable Priviledges for none of them are in the free 
Enjoyment either Liberty or Property of have any Command over their own 
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Persons or Estates, which are at the absolute Disposall of the said Lieut Governor 
Anstruther who Exercises his Power over them in so very Despotick a manner 
that they are quite overwhelmed with misery and Slavery.”873 
 
Although Mir brought these allegations against Anstruther in 1743, the Privy Council did 
not make its finding for another five years. The Jurats made twenty-five complaints in 
all, many of them submitted in the Catalan dialect Minorqui, without translation. The 
council complained that “the Papers were so numerous and the Persons so few who were 
thoroughly acquainted with the Language that a great length of time was taken up before 
this could be done.”874 Finally they asked Mir to choose the most pressing complaints. In 
1748 the Privy Council found that Anstruther “acted in an Arbitrary and unwarrantable 
Manner, to the great Injury and Oppression of many of Your Majestys Subjects.”875 The 
committee found that not only would the complaints be grounds for Anstruther’s 
dismissal were he still in office, but that he should make reparations to all who had “been 
injured by him in their Persons or Propertys,” and that he should cover the costs of the 
prosecution of the complaint before the Privy Council. Finally, “for the preventing any 
proceedings of the like nature for the future,” they proposed that finally, after years of 
silence and false starts, “some Regulations…be made for the better guidance and 
Conduct of your Governors of the said Island.”876  
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The “Regulations of 1752”  
A committee tasked with drafting regulations for Menorca finally made its report 
in 1752. They argued that governors should respect the island’s fueros, should not 
interfere with the civil government and procedures of the Jurats, and must not restrict the 
islanders rights to make petitions to the king. They also suggested that the governor 
himself (and not simply the Lieutenant-Governor) should live in Menorca. More 
surprisingly, they suggested that a civil governor should be appointed to correspond with 
the Jurats, and that a court of appeals should be established on the island.  
These proposals, however, were not yet decrees. However, they paved the way for 
the first attempt in forty years to define the sphere of civil government. The regulations 
that followed limited the governor’s power to intervene in the economic life of the island, 
gave the Jurats the power to appropriate housing for the troops, distribute wood and meat 
to the garrison, and enforce the brandy licensing system. They forbade the governor from 
engaging in trade, and prohibited him from preventing Menorcans from leaving the 
island.877  
From Menorca, Governor Blakeney complained mightily about the negative 
consequences these restrictions had on his authority, as well as the increased power the 
Universitats had in the colony. Blakeney claimed that the new powers of the Jurats had 
resulted in a paucity of meat, insufficient wood for the garrison, irregular prices for wine 
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and corn, and a major decrease of foreign imports.878  While Mir and the Jurats had used 
the language of “subjecthood,” “tyranny” and “despotism” to argue that their rights were 
being infringed, Blakeney attempted to use the islanders’ own cherished fueros to argue 
for his gubernatorial prerogative.  He cited a 1666 decree Spanish decree which held that 
while the Universitats were charged with providing for the island, the “governor was 
charged to see everything that was for the common good, duly executed.”879  
Blakeney claimed that in addition to the economic problems the Regulations of 
1752 caused, they also fueled a power struggle between the Universitats of Mahon and 
Ciutadella. During his tenure as Lieutenant Governor (and few years as governor) Kane 
had decreased the power of Ciutadella, the traditional seat of Menorcan power, and home 
of Menorcan elites. With the new restrictions on gubernatorial power, the Universitat of 
Ciutadella took the opportunity to try to win back their power over the civil 
administration of the island. Blakeney claimed that “Kane and his predecessors 
constantly endeavored to prevent either of the universities from exercising by act of 
superiority” but that the “power given to the Jurats has so intoxicated them” that they 
were vying for power among themselves.880 
Despite his reduced control, Blakeney did arrest and imprison two people for 
assaulting army officers. Although each had been tried and found guilty by the 
Universitat of Mahon, they had only been fined for the offence, a punishment that 
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Blakeney found to be insufficient. He argued that “it is of the greatest consequence not to 
suffer offenders of this kind to escape with a slight pecuniary Punishment.” He claimed 
that because “their Judges are natives,” they were “inclined to shed great partiality to 
their countrymen.” Therefore, Blakeney maintained, his interference in the judicial 
process was warranted because it was “highly necessary to keep up a proper care and 
respect for his majesty’s officers.”881 According to Blakeney, giving control of civil 
prosecution over to the local government resulted in unjust leniency on fellow 
Menorcans, and disrespect to the crown—a perspective that echoed the longstanding 
refrain that Menorcans were not loyal subjects.  
In response to Blakeney’s complaints, the Privy Council suggested that the rules 
be clarified:  
It appears to them that the confusion which has arisen in the Island is occasioned 
by the governor, and the Magistrates having mutually misconceived your 
majesty’s said regulations which…were intended to redress their former 
complaints, not by divesting either their Party of the Powers properly belonging to 
them, but by establishing such a check and control as might prevent abuses in 
carrying into execution those powers with which they are respectively vested.882  
 
In fact, the central problem was that it had never been clear which powers belonged to 
each party. For forty years, the governor and Jurats had clashed and compromised, but 
the first codified regulations seemed only to make the competition and complaints more 
intense. The Privy Council scrambled to amend the regulations, eventually deciding to 
retract them altogether, putting in their place a new and more severe measure: the 
Regulations of 1753. 
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The Regulations of 1753 
Illustrative of the British frustrations with Menorca was Lord Tyrawley's 
comments and suggestions on the draft of the 1753 regulations. Tyrawley had been the 
governor of Menorca since 1747, but in the tradition of what Desmond Gregory terms 
“Absentee recipients of Whig political patronage,”883 he had not set foot on the island 
since he served there as a colonel between 1713 and 1715. As the ministry attempted to 
draft new regulations for Menorca’s government, Tyrawley was asked to provide his 
comments and suggestions on the proposal.884 In his notes on the planned regulations, he 
set about crafting a program in which as governor he would have “absolute authority.”  “I 
must be left at my full Liberty,” he wrote, “and not leave it in the power of the Jurats 
there to produce Orders and Regulations”885  
The document is an interesting one. Tyrawley was the only man appointed 
governor who had any experience in Menorca before his appointment, and his attitude 
toward the Menorcans illustrates the extent to which he believed that they were not 
desirable subjects, but rather a “rabble of beggars and banditti” who needed to be 
subdued. 886 His suggestions for the regulations are rife with crossed out sections, 
insertions, and suggestions that toggle between his disdain for Menorcans, his certitude 
that the island was in need of an absolute ruler so that “quiet and proper Obedience may 
be restored in the Island,” and his understanding that his suggestions should be moderated 
by a sense of the goodwill and “mild government” of British rule. He struck out the 
                                                
883 Gregory, Minorca, 35. 
884 Tyrawley to Fox, 23 May 1753, BL Add MS 23638 ff. 95-116. 
885 Tyrawley to Fox, 23 May 1753, BL Add MS 23638 f. 102. 
886 Tyrawley to Fox, 23 May 1753, BL Add MS 23638 f. 102. 
  307 
phrase “the minorqueens must be govern’d by […] a severe hand; I would say a rod of 
Iron,” arguing instead that, used as they were to military rule and “hearing of no other, 
amongst their neighbours,” Menorcans “must be ruled by Principles some thing of the 
same nature.”887 His argument reveals much about how British colonial administrators 
viewed their Menorcan subjects. These subjects were not the “freeborn Englishmen” who 
would come to characterize so many of the debates about the rights and privileges of 
native-born subjects. After forty years of British rule, many Menorcans had indeed been 
born under “the mild government” of the British crown. However, their status as 
Catholics, and their adversarial relationship with colonial governors over the proper 
spheres of power, meant, according to some administrators, that they could not claim the 
liberties of British subjects but must instead be ruled with “a rod of iron.” Tyrawley also 
suggested that the governor be given power to dismiss or disqualify Jurats from holding 
office, as well as full power over the civil branch of government. He argued that the 
governor should be afforded the title of first magistrate—and be the chief justice in all 
civil cases.888  
Tyrawley, like so many governors before him, also took on the Treaty of Utrecht, 
noting that it made no mention of any “rights, privileges or immunities” and arguing 
further that although Menorcan petitions and representations often made reference to the 
Duke of Argyll’s promises to protect their fueros, he could find no record of that promise 
in the archives. The Duke had indeed made such a promise in 1712, in response to 
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Menorcan representations that General Stanhope had articulated that promise four years 
earlier.889 Tyrawley went on to argue that even if Argyll had made such a promise, 
because Menorca had been taken in the name of Charles III of Spain any such promises 
were invalid under British rule.890  
In the end, the Regulations of 1753 did indeed greatly strengthen the governor’s 
authority. They gave him the power to intervene in the economic decisions that had once 
been the prerogative of the Universitats, and gave him control over the lucrative brandy 
licensing and anchorage taxes.891 The regulations were also followed by a set of 
instructions to the governor. According to these instructions, the governor was to remind 
the Jurats of the economic benefits of British rule, and to “Take all proper care to 
acquaint our said Subjects with the terms of the 11th article of the treaty conducted at 
Utrecht on the 13th of July 1713 and as they are not entitled to any other privileges than 
what are therein specified.”892 Further, in order to avoid “frivolous and vexatious 
representations’ to the Privy Council,” Menorcan grievances could only be made by 
“persons of reputation in the island.”893  
Neither these new instructions, nor the regulations, however, were in effect for 
long. Tyrawley never made it to Menorca, and the beleaguered Blakeney was left to carry 
out these orders, causing outrage among the Jurats. Although they sent syndics to 
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London to protest, the Privy Council dismissed the Jurats’ complaints. Just three years 
after the regulations were promulgated, however, the French captured the island, cutting 
short Britain’s latest attempt at imperial regulation in Menorca.   
NEGOTIATING SUBJECTHOOD 
Despite struggles over the spheres of military, civil, and ecclesiastical 
government, and the tight control military governors exercised over the civilian 
populations of Gibraltar and Menorca, the inhabitants of both colonies quickly learned to 
navigate the overlapping and sometimes unclear spheres of power by carefully 
negotiating what it meant to be (and in some cases not to be) a British subject. Many used 
the language of British law and subjecthood to assert their rights and to seek justice—
with varying degrees of success.  
In a striking parallel to the Fábrigas case that established the right of Menorcans 
to bring suits in English courts, in 1778 Bernat Ferra petitioned Governor Murray, asking 
that Lieutenant John Lloyd be “tried by the Laws of England,” for the rape of Bernat’s 
daughter, Francina. ⁠894 Lloyd and his alleged accomplices had been court-martialed in 
Menorca for the rape but were found innocent. The Ferras hoped to seek justice in the 
English civil courts, arguing that because the court had determined in the Fábrigas case 
that “Minorquins being subjects of the British Crown, have a right to the protection and 
benefit of the Laws of England,” Francina’s case should be heard in England. ⁠895 After 
considering his petition, however, England’s Attorney and Solicitor Generals decreed that 
                                                
894 Petition of Bernat Ferra, TNA CO 174/12 f. 15.  
895 Petition of Bernat Ferra, TNA CO 174/12 f. 16.  
  310 
“the offence charged upon Lieutenant Lloyd was properly triable by a Court Martial,” 
and that “the 11th Section of the Articles of War for apprehending offenders, and 
delivering them over to the civil or Magistrate do not extend to Minorca but are confined 
and apply only to places where the Judicature of England obtains.” ⁠896 
As David Donaldson points out, although courts martial in Menorca often found 
British soldiers guilty of the theft, assault, and murder of male Menorcans, there is no 
record of any successful prosecution of a charge of rape—a fact that is hardly surprising 
for this period. ⁠897 As in the metropole, the protection of women had limited scope. In 
Gibraltar and Menorca, the protections of subjecthood were more often extended to those 
inhabitants who could help protect and provision the garrison, or who, as in the case of 
three runaway nuns, supported British conceptions of cultural or religious justice and 
allegiance. However, those rights of subjecthood were not extended to women who 
brought cases against British soldiers but did not themselves provide direct support to the 
garrison. Rarely were those rights extended to women whose cases challenged, rather 
than supported British notions of military order or religious superiority. 
In Menorca, convoluted, inconsistent, or contradictory legal arguments were often 
used to deny any rights that might be too troublesome to uphold. While as a British 
subject, Fábrigas had the right to take the governor to court in England, in Ferra’s case, 
lower-ranking army men were safe from prosecution because “the Judicature of England” 
suddenly no longer seemed to extend to Menorca.  In Gibraltar, contradictions usually ran 
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in the other direction—to grant rights to inhabitants who were not, in fact, subjects. The 
small civilian population of Gibraltar had more frequent contact with the garrison, and a 
much higher percentage of civilian inhabitants were involved in supporting or sustaining 
Britain’s military presence. Despite frequent threats to eject foreigners from the town, or 
deny residents lands or passes, there were also myriad creative workarounds that would 
enable foreign-born and non-Protestant inhabitants to claim some of the rights technically 
reserved for Protestant subjects. 
As Hannah Weiss Muller points out, although military governors were 
periodically concerned that foreign spies might be lurking within the garrison, inclusive 
attitudes towards non-Britons was more common.898 For example, in 1756, with the 
threat of attack imminent, the governor ordered that “All Genoese and other foreigners 
now in this town and garrison,” report to the secretary’s office to give their names and 
take an oath of fidelity to the King. Any foreigner who did not comply would be “turned 
out of the Town.” The oath required that the takers “profess and declare” themselves “to 
be an Inhabitant of Gibraltar, and a Subject of His Britannick Majesty,” a statement, that, 
in the case of any “Genoese” or “other foreigner” oath-taker, was necessarily untrue. 
Despite the contradictions these oaths might create, they were common in Gibraltar as a 
quick and pragmatic way that both governors and inhabitants could evade official rules 
about subjecthood in a colony where so few inhabitants were native-born or Protestant. 
With such oaths, individuals might obtain the land grants, passes, fishing licenses, and a 
whole host of other privileges officially reserved for “British protestants” or “natural born 
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subjects. ” These oaths provided a procedure by which the governor of Gibraltar could 
work with the actual inhabitants of Gibraltar while still making concessions to the 
principle of the “ideal” natural-born-British-protestant-subjects who were too few in 
number to effectively support the garrison or supply the colony the alone. 899 Numerous 
garrison inhabitants, understanding the advantages of such oaths, were quick to invoke 
their allegiance to the King and to assert their corresponding entitlement to protection.  
Active participation in this support, especially during wartime, could also turn 
those considered potentially subversive enemies into an integral and loyal part of the 
garrison. Although a 1779 proclamation instructed that “all male Inhabitants, of whatever 
Country and Class, who are not willing to take up Arms, or perform such office as shall 
be requir’d in defence of this Fortress,” should immediately depart the Rock with their 
families, in the next breath it promised that those willing to assist, of whatever “country 
and class,” would be allowed to stay and were instructed to begin collecting provisions 
for the long siege ahead.900  
Although governors were wary of spies in the garrison and town, and often gave 
orders to register and monitor foreigners, in some instances, the fact that these 
“foreigners” lived, worked and had families in Gibraltar made them more trustworthy 
than the British soldiers who were far from home. During the 1727 siege, for example, a 
group of Genoese men formed to monitor and protect the border with Spain after 
commanders realized that British soldiers were likely to desert if left in alone in far-flung 
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outposts. After the siege, this group was dubbed the “Genoese Guard,” and was made up 
of Genoese boys and men of the town until it was disbanded in 1775.901 
Despite the fact that governors were often willing to confer the practical rights of 
subjecthood on many of the Rock’s inhabitants, they also had enormous latitude to 
bestow or withhold these privileges from any inhabitants. In fact, the governor had the 
right to “expel from the fortress all persons without regard to nationality whom he did not 
think fit to permit to remain”—a right governors exercised in both war and peace.902 For 
all inhabitants of Gibraltar, but especially for those not born in British territory, “rights 
and privileges” were more akin to favors granted at the governor’s pleasure.  
Despite the fact that many of the Rock’s inhabitants were foreign born, from the 
very beginning of British rule there were some inhabitants who were born on the Rock 
and therefore undeniably British subjects—a population that would continue to rise as the 
civilian population became increasingly established. As this population grew, inhabitants 
of Gibraltar began to assert their rights as British subjects in efforts to counter the 
capricious decrees of the colony’s governors.  
Some of the first British subjects born on the Rock were members of the Romero 
and de la Rosa families. These families were among the few residents who had stayed in 
Gibraltar after the Spanish evacuation. At that time, General Elliott had published a 
proclamation declaring that “all such Spaniards as should choose to remain in the said 
Town under obedience to the crown of Great Britain should be deemed British Subjects, 
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and be protected & privileged as such in their Persons & Propertys.” In July 1752, Peter 
Romero and John de la Rosa wrote a petition on behalf on themselves and their families. 
The governor had limited the wine, rum, and tobacco trade to British merchants in 1751, 
and then in July 1752 he had signed a contract with James Read, John Lowes, Leeds 
Booth, and Richard Holride, giving them a monopoly on the trade for three years.903 Four 
days after the governor published news of the contract, Romero and de la Rosa sent a 
petition to London claiming that they should be considered British subjects and thus be 
entitled to a share in the wine rum and tobacco trade that Bland had recently restricted to 
British merchants and subjects.904 
In their petition, Romero and de la Rosa argued that their fathers had “remained in 
Gibraltar; under Obedience to the Crown of great Britain & were ever after esteemed 
British Subjects, having thereby shaken off their Allegiance to the Crown of Spain.” The 
two families were the last remaining of the old Spanish Inhabitants, and they argued that 
they owned “no Soverign but His Britannick Majesty,” and that they had no “other Prince 
from whom to seek Protection.” They therefore desired “to be looked upon as British 
Subjects & to enjoy equal Protection and Privileges with the rest of his Majest’s British 
Subjects in the said Garrison & Town.”905 
In deciding their case, the Attorney and Solicitor Generals were asked for their 
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legal opinion on the specific status of subjects in Gibraltar. They were to decide whether 
Romero and de la Rosa, who were “natives and inhabitants” of the town and garrison of 
Gibraltar, could be denied opportunities for trade or contract, or whether they were 
“intitled to the Privileges of British Subjects at Gibraltar.”906 The ensuing report by the 
Attorney and Solicitor Generals stated that Romero and de la Rosa, having been born 
within the British Dominions and of parents living “under Obedience to the Crown of 
Great Britain,” were “as such are entitled to all the Priviledges of natural born Subjects at 
Gibraltar.” They affirmed that the two were indeed natural born subjects and thereby 
entitled to the privileges associated British subjecthood.907  
The fact that the governor might have ever denied Romero and de la Rosa a 
contract on the basis of their subject status seems puzzling at first glance. Born in 
Gibraltar, they were thus legally British subjects. Further, by the 1750s, schemes to 
attract significant numbers of British merchants had largely fallen away and many 
residents of Gibraltar who were deemed only to be “inhabitants” had begun to receive 
many of the privileges of subjecthood. It was not uncommon, however, for British 
administrators to exercise contradictory interpretations of subjecthood for their own ends. 
Eager to provision the garrison, the Vice Admiralty Court might provide Mediterranean 
passes to a wide variety of inhabitants (and sometimes those who might not even reside 
in Gibraltar). On the other hand, the governor’s choice to contract with one group of 
merchants over another, might lead him to redefine the boundaries of British subjecthood 
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more narrowly.  
CONCLUSION 
British rule over the civilian populations of their Mediterranean colonies was 
uneven, contested, and often unsuccessful. Religious conflicts, overlapping and unclear 
spheres of power, the undecided and often ad-hoc status of the inhabitants of these 
colonies as British subjects, along with the inability of British law to define the diverse 
residents created a fraught political situation in the colonies. The undefined spheres of 
civil and military power fueled disputes between inhabitants and military authorities, and 
throughout the eighteenth century, inhabitants of Gibraltar and Menorca would have 
difficult relationships with their respective governors.  
These Mediterranean colonies were above all military bases, key to controlling 
trade and engaging in warfare in the Mediterranean. In general, authorities in London 
were less interested in governing the relatively small civilian populations than in the 
colonies’ strategic value. While the diverse community in Gibraltar would slowly 
develop relatively cooperative relations with the British authorities, in Menorca, deep-
seated religious antagonism and overlapping spheres of power on the island led to an 
adversarial relationship in which British sovereignty over civil matters was hotly 
contested. Although subjecthood might provide islanders with rights they could employ 
for their own benefit, the British authorities and islanders remained mutually suspicious. 
Menorcans brought significant cases against five of the six lieutenant-governors in the 
eighteenth century, and their syndics spent months and even years in London carefully 
preparing cases to put before the Privy Council. The convoluted and contentious legal 
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pluralism of the island created an environment in which the British were never able to 
forge a deep-rooted allegiance from their subjects in Menorca.  
Perhaps because Gibraltar did not suffer from the same complications of legal 
pluralism, and because its population consisted mostly of immigrants attracted to the 
Rock by new opportunities rather than natives occupied by a foreign power, British 
authorities managed to forge stronger (although more legally tenuous) bonds with 
civilians in Gibraltar. When the previous Spanish population fled the Rock, those who 
repopulated it were neither “natives of Gibraltar” nor born on British territory. Although 
governors of Gibraltar had a long history of controlling who was and who was not 
allowed in the colony, their decisions about who might be afforded the protections of 
subjecthood were often capricious (or perhaps calculating) and often based on 
circumstance rather than principle.  
Despite the dominance of military rule, inhabitants’ right to bring their most 
grievous complaints before their sovereign was both an affirmation and a practice of their 
subjecthood. In appeals, memorials, and petitions to the governors and Privy Council, the 
inhabitants of the Mediterranean colonies defined the boundaries of subjecthood and 
allegiance to assert their rights and navigate the overlapping spheres of power that 
formed British imperial rule. Inhabitants and authorities navigated these overlapping 
spheres of power by instituting malleable policies, undertaking local diplomacies, 
sending appeals to London, and by using the language of subjecthood to assert and 
negotiate civilian rights and military authority.  
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Afterword. “To the shores of Tripoli”: British Subjecthood and the 
British Mediterranean in the Age of the New American Republic and 
the Napoleonic Wars 
After the American Revolution, seafaring citizens of the new American republic 
were confronted with a vexing problem: the loss of the protections of British subjecthood, 
and, paradoxically, stubbornly lingering obligations to the British crown. No longer 
protected by Mediterranean passes, American sailors were at risk of capture.908 Although 
Americans sought to keep the protection of British Mediterranean passes as they 
negotiated the Treaty of Paris, Britain declined, resuming the “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
policy it had pursued against its European competitors in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. North African privateers, Britain hoped, might be useful allies in thwarting the 
Americans’ goal of free trade in the Mediterranean. As increasing numbers of American 
sailors were captured and enslaved, the new United States government was confronted by 
the important, but often-overlooked role British diplomacy with the Maghreb played in 
the safety of British subjects at sea. Although American politicians thought of the 
Barbary corsairs as “petty tyrants”—less important to America’s foreign policy than 
conflicts with France or Britain—it quickly became clear that without British protection, 
American diplomacy with North Africa would have to become a serious item on the new 
republic’s international agenda.909 
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In fact, Moroccan sultan Sidi Muhammad was the first head of state to formally 
recognize the United States as a sovereign nation.910 In 1778, he contacted Thomas 
Jefferson with a request for a peace and trade agreement between the two nations. In 
1786 Jefferson, John Adams, and Sidi Muhammad signed the “Treaty of Friendship 
between the United States and Morocco”—a document similar to Morocco’s treaties with 
Britain.911 American ships and sailors would now be protected from Moroccan 
privateers—much as they had been before the Revolution. The Ottoman Regencies, 
however, were unwilling to extend trade agreements or Mediterranean passes to the new 
country without collecting considerable “tribute”—yearly sums of money that the tiny 
federal budget provided for by the Articles of Confederation could not hope to cover.912 
No longer British subjects, American sailors were now vulnerable to captivity in the 
Maghreb, and in the decades following American independence, hundreds of American 
sailors were captured by North African privateers—causing a crisis for American trade 
with Europe and the Mediterranean.913  
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Although American sailors had lost their protection against Barbary corsairs, the 
durability of their obligations to the crown made subjecthood a double-edged sword for 
the young republic and its seafaring citizens. Americans might no longer have the rights 
and protections of subjecthood, but the British Navy was reluctant to release them from 
their obligations as British subjects. For Americans, the Revolution had fundamentally 
changed the relationship between the individual and the state. Subjecthood was perpetual, 
while citizenship was voluntary.914 Under English law, subjecthood was inviolable: it 
could not be “forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of time, place or 
circumstance.” Technically, every person born within the sovereign’s realms would be 
considered his subject forever.915 Between 1793 and 1812, the British impressed more 
than ten thousand American citizens into the Royal Navy, claiming that because they 
were born in British territory, they were British subjects.916 Sailors born on American soil 
were exempt from impressment, but those born in Ireland, Scotland, England or Wales 
were still considered British subjects—even if they were naturalized as American 
citizens. When in 1790 Congress widened naturalization to any “free white alien” who 
could prove that he was “a person of good character,” would take an oath, and had been a 
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resident for two years in the United States, the opportunities for conflict between these 
new American citizens and British press gangs increased.917  
 To avoid impressment, American mariners would have to carry documents 
proving their place of birth. Immigrants, or those without proper documentation, would 
have to take their chances. To make matters pricklier, as British subjects began to forge, 
steal, or falsify such documents, British naval officers became increasingly skeptical of 
the validity of any papers sailors might present.918 As the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars raged across Europe and the Mediterranean, the British Navy had even 
greater impetus to impress sailors from American vessels, and even less inducement to 
fret over documents or verify sailors’ nationality. 
American citizens, however, did not always eschew their British subjecthood 
altogether. Like so many who sailed the Mediterranean before them, Americans captured 
by North African corsairs might attempt to cross the lines of nationality or allegiance. 
American citizens—who might vociferously protest their citizenship when faced with the 
British press gang—might just as vociferously claim British subjecthood in order to be 
redeemed from captivity. In 1785 for example, mariners from the American ship the 
Dauphin were captured and enslaved at Algiers. Eleven of the sailors petitioned King 
George for their release, claiming that they had been born in British territory and were 
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thus British subjects.919 One of these men, James Leander Cathcart, was born in Ireland, 
came to the American colonies as a boy, served in the Continental Navy during the 
Revolution, and was even taken as a British prisoner of war. 920 In 1794 he wrote from 
Algiers to William Wilberforce asking for help raising money for his ransom. In his letter 
to the famous British abolitionist, Cathcart claimed that he longed to return to his “long 
lamented Patria.”921 When he was finally released in 1796, however, it was through the 
intercession of American envoys, and Cathcart was thereafter appointed American consul 
at Tunis and Tripoli.922  
In 1796, The Untied States finally signed treaties with Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, 
agreeing to pay large sums each year in order to obtain the Mediterranean passes that 
would protect their ships and citizens.923 The peace would not, however, last long. 
Unhappy with the provisions of the treaty and America’s late payments, in 1800 the 
Pasha of Tripoli demanded that the United States increase their tribute payments, or else 
face a declaration of war and attacks on American shipping. Jefferson hoped to tip the 
diplomatic negotiations in America’s favor—much as the British Navy often had in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—with a display of naval power, but without 
resorting to outright violence. He sent a squadron to the Mediterranean, hopeful that it 
might protect American merchant shipping and impress Tripoli with the might of the 
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American Navy. The plan, however, was not a success, and naval skirmishes, battles, and 
blockades continued on and off for years. After a full-scale bombardment, aided by Arab 
troops loyal to the Pasha’s brother, America and Tripoli finally signed a treaty in 1805. 
After five years of conflict, the United States agreed to pay a sum that was only ten per-
cent of the tribute the Pasha had originally demanded.924  
Just as Americans defeated Tripoli and anticipated free trade with the 
Mediterranean, the escalating conflict between Britain and France put American shipping 
and sailors in danger. Britain’s ongoing wars with France had posed both new trading 
challenges and opportunities for the young nation. On one hand, as a neutral nation, 
America might take up trade that British and French ships had abandoned. In the fifteen 
years between 1792 and 1807, American exports increased by over 500 percent.925 By 
1812, America would have the second largest merchant fleet in the world, and American 
ships and goods reached into the Baltic Sea and the Levant.926 On the other hand, the 
rival European powers began to impose new restrictions on ships of neutral counties. 
When Napoleon decreed a continental blockade of Europe, banning British merchandise, 
England replied with a series of Orders in Council, which forbade trade with any French-
held ports. Any violation of these restrictions could put American ships at risk of search, 
seizure, or attack.927  
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American mariners also still sailed in fear of the British press gang, and tension 
between America and Britain was on the rise. The attack on the American USS 
Chesapeake by the British Leopold would bring the two nations one step closer to war. In 
June 1807, the Chesapeake set sail from Norfolk, Virginia for the Mediterranean. The 
Chesapeake had been the flagship of the Mediterranean squadron since 1801, and had 
taken part in operations against Tripoli and the other Ottoman Regencies. In 1807, it was 
headed for a two-year assignment in the Mediterranean where it would provide escort for 
American merchant ships, and would help to “remind the Barbary pirates any raids on 
American shipping would be met by overwhelming force.”928 Before the Chesapeake 
departed, the British Navy complained that five deserters had enlisted aboard the 
American ship. After investigating the issue, Captain James Barron determined that at 
least three of the deserters were in fact American citizens who had been pressed into 
Royal Navy service. Therefore, he refused to turn them over to British authorities.929 As 
the Chesapeake came into the open sea, however, the British ship the Leopold, 
confronted her and ordered that the captain submit to a search for British deserters. When 
Barron refused, the Leopold fired on the American ship, killing three sailors and 
wounding eighteen before boarding the Chesapeake and removing four crew members 
who would be tried for desertion from the British Navy.930  
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The so-called “Chesapeake affair” outraged the American public, and fueled the 
simmering tensions that would lead to the war of 1812 five years later. With its flagship 
badly damaged, America would have to withdraw its squadron entirely from the 
Mediterranean. In his annual message to congress Jefferson opined that, “under this new 
law of the ocean our trade on the Mediterranean has been swept away by seizures and 
condemnations.” In this case, these “seizures and condemnations” that interrupted the 
Mediterranean trade were made not by North African privateers, but instead by the 
British Navy.931  
Britain and America finally went to war in 1812—fueled in part by British 
impressment of American citizens, British restrictions on American trade, and the 
harassment of American ships such as the Chesapeake. Alan Taylor argues that the War 
of 1812 “pivoted on the contentious boundary between the king’s subject and the 
republic’s citizen.”932 Taylor argues that by “seizing supposed subjects from merchant 
ships, the Royal Navy threatened to reduce American sailors and commerce to a quasi-
colonial status.”933 By engaging in war with the British, Americans would not only assert 
their independence, but also protect their citizenship.  
 While the American Navy was caught up in (and blockaded by) the war, the 
Ottoman Regencies—Algiers in particular—took the opportunity to prey on unprotected 
American shipping and to pressure the United States to increase their tribute payments. 
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The British—still close allies of the Barbary States—were also complicit in this plan: an 
1812 letter from London to Algiers assured the Dey of British support against the 
“enemies of Great Britain.”934 When Britain and America finally came together to 
negotiate a peace in 1815, the talks stalled around the issue of impressment. In the end, 
the Treaty of Ghent largely returned the British-American maritime relationship to the 
status quo. The two countries reached no agreement about the subjecthood of American 
sailors, or British constraints on American trade. One week after it was ratified however, 
Congress declared war on Algiers. Hoping to secure a lasting and satisfactory peace in 
North Africa, they sent squadrons to force all three Ottoman Regencies to sign treaties 
that would require neither tribute nor ransom to free American captives. Because of the 
enormous growth of the navy during the war of 1812, the Regencies were quickly 
convinced. Although America had not been able to jettison the obligations of British 
subjecthood, they were able to acquire new protections for American citizenship with 
North African states.  
Definitions of British subjecthood born in the eighteenth-century Mediterranean 
continued to reverberate into the early nineteenth century, and would become a central 
problem for the early American republic. James Cathcart described himself and his 
fellow American captives in Algiers as “victims of independence.”935 Americans, who 
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were now in competition with British trade, would no longer be protected as British 
subjects by Mediterranean passes. With independence came the loss of American sailors’ 
protection as British subjects. While in the eighteenth century, subjecthood might be 
expanded to residents of the Mediterranean who would help provision the garrisons at 
Gibraltar and Menorca, it could also contract, in order to control former subjects who 
were now Britain’s commercial competitors.  
For most “new subjects” in the British Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, 
“British subjecthood” was instrumental, and not connected with wider ideas about culture 
or identity. In a region with few native-born Britons, few British administrators, and only 
tiny British territories, “British Subjecthood” had little cultural significance to either 
groups or individuals. When the British lost the North American colonies, the number of 
British subjects who might plausibly be considered white, Protestant, or free, dropped 
precipitously. New conceptions of subjecthood and empire were taking shape. In 
America, citizenship was hard won and culturally meaningful, if still complex and 
mutable. America’s victories over Tripoli in 1807, for example, might inspire patriotic 
songs, poems and plays. The impressment of American citizens by the Royal Navy might 
raise patriotic outrage. In the tentative and formative years of the fledgling republic, 
however, captives like James Cathcart would still find it useful to slide between the 
unstable categories of subject and citizen for their own protection or freedom. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the eighteenth century was a time of enormous 
change for the British Empire and for the practice of British subjecthood. With the loss of 
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the American colonies, and the “swing to the east,” the British Empire, as Kathleen 
Wilson puts it, “once idealized as the domain of free white British peoples…had become 
the imperium of palpably alien colonial subjects.”936 “Britishness” might be increasingly 
limited by race and geography, but by 1783, British subjects lived all over the globe and 
were of many cultures, races, and religions. The American War “provided irrefutable 
evidence,” Wilson argues, “that the British empire was comprised not just of free British 
subjects but of large numbers of alien people, incorporated into the empire by conquest, 
not consent.”937 
Since the early eighteenth century, however, the British Mediterranean, had been 
neither been composed of white settler colonies, nor a territorial possession in which 
“large numbers of alien people,” were incorporated into the empire by conquest. Instead, 
British power in the Mediterranean was seaborne and mobile. British sovereignty in the 
region was shaped by the Treaty of Utrecht, restricted by the presence of other powerful 
states, and dependent on good diplomatic relations with North Africa. This British 
Mediterranean was peopled and administered by only a scattered population of native-
born Britons and managed only by regular correspondence between merchants and 
consuls, ambassadors and admirals, governors and the ministry in London, and by the 
circulation of ships, goods, people and documents. Instead of white settler colonists, it 
was populated by linguistically and culturally diverse people—Menorcans and 
Moroccans, Genoese and Greeks, Jews, Catholics, Muslims and Christians of many sects 
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and of many nations. 
The British Mediterranean, then, did not fit comfortably into any contemporary 
conception of the British Empire. The local negotiations, compromises and 
improvisations practiced in the Mediterranean demonstrate not only a different model of 
British sovereignty and subjecthood, but also reveal how a diverse population—largely 
uninterested in “Britishness,” “national identity” or the ideals of empire—engaged with 
British power to safely navigate eighteenth century imperial warfare and expansion. The 
looming crisis of empire and identity that would be brought on by the territorial gains of 
the Seven Years’ War and the territorial losses of the American Revolution, was not clear 
to the Mediterranean peoples who lived in its impending shadow. Despite the ongoing 
conflicts with military governors, religious antagonisms and civil abuses, these subject 
“aliens” were not protected only by treaties. They were, in fact, essential to British naval 
expansion and war. Truly subjects at sea, they were not only subject to British 
sovereignty, but, through the malleable practices of British subjecthood, they helped to 
extend British sovereignty into a diverse and contested maritime realm. By extending 
rights and protections to a diverse and mobile population, the British created an empire of 
people, rather than territory—an empire of accommodation, collaboration and creative 
diplomacy, rather than sheer conquest. As for themselves, the “alien subjects” of the 
Mediterranean saw opportunities to both collaborate with and subvert British power. And 
to don, shed and transform British subjecthood.  
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